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INFORMATION DISCLOSURE AND BANKING SECTOR  
PERFORMANCE AND STABILITY 
PERIHAN IREN 
ABSTRACT 
 
Over the last decade, financial and capital markets have grown very rapidly and 
the markets have become more complex as a result of increased used of derivative 
securities. The recent subprime crisis has intensified the debate regarding the need for 
greater transparency. The purpose of this study is to contribute to this debate by 
examining the relationship between the quantity and quality of information disclosure 
regarding a bank’s securitization and credit derivative activities and the subsequent 
impact on bank performance and stability.  
The results show a significant relationship between the quality/quantity of 
disclosure and bank performance/stability. When information on securitization and credit 
derivative activities are disclosed on call reports and annual reports, performance/stability 
initially decreases. After a bank establishes certain setup, equipment, personnel and 
expertise on these activities, performance/stability starts to increase.  
The results also show that increases in disclosure/activity have an asymmetrical 
impact on bank performance and stability compared to decreases in disclosure; bank 
performance measures are more sensitive to disclosure than stability measures; the 
financial markets are more sensitive to changes in quantitative measures of 
disclosure/activity compared to qualitative measures; and the financial markets show the 
greatest reaction to changes in the level of disclosure/activity by money center banks, 
 iv
followed by regional banks. The empirical results show that even when the level of 
financial activity had not changed, an increase in the detail describing the activity was 
followed by a significant reaction in the market. Examining the bank’s annual report, it 
appears that an extensive discussion of their securitization and credit derivatives activities 
tends to increase stock price volatility,  
Analysis of the effects of the quality of disclosure shows that low quality 
information decreases performance but has no effect on stability. Also, the results show 
that highly transparent banks are riskier than their less transparent peers. A comparison of 
troubled and healthy banks in terms of their information disclosure surprisingly reveals 
that troubled banks are more transparent than healthy banks. Greater disclosure regarding 
their securitization and credit derivative activities submitted on regulatory reports, as well 
as extensive coverage of credit derivatives in annual reports, increases the probability of 
an institution being classified as a “troubled” bank.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Motivation of the Study 
“… regulation can serve to strengthen market discipline, for example, by mandating a 
transparent disclosure regime for financial firms.”    Ben Bernanke, Fed Chairman 
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium in 
Jackson Hole, Wyoming, 2008 
 
Commercial banks are often viewed as being opaque due to information 
asymmetries but as the above quote suggests, expanded financial disclosure can strength 
market discipline and complement supervisory regulation. However, the positive effects 
of disclosure may yield diminishing marginal benefits and ultimately negative returns. 
Thus it is useful to think of an optimum level of public information disclosure. If too 
much complex information is provided, even a financially sound bank could fail due to 
irrational depositor panic and massive deposit withdrawals. For example, a bank’s 
CAMELS rating or the amount that it borrows through the FED’s discount window, are 
purposely not made public in order not to destabilize financial markets. On the other 
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hand, to ensure proper discipline and to channel capital to its most productive use the 
market needs to have relevant, correct and timely information about the risk and returns 
profile of publicly traded banks. 
The recent economic meltdown has heightened the debate regarding transparency 
since one dimension of the crisis revolves around the lack of sufficient market 
information. A recent Wall Street Journal article states that… “Today, a shrinking 
number of huge, integrated financial conglomerates dominate markets. They offer a full 
range of financial services -- commercial banking, investment banking, insurance, credit 
cards, asset management, mutual funds, pension funds and so on. But annual reports, 10-
K reports and other currently required reporting tools give us little idea of the true extent 
of their risk-taking activities” (WSJ, 01/03/2008). After the failure of a number of large 
financial firms (e.g., AIG, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Wachovia, Washington 
Mutual), the markets have started to question the lack of transparency more than ever 
before. For example, a report presented by the Financial Stability Forum to the G7 
Finance Ministers calls for enhanced disclosure requirements. The report states that… 
“Financial institutions should strengthen their risk disclosures and supervisors should 
improve risk disclosure requirements under Pillar 3 of Basel II” (FSF, 2008).  
 
1.2. Research Objectives and Contribution 
 The purpose of this research is to identify the effect of information disclosure on 
commercial bank performance and bank stability. Specifically, the study examines 
relationship between the quantity and quality of information disclosure regarding a 
bank’s securitization and credit derivative activities and the subsequent impact on bank 
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performance. Both accounting measures of performance (i.e. ROE, ROA, Risk-adjusted 
ROE, Risk-adjusted ROA) and market measures of performance (i.e. stock returns, 
Sharpe ratio) are used to proxy bank performance. Bank stability is measured in terms of 
stock price volatility, beta, bank’s z-statistic and credit default swap (CDS) spreads.  
As mentioned above, the impact of both the quantity and quality of disclosure 
surrounding the securitization and credit derivatives on bank performance and stability 
are studied. The focus of this study is on securitized assets, often referred to as “toxic 
assets”, and credit derivative activities, such as credit default swaps, both of which are at 
the heart of the current financial crisis. 
The first phase of the study seeks an answer to the question “Is there an optimum 
level of information disclosure?” At this level, both the quantity and quality of 
information disclosed to the market are examined. Bank call reports, annual reports and 
The Wall Street Journal are closely studied to construct several quantity and quality of 
disclosure indices. Also, the interaction between quantity and quality of information is 
questioned. Here, the aim is to see the effect of both higher quantity and higher quality 
information disclosure on bank performance and stability. 
The second phase of the study involves several comparisons. First, the market’s 
reactions to disclosure events are examined through a before and after comparison using 
a standard event study approach. Then, the most and the least transparent banks are 
compared in terms of their performance and stability. And finally, a sample of both 
healthy and weak banks which are heavily involved in securitization and credit derivative 
activities are examined to identify the extent to which transparency is stabilizing or 
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destabilizing and increasing or decreasing the performance. Also, a logit model is used to 
see if a bank’s quantity and quality of disclosure lead it to become a troubled bank.  
This study contributes to the current policy discussion by evaluating the linkages 
between market disclosure and bank stability. The examination of the effects of both the 
quantity and the quality of information disclosure on bank performance/stability makes 
this study unique. Also, the results of this research help to determine whether more 
transparent banks are inherently more stable and whether the market can correctly 
evaluate and properly react to more transparent information flows.   
 4
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
2.1. Banks and Market Discipline 
Banks play a very important role in modern economies. As described in the early 
literature, they secure funds from surplus spending units and transmit them to deficit 
spending units (Klein, 1971); they reduce transaction costs (Benston and Smith, 1976); 
they simultaneously produce information and other services desired by investors 
(Campbell and Kracaw, 1980); they provide liquidity insurance (Diamond and Dybvig, 
1983); they provide a special service with their lending activity that is not available from 
other lenders (James, 1987); they create liquidity by splitting the risky cash flows of the 
underlying assets they hold (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990); they act as delegated monitors 
(Diamond, 1996); they improve transaction possibilities over what is available at the 
market (Rajan, 1998); they create money by issuing deposits on their claims that public 
accepts as money (Bossone, 2001). More recently, Allen and Santomero (2001) argue 
that banks’ ability to manage risk makes them unique.  
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In an effort to improve the regulation and supervision of banks, Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision developed guidelines and supervisory standards which are 
known as Basel Accords. The first accord was released in 1998 and known as Basel I.  
The second updated and expanded accord, Basel II, went into effect in 2008 in Europe 
and expected to be implemented in the U.S. during 2009. Basel II stands on three pillars. 
Pillar I deals with risk-based capital requirements. Pillar II focuses on bank supervisory 
processes. Pillar III complements the other pillars by providing a set of rules to improve 
public disclosure and enhance market discipline.   
A strand of previous literature has investigated market discipline by examining 
debt prices, particularly subordinated notes and debentures (SNDs) spreads. Evanoff and 
Wall (2001) compared the accuracy of four alternative capital adequacy measures with 
subordinated debt spreads as predictors of future supervisory ratings. They found that 
sub-debt yield spreads perform as well or better than the capital adequacy measures.   
Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2005) examined whether subordinated debt issues 
affect market monitoring. They extracted the credit-spread curve for the banks in their 
sample. Their results showed that the subordinated debt spread changes are not signals 
for future rating changes. A follow-up study by Krishnan, Ritchken and Thomson (2006) 
showed that subordinated debt credit-spread curves predict future credit spreads and bank 
risk. Deyoung et. al. (2001) studied the relationship between the supervisors’ bank exam 
ratings and the risk premium on subordinated debts. They documented that poor exam 
ratings are followed by reductions in subordinated debt spreads. Sironi (2003) 
investigated the European banks’ subordinated debt spreads. He found that subordinated 
debt spreads are sensitive to bank risk, with the exception of those issued by public sector 
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banks. He and Reichert (2003) found that a common set of factors are useful in 
explaining the returns of the bank holding companies. They showed that stock, bond and 
real estate market factors are important in determining the risk premiums for financial 
institutions.  
 
2.2. Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Securitization 
Although most of the literature agrees that market discipline can complement 
traditional supervisory methods, during the recent subprime mortgage crisis the market 
failed to understand the risks inherent in banks’ securitization and off-balance sheet 
activities. The global economic crisis which affected the entire financial system was 
triggered by loose underwriting standards and exacerbated by the large volume of 
mortgage backed securities (e.g., CMOs) produced via the securitization process and the 
even large volume of insurance contracts written on these securities. Figures 1 and 2 
gives a visual depiction of the inter- relationships that led to the crisis. 
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Figure 1. The Key Players 
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As mentioned above, securitization lies at the heart of the problem. It is the 
process of creating securities backed by the cash flows of underlying mortgage and in 
some cases non-mortgage loans (e.g., auto, credit card, and student loans) and other debt 
instruments. The securitization process is shown at Figure 2. 
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Figure 2. Securitization process 
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 The securitization process involves a number of different players. The originator 
initially funds and possibly services the loans. The pool of loans are then sold to a  
trust. The trustee manages the process and arranges for credit enhancement as needed, the 
underwriter assists in the sale and the rating agency rates the securities. Banks can either 
originate the loan themselves or buy it from another lender (i.e. a mortgage broker). 
Asset-backed securities created through this process are then sold to a broad range of 
investors.  
The search for yield by investors has resulted in the tremendous growth of the 
securitization process which produced not only higher return but also higher risk assets as 
mentioned above. Instead of originating and holding the loans, they were purchased and 
sold to investors. Thus, at least a portion of their risk was transferred to investors 
purchasing securitized assets. Banks typically borrow short and lend long. On the asset 
side of their balance sheet, secured and unsecured loans are the major components. Since 
the loans were originated and subsequently sold to other investors, lenders began to lend 
aggressively.  
  The rating agencies which rate the securitized assets failed to do their job 
appropriately. Their models were inadequate to assess the riskiness of many of these asset 
backed securities. During the crisis period, the credit rating agencies were slow to 
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downgrade their ratings for mortgage-backed securities. The downgrades ultimately made 
during the summer of 2007 were large in scale and unexpected, which dramatically 
worsened problems in the credit markets.  
 The conflict of interest problem regarding the credit rating agencies has weakened 
public confidence in these agencies. The conflict of interest arises from two sources. First 
of all, the rating agencies are paid by the security issuer rather than the investor in the 
securities. This might bias the ratings they provide. However, even if the rating agencies 
were paid by investors, a conflict of interest could exist but this time in the opposite 
direction, since the investor might want to force the agencies to downgrade the borrower 
so as to lower their purchase price and maximize their gain. The second source of conflict 
arises from the fact that the credit rating agencies provide additional services such as 
advisory and consulting to the firms whose products they rate. 
 Borrower default has caused capital adequacy concerns in the banking sector. 
Consequently, investors, large-uninsured depositors, bank shareholders and bondholders 
have been affected by the wave of loan defaults. Although banking is one of the most 
heavily regulated industries, regulation was inadequate prior to the crisis. The growing 
complexity of asset backed securities with their many separate investment tranches has 
made it difficult for regulators to evaluate their riskiness. This complexity along with the 
lack of staff has caused regulators to underestimate the riskiness of many securitization 
practices.  
 Even though self-regulation is often necessary and frequently desirable, as 
mentioned before, the lack of accountability undermined the securitization process since 
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originators were often not held accountable for generating risky loans nor were other 
participants in the securitization process.  
Securitization activities have dramatically grown in importance. As shown in 
Figure 3 below, securitization activities have increased significantly from $404 billion in 
1996 to $2.5 trillion in 2008. In 1996, credit card securitization comprised the greatest 
portion of the total amount of outstanding asset-backed securities. By 2008 its importance 
has declined, while home equity loans and other securitization (such as first mortgages) 
activities have increased dramatically. The greatest percentage expansion was in the 
home equity and student-backed loan categories. 
 
Figure 3. Total Asset-Backed Securities Outstanding In the U.S. ($ billions) 
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In a study by Independent Strategy the concept of market liquidity is depicted as 
an inverted pyramid. As shown in Figure 4, the notes and coins in circulation forms only 
1% of the global liquidity pyramid. The broad measure of money (check accounts) 
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accounts for 11% of total global securities, securitized debt accounts for 13%, and 
derivatives account for 75% of global liquidity.  
 
Figure 4. The inverted pyramid of global liquidity       
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Recognizing that asset securitization can be used for different purposes which will 
have different effects on a banks’ risk exposure, Wu, Yang and Hong (2008) studied the 
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impact of asset securitization on banks’ risk. They used a time-varying risk beta model where 
a bank’s risk beta is a function of bank-specific attributes such as cost of fund, bad loan rate, 
loan deposit gap, net foreign assets ratio, net short assets ratio, net short fund ratio, 
securitization balance and risk retention from securitization and asset sale. The common risk 
factors they took into account are interest rates, market return, exchange rate, liquidity 
spread, credit spread, term spread and asset-backed security market risks. They found that 
credit, liquidity and secondary market risks significantly increased as a result of 
securitization activities. 
 
2.3. Credit Derivatives  
 Credit derivatives are insurance contracts where the protection buyer pays a 
protection seller a certain premium to insure a risky asset owned by the buyer. There are 
two basic types of credit derivatives: total return swaps and credit default swaps. In the 
total return swap the protection buyer pays the seller the total return on the risky asset 
which includes the associated interest payment and the change in the market value of the 
risky asset subsequent to a pre-determined credit “event”, such as a credit downgrade or 
outright default. In exchange the protection seller pays the buyer a risk-free reference rate 
plus a spread called the premium. In a credit default swap the protection buyer pays a 
fixed premium to the seller and generally receives no payment until a credit event takes 
place. The payment at the time of the credit event is usually the difference between the 
face value and market value of the instrument, or in some cases, simply the face value of 
the risky asset. Due to their greater simplicity and flexibility credit default swaps have 
become much more popular than total return swaps.  
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Figure 5 shows the dramatic growth in total credit derivatives over the past ten 
years.  For example, in 1997 the total notional amount of credit derivatives outstanding in 
the U.S. was only $55 billion, but by 2008 this figure had grown to $15.5 trillion. On a 
global basis the notional value exceeded $50 trillion by 2008. 
 
Figure 5. Notional Value of Total Credit Derivative Contracts in the U.S. 
($ billions) 
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For additional information on how banks use derivatives and the impact of 
derivative use on bank risk, see Shyu and Reichert (2002) and Reichert and Shyu (2003).  
An article at the Wall Street Journal states that credit default swap (CDS) trading 
has lately been closely examined by regulators and quotes the words of Brian Yelvington, 
an analyst at debt research firm Credit Sights that “….Transparency provides a great deal 
of comfort to the market” (WSJ, 11/05/2008).  
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2.4. Transparency 
These dramatic developments have intensified the debate concerning the 
transparency of the banks and their products. Transparency is defined as “Public 
disclosure of reliable and timely information that enables users of that information to 
make an accurate assessment of a bank’s financial condition and performance, business 
activities, risk profile and risk management practices”. (BIS, 1998) 
BIS (1998) lists five characteristics of transparent information: 1) 
comprehensiveness, 2) relevance and timeliness, 3) reliability, 4) comparability and 5) 
materiality. Information should be comprehensive, in other words it should aggregate and 
consolidate all information across different activities and legal entities. Only relevant 
information helps the market to understand the safety and soundness of the bank. Also, if 
information is relevant, it should also be timely; i.e., disclosed with sufficient frequency 
and timeliness. In order to be reliable, information should be verifiable, free from 
material errors, prudent and complete. Besides, information needs to be comparable to 
allow market participants to compare different institutions. The disclosure of the 
information should follow consistent accounting policies and procedures and uniform 
measurement concepts. Finally, information should be material, which means that 
reporting error or lack of information could negatively influence the assessment or 
decision of a market participant that relies upon the information. 
During the financial meltdown which began late 2007, both capital market (e.g. 
SEC) and the bank regulatory authorities (e.g. Fed, FDIC, Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency) have called for enhanced transparency. However, inappropriate and 
improperly timed information disclosure may make the banking system as a whole, and 
 15
specific financial institutions in particular more sensitive to systemic shocks. The 
relationship between the degree of disclosure and the net benefits of transparency is 
depicted in Figure 6. At first, as the level and quality of financial disclosure increases, the 
net social benefits rise (discussed below). But at some point the optimal amount of 
information disclosure is reached after which the net benefits of disclosing information 
decline.  
Since information is not free, there are both private and public costs attached to 
producing it. The optimal amount and quality of information disclosure is found where 
the marginal benefits of expanded information disclosure equals the marginal costs of 
producing the information. While the private costs and benefits can be readily defined 
and measured, the public costs and benefits are more intangible, with no efficient market 
to price them.  
 
Figure 6. Information disclosure and benefits of transparency to the society 
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Prescott (2008) analyzes whether the supervisory authorities should disclose more 
information about banks. He presents several models where the bank sends the same 
report to both regulators and the market; bank sends separate reports to the regulators and 
the market and the regulators do not share the information; the bank has the option to 
share the supervisory documents, such as CAMELS rating after receiving from the 
regulators and the supervisors have the technology to detect a false report. He concludes 
that the supervisory disclosure makes it harder for the regulator to collect the information.  
Figure 7 shows the public and private benefits/ costs of information. While 
investors seek higher risk-adjusted returns, regulators want to maintain stability in the 
financial system. Due to externalities, the public benefits of information disclosure are 
larger than the private benefits of such disclosure alone. An important cost to both private 
institutions and regulators is the possible loss of reputation. According to JP Morgan 
Chase “A firm’s success depends not only on its prudent management of liquidity, credit, 
market and operational risk….but of a reputation for business practices of the highest 
quality (p.95, 2007 Annual report). A recent article at the Wall Street Journal pointed out 
that the Swiss Bank, UBS AG is facing withdrawals by wealthy clients due to 
“reputational” damage (WSJ, 11/05/2008).  
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Figure 7. Public and Private benefits/ costs of information 
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It is important to make a distinction between market transparency and non-market 
transparency. Non-market transparency is used for regulatory purposes as some of the 
information, such as a bank’s CAMELS ratings, or its presence on the FDIC’s problem 
bank list, is not publicly disclosed. On the other hand, market transparency denotes the 
information disclosed to investors operating in a competitive market. Although, full 
disclosure of problematic banks may cause bank runs and a major banking crisis, a 
minimum amount of information disclosure is required for investors to fairly evaluate the 
riskiness of their investments.  
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Cordella and Yeyati (1998) sought to answer the question of optimal disclosure 
by developing a model of a monopolistic bank that receives funds from depositors and 
invests them in risky entrepreneurial projects. They have found that when the bank 
endogenously chooses the riskiness of its loan portfolio, disclosure reduces risk-taking 
incentives. However when risk is exogenously determined by the market, disclosing 
information regarding the bank’s asset portfolio increases the probability of bank failure. 
Determining whether more transparency regarding securitization and credit 
derivatives activities increases the market’s ability to reliably and accurately assess a 
bank’s financial condition is a crucial element in resolving the current financial crisis. 
According to Nier and Bauman (2006) “Market discipline refers to a market-based 
incentive scheme in which investors in bank liabilities, such as subordinated debt or 
uninsured deposits, “punish” banks for greater risk-taking by demanding higher yields on 
those liabilities.” As outlined in Pillar 3 of the Basel II accord, regulators see market 
discipline as a complementary tool for monitoring risk at individual banks and 
maintaining financial stability.   
Penas and Tumer-Alkan (2010) found weak evidence of market discipline using 
data from Turkish banking market. Using the banks’ measures of financial fragility, they 
have studied the market’s ability to monitor bank activities and found that the market 
reacted negatively to measures of financial fragility. They have also examined how 
market reacts to the quality and timeliness of the information disclosure and showed that 
improvements in disclosure requirements increase the informativeness of accounting 
statements and audited statements with greater lags are not informative. 
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“Market discipline can only work if market participants have access to timely and 
reliable information which enables them to assess a bank’s activities and the risks 
inherent in their activities. Improved public disclosure strengthens market participants’ 
ability to encourage safe and sound banking practices.” (BIS, 1998) To the extent bank 
management knows that its activities and risk exposures will be transparent, they have a 
strong incentive to improve their risk management practices and strengthen their internal 
controls.  
   The previous literature found that markets require greater transparency. Tadesse 
(2005) found that crises are less likely in countries with regulatory regimes that require 
extensive bank disclosure. Bauman and Nier (2004) studied the relationship between a 
banks’ long-run average stock price volatility and the long-run average level of disclosure 
that banks provide in their annual reports and found that expanded disclosure benefits 
investors. Nier and Baumann (2006) show that banks that disclose more information are 
subject to more market discipline and have a greater incentive to limit their risk of 
default. They found that greater information disclosure led banks to hold larger capital 
buffers. Hirtle (2007) found that greater disclosure is associated with more efficient risk 
taking and improved risk-adjusted returns. 
This research extends the work of Bauman and Nier (2004), Nier and Baumann 
(2006) and Hirtle (2007). These studies examined the link between the level of disclosure 
and bank stock price volatility. This study goes one step further and examines the effect 
of both the quantity and quality of information disclosure surrounding the securitization 
process and credit derivatives activity on bank performance and stability. Here, bank 
performance is measured as ROA, ROE, risk-adjusted ROA, risk-adjusted ROE, stock 
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return and Sharpe ratio; and bank stability is measured as stock price volatility, beta, a 
bank’s z-statistic and credit default swap (CDS) spreads. A number of disclosure indices 
are constructed based on the credit derivatives and securitization information provided in 
the FDIC call reports. Besides call report data, annual 10-K reports are examined to 
identify more transparent banks. Tests are conducted to see if bank stability significantly 
increases for more transparent banks relative to least transparent banks, as well as before 
and after certain disclosure event performance and stability. Finally, troubled banks and 
their healthy peers are compared based on their disclosure levels.   
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CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
 
 
3.1. Conceptual Framework 
 Banks engage in securitization and credit derivative activities and then disclose 
information about them to public. As seen in Figure 8, both business activities 
(securitization and credit derivatives) and information disclosure might affect bank’s 
performance and stability. Although many control variables are introduced in the models, 
it is not quite possible to perfectly segregate business activities from information 
disclosure. Therefore, the results of this study should be evaluated based on the fact that 
the effects of information disclosure and business activity are intertwined. 
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Figure 8. Business Activities and Information Disclosure 
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3.2. Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses are tested: 
H1A: There is an optimum quantity of disclosure that leads to maximum performance and 
stability. 
 
H2A: There is a positive relationship between the quality of disclosure and bank 
performance and stability.  
 
H3A: The impact of expanded disclosure on both performance and stability is enhanced 
when the information being disclosed is of higher quality. (+ inter-action effect)   
 
H4A:: Healthy banks have higher disclosure levels than troubled banks. 
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3.3. Methodology 
To examine the effect of both the quantity and quality of disclosure on bank 
performance and stability, two separate model specifications are estimated. The first set 
measures the effect of the quantity of disclosure while the second set measures the effect 
of the quality of the information disclosure.   
The general equation for both sets of models is as follows: 
Performance/Stability  = f (Disclosure Quantity/Quality Indices, Control Variables)   (1) 
 
The optimal level of disclosure is tested using the following equation:  
 
i
m
j
jiii ControlDISCDISCSP εααα +++= ∑
=1
2
21 )()()(                                       (2) 
where  
P= performance;  
S= stability;  
DISC= quantity of disclosure; 
 i = individual bank;  
j= specific control variable.  
The expected signs of the estimated coefficients are as follows: 
a) for performance  (P): α1 >0, and α2 <0 
b) for stability  (σ2):       α1 <0, and α2 >0 
 
3.3.1. Measures of Bank Performance and Stability 
Dependent Variables  - Following Hirtle (2007), measures of bank performance 
and bank stability will be used as dependent variables in separate regressions.  
Bank performance is measured by using; 
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1) Accounting measures of performance, (quarterly) 
- Return on equity (ROE) : calculated as net income divided by equity 
- Return on assets (ROA) : calculated as net income divided by total assets  
- Risk-adjusted returns  
o Risk-adjusted return on equity (RARROE) = 
ROE
ROE
σ    
o Risk-adjusted return on assets (RARROA) = 
ROA
ROA
σ    
Rolling standard deviations of ROA and ROE are calculated using eight 
preceding quarters.   
2) Stock market performance measures, (daily) 
- The level of   total returns  
0
101
1 P
DPP
R
+−=  
- Sharpe ratio (SP) = 
)( PR
fP RR
σ
−
 
Several measures of bank performance are used in this study. Although it might 
seem that accounting measures of performance are not directly affected by the changes in 
disclosure, it actually can have an indirect impact. For example, the market may perceive 
a more transparent bank more/less risky and require a lower/higher cost when raising 
capital, which consequently impacts the accounting measures of performance. To see if 
such an effect exists, accounting measures of performance along with market measures of 
performance are used in this research. 
Bank stability is measured using four variables:  
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 1) Stock price volatility as measured by the standard deviation of a bank’s total 
stock return  
 2) Market beta. Beta is calculated from Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and 
shows the sensitivity of the bank’s stock return to the market return: 
Rit - Rft = (Rmt - Rft) βi +εit, 
where  
Rit : the return on bank i during time t,  
Rft : the return on the riskless asset during time t,  
Rmt : the return on the market proxy on time t. 
3) The bank’s probability-of-default (z-statistic) which is calculated as follows 
(Boyd and Graham, 1986; Stiroh, 2004): (quarterly) 
ROA
AEROAZ σ
/+=  
AE /  is the mean equity to assets ratio. Rolling standard deviations of ROA is 
used in calculating the Z value. Z- statistic shows how many standard deviations a bank is 
away from insolvency. A higher Z-score indicates an improved risk-adjusted 
performance or lower probability of default. 
4) Bank’s credit default swaps (CDS) spreads, (daily) 
 
3.3.2. Quantity of Disclosure  
Independent Variables - To measure the quantity of information, several 
disclosure indexes are constructed. The index measures the level of detail that banks 
disclose on their securitization and credit derivative activity. The types of information 
considered in the construction of the index are listed at Appendix A. 
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Based upon the information presented in Appendix A the following three activity 
disclosure indices are calculated as follows: 
 
1) Total Activity Binary Index (TABI) – is simply the sum of the 11 securitization and 4 
off-balance sheet activity items. If there is no reported information for any of the 
corresponding categories within each of the 15 broad financial activities, a value of 0 is 
assigned to those activities. A value of 1 is assigned if there is at least some activity 
reported. Thus, the value of TABI will range from 0-15. Similarly, the TABI index can 
be divided into two sub-indices; one for securitization activity (SABI) and one for credit 
derivative items (DABI). The value for SABI index would range from 0 to 11 and the 
value for DABI index would range from 0 to 4.  
 
2) Subcategory Binary Index (SBI) – takes the various subcategories within each of the 
broad financial activities into consideration. For example, as seen in Panel A of Appendix 
A (Securitization), all activity categories include a number of specific subcategories. 
When constructing the SBI index, the total number of sub-categories that report data are 
counted. As before, no data is recorded as 0, while the presence of data is recorded as 1. 
For example, in Panel A of the Appendix A the first activity (securitization activities) has 
a total of 7 subcategories. If a bank reports values for four of these six sub-categories, the 
activity is assigned a value of 4. This same procedure is employed for all 11 activities, 
producing a maximum value of 69 for the securitization index (SSBI). The same 
procedure is followed for Part B of Table (Credit Derivative Activities) where a 
maximum index value equal to 12 is possible (DSBI). The maximum value for all of 
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Appendix A (both securitization and derivative activities) is the sum of the two activity 
sub-categories or 81 (69+12) (TSBI).   
 
3) Total Quantitative Index (TQI) – adds the reported numerical values for each of the 
possible 81 activities in Appendix A for a given bank and divides this aggregate value by 
the bank’s total assets at the time of the call report. In addition, two quantitative sub-
indices, Securitization Quantitative Index (TSQI) and the Derivative Quantitative Index 
(TDQI) are calculated in a similar fashion.  
 
4) Annual Report Index (ARI) – The fourth quantitative measure of disclosure is based 
upon the banks annual 10-K reports.  Each bank’s 10-K is examined to determine the 
bank’s level of securitization and credit derivatives disclosure activity. The focus here is 
on the extent of information provided regarding the objectives and strategies being 
followed by management and the potential risks facing the bank. 
The annual reports are pulled from the SEC’s EDGAR database. Each bank’s 
annual report is analyzed thoroughly.  Several keywords regarding the securitization and 
credit derivatives are counted in the text. Two indices are formed based on the annual 
report data: Securitization Annual Report Index (SARI) and Credit Derivatives Annual 
Report Index (DARI). Keywords counted to construct SARI are securitization, asset-
backed securities, mortgage-backed securities, collateralized debt obligations, 
collateralized mortgage obligations and collateralized loan obligations while the 
keywords counted to construct DARI are credit derivatives, credit default swaps, total 
return swaps and credit options.  
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Banks are required to disclose certain information in their call reports. However, 
disclosure in annual reports is voluntary. SABI, DABI, TABI, SSBI, TSBI, TSQI, TDQI 
and TQI indices are based on call report data, while ARI indices (SARI and DARI) are 
based on annual report data. Consequently, SABI, DABI, TABI, SSBI, TSBI, TSQI, 
TDQI and TQI indices are also a measure of the level of securitization and credit 
derivative activities the banks are employing. Over the sample period, there have been 
changes in the required level of disclosure in call reports. Table I shows the minimum 
and maximum values for indices. There have been four major changes in the detail of the 
information given in the call reports. In each breakpoint, even though the banks are 
employing the same level of the activity, they were required to disclose more details 
about their securitization and credit derivative activities. Hence, the indices based on call 
report data are measuring both the level of activity and disclosure of the banks in the 
sample. 
 
Table I. Minimum and Maximum Values for Indices
 SABI DABI TABI SSBI DSBI TSBI 
  June 2001- December 2001 0-10 0-2 0-12 0-62 0-2 0-64 
March 2002- December 2002 0-10 0-4 0-14 0-62 0-6 0-68 
March 2003- December 2005 0-11 0-4 0-15 0-69 0-6 0-75 
March 2006- December 2008 0-11 0-4 0-15 0-69 0-12 0-81 
 
It should be noted that the analyses in this study are based on the assumption that 
the current accounting system is adequate and the effects on performance and stability 
can be understood by just looking at the quality and the quantity of the data disclosed. 
However, the literature establishes that current accounting systems are mixed systems 
and hence produce different values for the investment book (fair value) and the banking 
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book (amortized cost). IMF (2008) shows that mixed and total fair value systems have 
different impact on the volatility of the bank performance. Thus, the results of this 
analysis should be assessed on the basis of the current accounting system.  
 
3.3.3. Quality of Disclosure   
To measure the quality of the information, the market’s reaction to 
announcements concerning revisions in a bank’s provision for loan losses and projected 
earnings are studied. Provisions for losses are intended to reflect the likelihood of future 
loan losses. Revisions to earnings projections and loan losses may reflect exogenous 
factors such as volatile interest rates and economic conditions. Alternatively, self interest 
can motivate revisions. For example, banks may have short term incentives to hold 
insufficient levels of loan loss reserves. According to Gunther and Moore (2003: p. 157) 
… “Risk-based capital requirements allow banks to count allowance for loan and lease 
losses (ALLL) only in Tier-2 capital and only up to 1.25 percent of risk-weighted assets. 
By not making the necessary provisions, banks with asset-quality problems can raise 
reported net income and retained earnings, thereby boosting Tier-1 capital and potentially 
avoiding the restrictions supervisors typically place on troubled banks.”  
If bank examiners detect that a bank’s loan loss reserves level is lower than 
appropriate, the bank will be instructed to increase its loan loss reserve to a minimum 
required level. Thus, revisions to loan loss reserve announcements may reflect the quality 
of the data disclosed by the bank. Revisions in earnings projections may also reflect 
changes in economic conditions, an attempt to manipulate earnings, or an inability to 
monitor and predict changes in the bank’s competitive environment, credit risk, and 
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operating expenses. Also, SEC’s investigations about a bank’s failure to reveal actual 
knowledge might be a sign of the quality of the data disclosed to public.  
A sample of announcements articles relating to loan loss revisions, earnings 
announcements and SEC probes are extracted from The Wall Street Journal Index 
(WSJI).  Each article is studied to identify the bank’s motives for changing its provisions 
of loan losses, its projections of future earnings or the nature of the formal investigation 
by the SEC. The following keywords are used in the search: disclosure, disclose, 
disclosing, disclosed, actual knowledge, actual, reveal, reveals, revealed, SEC, probe, 
probes, transparent, transparency, scrutiny, scandal, red flag, fails, failed, failure, 
violation, violations, revision, revisions, loan loss and loan losses. Based on these reports, 
a comprehensive Quality Index (QualIndex) is constructed as [1- (quality related articles/ 
total articles about the bank)]*100. The index ranges from 0-100. Almost all of the 
articles appeared in search for the banks in the sample convey negative information about 
the bank-even when they are not related to loan loss revisions, earnings announcements 
or SEC probes.  Therefore, in addition to QualIndex, total number of quality related 
articles and total number of articles appeared when the bank’s name is searched in the 
WSJ index are also used to proxy quality of disclosure. 
 
3.3.4. Control Variables 
 Following Nier and Baumann (2004) and Hirtle (2007), the control variables 
included in the model are bank size (log of total assets), risk profile (ratio of risk-
weighted assets to total assets and the bank’s risk-based capital ratio), balance sheet 
composition (loan to deposit ratio and loan to asset ratio), leverage ratio, revenue 
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composition (non-interest income as a share of total operating income), and the bank’s 
efficiency ratio (non-interest expense to total revenue).  Both the disclosure indices and 
control variables are lagged one period to deal with a potential endogeneity problem 
 
3.3.5. Interaction Effects 
It seems likely that both the quantity and quality of the information disclosure 
may interact, since the market may be particularly concerned about banks with both a low 
level as well as low quality of information disclosure.  Alternatively, the market may be 
concerned about low quality and a low level of disclosure between healthy and weak 
banks. Interaction terms are included in the model to test for such effects.   
 
3.3.6. Peer Comparisons  
          Several approaches will be used to estimate the impact of both the quantity and 
quality of disclosure: 1) a before-and- after approach is utilized, 2) a comparison is made 
between high versus low disclosure banks, and 3)  a comparison is made between weak 
versus healthy banks.  
 
3.3.6.1. Before-and After-Comparison  
To see how market react to information flows about a bank’s transparency and 
healthiness issues, a standard event study methodology is used. The Wall Street Journal 
index is investigated thoroughly for transparency and trouble related articles for the banks 
in the sample. First the bank’s name is searched and the search is then narrowed by using 
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keywords1. The resulting set of articles are then read one by one to see if they are really 
about the transparency issues or about the troubles a bank is facing. The dates of the 
related articles are recorded and used as event dates. 
Event dates are grouped under three categories. The first category is the dates 
when an article about a bank’s transparency problems (i.e. disclosing wrong or lacking 
information to public) is revealed on Wall Street Journal. There are a total of 68 articles 
on transparency for the banks in the sample between 2001 and 2008. The second category 
is the dates when an article about a bank’s financial soundness appeared on Wall Street 
Journal. There are a total of 105 articles on troubles about the banks in the sample.  Last 
category is the dates when a significant amendment to annual reports is announced. There 
are 44 amendments for the banks in the sample during the period from 2001 to 2008. 
However, not all the amendments are very significant. Some are intended to correct typos 
in the annual reports or to include the omitted signatures of the accounting firms or to 
make some minor changes to the graphs or tables. After eliminating the nonsignificant 
ones, 9 significant amendments are identified2. The days these amendments were 
announced are used as event dates.    
It should also be noted that not all the 68 article dates for transparency and 105 
article dates for trouble are used as event dates because some articles appeared on the 
same date and some were published at dates which fall into the estimation period of an 
earlier event (article). Any abnormal returns surrounding the earlier events contaminates 
                                                 
1 These keywords (disclosure, disclose, disclosing, disclosed, actual knowledge, actual, reveal, reveals, 
revealed, SEC, probe, probes, transparent, transparency, scrutiny, scandal, red flag, fails, failed, failure, 
violation, violations, revision, revisions, loan loss and loan losses for transparency; charge-offs, trouble, 
problem and write downs for trouble) are the same as the ones as the ones used in determining the quality 
index and the troubled bank sample. 
2 For example, Huntington Banchares Inc’s amendment to 2002 Annual report restated the net income from 
$363 million to $333 million. 
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the estimates of price reactions by increasing the volatility of the returns over the 
estimation period and biasing the results against finding any abnormal returns for the 
later events. Therefore, first events are separated as a sub-sample. The full sample is also 
used as a robustness check. In all cases, events those are very close to each other (i.e., one 
month) are excluded because the articles following the first one are not “new” 
information to market any more.   
 
3.3.6.1.1 Stock Returns 
The standard market model is used to estimate the abnormal return (AR) for bank 
i on day t as follows: 
mtiiitit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=                                                                                           (3)          
where  
itR = observed return on bank i on event day t; 
mtR = return on S&P 500 index on event day t; 
iαˆ  and = estimated regression parameters for bank i. iβˆ
 Market model parameters are estimated for an estimation period of day -201 to 
day -2, where day 0 is the event day. Daily abnormal returns are then cumulated to form 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) over several event windows.                                                               
 
3.3.6.1.2. CDS Spreads 
Besides the stock price responses, it is interesting to see the CDS spread reactions 
to disclosure events. Five year CDS spreads data is obtained from Bloomberg and 
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available only for 6 banks in the sample3.  However, data for National City Bank is 
available only through June 2008 with a lot of missing data points. Therefore, National 
City Bank is not included in the analysis.  
As a proxy for the market, two CDX indices by Markit are used.  Markit 
publishes several bond, equity, credit and loan indices. For the purpose of this analysis, 
two different credit default swap indices are utilized. The first index is a general market 
index (CDX) for credit default swaps and it includes 125 large firms. The second index is 
the financials index (CDXFIN) and it includes 25 financial firms4. A common measure of 
a bank’s risk is its certificates of deposit (CD) spreads. Since neither of the Markit indices 
include any banks, six-month certificates of deposit (CD) spreads are also used as a proxy 
for the market to test for the robustness of the results. 
Initially, the CDS spreads for the 5 banks are plotted over the event period to 
visually observe abnormal behavior of CDS spreads around the event days. Afterwards, 
as with stock price data, a standard event study is conducted. And finally, a cross-
sectional regression model is run for all 5 banks. The model is as follows: 
∑+++= iii ECrisisTimeTrendCDXCDS                                                        (4) 
where 
iCDS = Return (change) on CDS spread on day i, 
iCDX = Return (change) on CDX spread on day i, 
TimeTrend = Time trend variable, 
Crisis = Dummy variable which takes value of 1 for all days after 1/1/2007, 1 otherwise, 
                                                 
3 Banks with CDS spread data are Citigroup, Bank of America, JP Morgan, Wachovia, Wells Fargo and 
National City Bank.  
4 Most of the firms constituting the CDXFIN index are insurance companies. 
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iE = Dummy variable which takes value of 1 for the event day and one day before the 
event day, 0 otherwise. 
 This regression model allows us to see the effects of all events, including the ones 
removed from the sample to prevent event clustering. The model is run with different 
specifications (with or without the time trend and crisis variables). The results are robust 
to all specifications.                                                  
 
  3.3.6.2. High vs. Low Disclosure Banks  
Bank performance and stability measures are compared for highly transparent 
banks (i.e., banks with a high disclosure index value) and their less-transparent peers. 
Standard tests of significance are used to compare differences in average post-disclosure 
performance between these two groups.  
 To fix the most and least transparent banks samples, all banks are ranked based on 
their disclosure indices. The list of most and least transparent banks is given at Table II. 
Banks those are consistently at the top 1/3rd of the list are included in the most transparent 
banks sample. Similarly, banks those consistently have the lowest disclosure index values 
and belong to the bottom 1/3rd of the list are included in the least transparent banks 
sample. Then, these two samples are compared using standard tests of significance.  
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Table II. The Most and Least Transparent Banks Samples 
A. Most Transparent Banks Sample 
BHC NAME SSBI DSBI TSBI TQI SARI DARI 
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION 42.06 7.13 49.19 0.84 118.68 19.42
WACHOVIA CORPORATION 39.80 6.50 46.30 0.43 107.74 3.81
CITIGROUP INC. 39.13 7.16 46.29 0.93 129.61 27.13
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 37.19 7.94 45.13 2.26 149.29 46.81
NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION 18.00 3.87 21.87 0.03 130.00 0.00
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 16.26 5.94 22.19 0.64 65.58 6.97
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. 13.39 5.81 19.19 0.46 46.03 6.58
KEYCORP 11.55 4.45 16.00 0.11 89.26 11.10
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP 7.74 4.45 12.19 0.05 79.00 18.35
 
B. Least Transparent Banks Sample 
BHC NAME SSBI DSBI TSBI TQI SARI DARI 
COMERICA INCORPORATED 0.00 2.61 2.61 0.00 1.29 0.35
NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION 0.00 2.45 2.45 0.00 13.71 5.16
BB&T CORPORATION 0.00 1.32 1.32 0.00 28.42 0.13
COLONIAL BANCGROUP 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.00 31.23 1.81
ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 0.90 0.52 1.42 0.00 5.52 0.00
FIRSTMERIT CORPORATION 1.61 0.00 1.61 0.01 13.10 0.00
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP 1.68 0.00 1.68 0.01 18.39 0.26
FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES 1.87 0.00 1.87 0.01 6.58 0.00
INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORP 2.16 0.00 2.16 0.00 0.81 0.00
 
  3.3.6.3. Weak versus Healthy Banks  
 A comparison similar to that described above for high vs. low disclosure banks 
are made between matched samples of weak vs. healthy banks. 
 In addition to standard tests of significance, logit regressions are run to see if a 
bank’s disclosure level leads it to become a troubled bank. Also, all the regressions those 
test the effects of quality and quantity of information on bank performance and stability 
are run again but with a troubled bank dummy to see the marginal effect of being in the 
troubled bank list. 
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The sample of weak (troubled) banks is based on two sources. The first is the list 
of failed banks published by the FDIC. Large banks from this list are included in the 
troubled banks sample5. Also, banks those received large amounts of TARP money are 
determined. Although there are many institutions such as AIG, Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley which received considerable amount of money from the government, 
they are not included in the troubled bank sample since they are not commercial banks 
and they are subject to different regulations. Here, one should be aware of the existence 
of some banks which were not really in trouble and were not in need of bailout but had 
received TARP money. Therefore, a second source - the Wall Street Journal index- is 
used to determine the troubled banks. The index is searched for the following key phrases 
“charge-offs”, “trouble”, “problem” and “write downs”. Large banks whose names are 
appeared in the news as being in trouble are included in the sample.  
The list of the troubled banks sample is given in Table III.  (Note: This is not the 
same as the FDIC’s “problem bank list” since the identity of the banks on the FDIC list is 
not disclosed to the public). The column titled “Number of total articles (2006-2008)” 
gives the search result when a bank’s name is searched in the Wall Street Journal Index 
for the 2006-2008 period. This number reflects how many times a banks’ name was 
mentioned in the news. Some of those articles may not be really about the bank, but 
maybe referring the bank’s name as a peer in an article about another bank. Thus, this 
number doesn’t really reflect the number articles about the bank’s troubles. Hence, after 
those total articles are determined, a keyword search is done. For example, after 
                                                 
5 A total of 47 banks failed during the 2001-2008 period. Most of the banks were small and were not 
involved in securitization or derivatives in any meaningful way. Therefore, these banks are excluded from 
the sample. Colonial Bank which has failed on August 14, 2009 is included in the troubled bank sample 
based on the number of articles which were stating the troubles the bank was facing. 
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searching for Citigroup in the Wall Street Journal Index to find out the total number of 
articles about the bank (1832), certain keywords are searched. The keyword “trouble” for 
Citigroup turns out a total of 60 articles. All these 60 articles are read to see if the article 
is about a trouble Citigroup is facing. It should be noted that here a subjective judgment 
is used to determine which articles are really about trouble. 
 
Table III. Troubled Bank Sample 
Institution Name  
Total Assets 
($000: 
December 
2008)* 
TARP 
money 
received 
(($000) 
TARP 
money/ 
Total 
Assets 
(%) 
Number 
of Total 
Articles  
(2006-
2008) 
Number 
of 
Articles 
Stating 
Trouble 
Number 
of 
Trouble 
Stating 
Articles
/ Total 
Articles 
(%) 
JP Morgan Chase 2,180,000,000 25,000,000 1.15 1240 4 0.32
Citigroup 1,940,000,000 45,000,000 2.32 1832 24 1.31
Bank of America 1,820,000,000 15,000,000 0.82 1132 5 0.44
Wells Fargo 1,310,000,000 25,000,000 1.91 213 5 2.35
Wachovia 670,639,000            N.A. N.A. 451 25 5.54
PNC 291,000,000 7,579,200 2.60 70 2 2.86
U.S. Bancorp 267,000,000 6,599,000 2.47 41 4 9.76
Suntrust 189,000,000 4,850,000 2.57 68 3 4.41
National City 151,165,000            N.A. N.A. 84 11 13.10
Regions Financial 146,000,000 3,500,000 2.40 28 3 10.71
Fifth Third 120,000,000 3,408,000 2.84 59 3 5.08
Keycorp 105,000,000 2,500,000 2.38 40 4 10.00
Comerica 67,912,580 2,250,000 3.31 22 1 4.55
M&T Bank 65,815,757 600,000 0.91 17 2 11.76
Zions Bancorporation 55,339,951 1,400,000 2.53 21 1 4.76
Colonial Bancgroup 25,816,306            N.A. N.A. 6 2 33.33
*Wachovia is purchased by Wells Fargo on October 3, 2008 and National City is purchased by PNC on October 24, 
2008. Therefore total assets figures shown in this table for those two banks are by the end of September 2008. 
**Wachovia and National City remain in the sample through September 2008. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DATA  
 
 
 
4.1. Data Sample 
The sample period is from June 2001 to December 2008. Considering that smaller 
banks are not heavily engaged in securitization and off-balance sheet activities, they are 
excluded from the sample. The sample consists of bank holding companies which have 
total assets greater than $10 billion at December 2008.  Table IV shows the total number 
of bank holding companies with assets greater than $10 billion during the sample period.  
 
Table IV. Number of Bank Holding Companies with Assets Greater than $10 Billion
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of BHCs  with 
assets more  than $10 billion 89 97 98 99 102 78 71 74
 Source: Federal Reserve’s Y-9C reports 
 
By December 2008, there are 74 BHCs with assets greater than $10 billion. Ten 
foreign BHCs are dropped from the sample since US activities for these BHCs represent 
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only a part of their overall activities. In addition, two BHCs whose activities are primarily 
non-banking in nature and fourteen BHCs with insufficient data for the whole sample 
period are removed from the sample6. Out of the sample of resulting 50 banks, 14 banks 
with zero disclosure on securitization and derivative activities are removed from the 
sample7.  Finally, 7 banks with very low activity are dropped8. The sample is fixed with 
the resulting 27 BHCs. The list of the banks in the sample is given in Appendix B. 
 
4.2. Data Sources 
The stock price data for BHCs are downloaded from University of Chicago’s 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Data concerning securitization 
and credit derivative activities are extracted from bank’s Y-9C reports available from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and 10-K reports which are available at SEC Edgar 
database. Data on CDS spreads are obtained from Bloomberg. Data on CDS indices are 
kindly provided by Markit. Data on CD spreads are collected from St. Louis Federal 
Reserve Bank. The data sets are merged using PERMCOs. Data about transparency 
issues are extracted from Wall Street Journal Index. 
                                                 
6 Ten foreign BHCs which are removed from the sample are Utrecht Holdings (Netherlands), Taunus Corp 
(Germany), Barclays Group (Britain) and HSBC Holdings Inc (Britain), Popular Inc. (Puerto Rico), 
Compass Bancshares (Spain), RBC Centura Banks (Canada), W Holding Company (Puerto Rico), First 
Bancorp (Puerto Rico), Bancwest (France). Two BHCs whose activities are primarily non-banking in 
nature are State Street Corp and Metlife Inc. In addition, seven BHCs with insufficient data are Webster 
Financial Corporation, Capital One Financial Corporation, Compass Bancshares, Sterling Financial 
Corporation, ESB Acquisition Corp., Bank of New York Mellon Corporation and Marshall & Ilsley 
Corporation, Harris Bankcorp, First National of Nebraska, First Banks, FBOP Corporation, Citizens 
Financial Group, Harris Financial Corp, Arvest Bank Group. 
7 Fourteen banks with zero disclosure are Bank of Hawaii Corporation, City National Corporation, Valley 
National Corporation, UMB Financial Corporation, Synovus Financial Corporation, Whitney Holding 
Corporation, Bancorpsouth, Cullen/Frost Bankers, Citizens Banking Corporation, Unionbancal 
Corporation, Cathay General Bancorp, Wilmington Trust Corporation, New York Community Bancorp, 
TCF Financial Corporation. 
8 Seven banks with low securitization and derivate activities are Commerce Bancshares, Bok Financial 
Corporation, Banknorth Group, Privatebancorp, Fulton Financial Corporation, Wintrust Financial 
Corporation, UCBH Holdings. 
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4.3. Descriptive Statistics   
Table V gives the descriptive statistics. The average total assets for the BHCs in 
the sample for the June 2001- December 2008 period is around $ 227 billion. Banks in 
the sample have an average annualized ROA of 1.04% and an average annualized ROE 
of 11.84%. In general, banks in the sample have very high loan to deposit ratios, as well 
as high levels of risk weighted assets to total assets ratios. 
Average value for SABI index is 4.65 while the highest attainable index value is 
11. BHCs in the sample have an average of 1.49 for DABI index and 6.13 for TABI 
index. Average value for SSBI index is 10.98, DSBI index is 2.31 and TSBI index is 
13.3. These numbers show that on average banks have low disclosure index values based 
on their call reports. The averages for annual report indices show that banks generally 
communicate more about securitization rather than the credit derivatives in their annual 
reports.  
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Table V. Descriptive Statistics 
This table shows the descriptive statistics for hypothesis, dependent and control variables. SABI is securitization 
activity binary index, DABI is credit derivative activities binary index, TABI is total activity binary index, SSBI is 
securitization subcategory binary index, DSBI is credit derivative activities subcategory binary index, TSBI is total 
activities subcategory binary index, TSQI is total securitization activity quantitative index, TDQI is total credit 
derivative activities quantitative index , TQI is total quantitative index., SARI is securitization annual report index, 
DARI is credit derivatives annual report index and QUAL is quality index.  Total Articles shows the total number of 
articles those appear when a bank’s name is searched in WSJ index and Transparency Articles shows the total number 
of  transparency issues related articles. Total assets is in millions ($).  ROA and ROE are annualized. Risk based capital 
ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total capital ratio. Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it is shown in 
decimals. Time period: June 2001- December 2008. Stock return is calculated as (price at the end of the period-
price at the beginning of the period)/ price at the beginning of the period. Afterwards these figures are 
annualized 
 
  Mean  Median  Max.  Min. 
 Std. 
Dev.  Obs. 
Hypothesis Variables Range             
SABI (0-11) 4.63 5.00 11.00 0.00 3.55 835 
DABI (0-4) 1.59 0.00 4.00 0.00 1.79 835 
TABI (0-15) 6.23 6.00 15.00 0.00 4.73 835 
SSBI (0-69) 11.36 6.50 52.00 0.00 13.42 835 
DSBI (0-12) 2.48 0.00 12.00 0.00 3.15 835 
TSBI (0-81) 13.84 7.00 62.00 0.00 15.71 835 
TQI N.A. 0.27 0.02 6.31 0.00 0.67 835 
SARI N.A. 55.97 43.00 286.00 0.00 50.53 835 
DARI N.A. 5.78 0.00 90.00 0.00 13.44 835 
QUAL (0-100) 99.11 100.00 100.00 0.00 6.83 835 
Total Articles N.A. 14.43 2.00 256.00 0.00 33.22 835 
Transparency Articles N.A. 0.08 0.00 9.00 0.00 0.50 835 
Dependent Variables         
ROA(%)  1.04 1.25 6.03 -16.09 1.43 835 
ROE(%)  11.84 14.29 55.18 -261.85 17.33 835 
Stock Return(%)  3.83 8.87 355.15 -465.59 65.42 835 
Volatility of Stock Return(%)  30.82 20.87 321.66 6.73 29.70 835 
Sharpe ratio  0.17 0.18 5.57 -5.61 1.69 835 
Beta  1.04 0.95 7.50 0.07 0.51 835 
Z statistic  290.45 198.31 1713.12 1.44 279.77 646 
Control Variables          
Total Assets ($ in millions)  227,229 57,326 2,360,000 2,629 424,553 835
Risk weighted assets 
/Total assets (%)  80.93 80.72 122.30 50.36 12.79 835
Risk based capital ratio (%)  12.36 12.11 20.18 10.07 1.35 835
Loan to deposit ratio (%)  101.41 103.48 164.16 45.84 17.89 835
Loan to assets ratio (%)  64.57 68.45 85.14 27.17 12.94 835
Leverage ratio  10.49 10.21 18.21 5.78 1.94 835
Revenue composition (%)  28.88 27.73 83.82 -21.94 12.15 835
Efficiency ratio (%)  43.82 41.99 212.07 7.73 12.03 835
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The Qual index on average is 99.1% which shows that on the whole, banks 
convey high quality (free from material errors and on purpose omissions of important 
facts) information to public. Qual index is closely related to the number of transparency 
related articles which is not very high for the banks in the sample. However, the number 
of total articles that appears in search for a specific quarter is on average 14. Although 
not all these articles are related to revisions in loan losses, earnings revisions or SEC 
probes, most of them convey negative information about the banks; therefore this number 
is used as a robustness measure to the quality of information.  
Figure 9 shows the graph of average ROA and ROE during the sample period. 
Part (a) of the graph shows the un-weighted average ROA and ROE for June 2001- 
September 2008 period. Part (b) of the graph shows the weighted average ROA and ROE. 
Banks are ranked according to their average total assets and assigned into three different 
size groups- small, medium, big. ROAs and ROEs for different size groups are shown at 
part (c) of Figure 10. As can be seen from the graph, bigger banks have more volatile 
ROAs. 
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Figure 9. ROA and ROE 
(a) Unweighted ROA and ROE 
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(b) Weighted ROA and ROE (weighted by total assets) 
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(c) ROA and ROE by size groups 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
 
 
5.1. Quantity of Disclosure 
5.1.1. Call Report Indices 
5.1.1.1. Call Report Disclosure and Performance 
Table VI shows the results of the regression which tests the relationship between 
disclosure/activity measured by call report indices and bank performance.  
When performance is measured by ROA and ROE, no significant results are 
found. But when performance is measured by Risk-adjusted ROA and Risk-adjusted 
ROE, there is a significant relationship between disclosure/activity and performance 
(When risk-adjusted ROA is the performance measure, the coefficient on SSBI is -
0.9311, on SSBI2 is 0.0166; and the coefficient on TSBI is -0.8683, on TSBI2 is 0.0137. 
When risk-adjusted ROE is the performance measure, the coefficient on SSBI is -0.9706, 
on SSBI2 is 0.0142; and the coefficient on TSBI is -0.908, on TSBI2 is 0.0127). However, 
the signs of the coefficients are just opposite of the expected, which shows that as the 
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level of information disclosure/activity increases, bank performance decreases up to a 
certain point and afterwards starts to increase. This might be explained by the economies 
of scale. There are several costs –such as personnel, computer, software, etc.-attached to 
employing securitization and credit derivative activities. If the levels of these activities 
are low, their costs may outweigh their profits. However, once a bank is at a certain size, 
it can handle a higher level of these activities, manage the costs more efficiently and 
make more profit. Also, when investors become more familiar with an instrument, they 
find the information about it more valuable. Investors of those banks which involve 
heavily in securitization and credit derivatives activities appreciate the information on 
those activities. 
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Table VI. Disclosure/Activity and Performance 
This table shows the regression results for disclosure/activity and performance. SSBI is securitization subcategory 
binary index, DSBI is credit derivative activities subcategory binary index, TSBI is total activities subcategory binary 
index and TQI is total quantitative index.  In Panel A ROA; in Panel B ROE; in Panel C risk-adjusted ROA,; in Panel 
D risk-adjusted ROE; in Panel E stock return; and in Panel F Sharpe ratio is used as the performance measure.Risk 
based capital ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total capital ratio. Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it is 
shown in decimals. Time period: June 2001- December 2008. Crisis dummy represents January 2007-December 2008 
period. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. ROA 
  ROA 
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables        
SSBI + 0.0001    0.00008 
  (0.0002)    (0.0002) 
SSBI2 - -0.000001    -0.000001 
    (0.000005)       (0.000005) 
DSBI +   -0.0007   -0.00076 
    (0.0006)   (0.0006) 
DSBI2 -   0.00008   0.00008 
      (0.00006)     (0.00006) 
TSBI +    0.000017   
     (0.0002)   
TSBI2 -    0.0000005   
        (0.000003)     
TQI +     -0.0024  
      (0.0027)  
TQI2 -     0.00083*  
          (0.0005)   
Control variables        
Bank size (log assets)  -0.011*** -0.0114*** -0.011*** -0.0113*** -0.0114*** 
  (0.0029) (0.003) (0.0029) (0.0029) (0.0030) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.0218 -0.0165 -0.0198 -0.0219 -0.0173 
  (0.0156) (0.0152) (0.0159) (0.0151) (0.016) 
Risk based capital ratio  -0.0024*** -0.0026*** -0.0024*** -0.0026*** -0.0026*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.00054) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.0049 0.0056 0.0051 0.0066 0.0051 
  (0.0071) (0.007) (0.0070) (0.0069) (0.0071) 
Loan to asset ratio  -0.0288 -0.0326* -0.0297 -0.0311* -0.0318* 
  (0.019) (0.019) (0.0191) (0.0189) (0.0191) 
Leverage ratio  -0.00012 -0.00013 -0.00009 -0.00012 -0.00012 
  (0.00043) (0.00041) (0.00043) (0.00042) (0.00043) 
Revenue composition  0.0244*** 0.0257*** 0.0244*** 0.0249*** 0.0255*** 
  (0.0078) (0.00781) (0.00781) (0.00776) (0.00784) 
Efficiency ratio  -0.0374*** -0.0371*** -0.0371*** -0.0365*** -0.0373*** 
  (0.00611) (0.00613) (0.0061) (0.00609) (0.00615) 
Intercept  0.2813*** 0.2893*** 0.2808*** 0.3026*** 0.2896*** 
  (0.0597) (0.0599) (0.0596) (0.0688) (0.0601) 
AR(1)  -0.0510 -0.0500 -0.0520 -0.0486 -0.0496 
  (0.0347) (0.0347)  (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0347) 
Crisis Dummy   -0.0067*** -0.0068*** -0.0068*** -0.0070*** -0.0068*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) 
R-squared  0.2574 0.2588 0.2574 0.2611 0.2590 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.7700 1.7732 1.7696 1.7687 1.7735 
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Panel B. ROE 
  ROE 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables         
SSBI + -0.00026    -0.00051 
  (0.0027)    (0.0027) 
SSBI2 - 0.00001    0.000015 
    (0.00006)       (0.000061) 
DSBI +   -0.0065   -0.0067 
    (0.0077)   (0.0078) 
DSBI2 -   0.00063   0.00064 
      (0.0007)     (0.0007) 
TSBI +    -0.00072    
     (0.0025)    
TSBI2 -    0.000016    
        (0.000045)     
TQI +     -0.0427   
      (0.0317)   
TQI2 -     0.012**   
          (0.0060)   
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  -0.146*** -0.1494*** -0.1467*** -0.1489*** -0.1492*** 
  (0.0359) (0.0362) (0.0361) (0.0351) (0.0363) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.1161 -0.0927 -0.1036 -0.1531 -0.0785 
  (0.1876) (0.1834) (0.1909) (0.1763) (0.1923) 
Risk based capital ratio  -0.031*** -0.0322*** -0.0313*** -0.0327*** -0.0321*** 
  (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0064) (0.0061) (0.0065) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.0746 0.0759 0.0771 0.0874 0.0755 
  (0.0857) (0.0844) (0.0852) (0.0819) (0.0859) 
Loan to asset ratio  -0.2882 -0.309 -0.2975 -0.2955 -0.311 
  (0.229) (0.2291) (0.23) (0.2209) (0.2308) 
Leverage ratio  0.0032 0.0029 0.0032 0.00296 0.00322 
  (0.0052) (0.0050) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0052) 
Revenue composition  0.3322*** 0.3417*** 0.3342*** 0.3549*** 0.3418*** 
  (0.0944) (0.0947) (0.0946) (0.0928) (0.095) 
Efficiency ratio  -0.5079*** -0.5089*** -0.5065*** -0.5277*** -0.5081*** 
  (0.0742) (0.0744) (0.0741) (0.0735) (0.0747) 
Intercept  3.7045*** 3.7899*** 3.7181*** 3.8056*** 3.7731*** 
  (0.8354) (0.8356) (0.8327) (0.8092) (0.8401) 
AR(1)  -0.0393  -0.0379 -0.0395 -0.0347 -0.0383 
  (0.0347) (0.0347)  (0.0347) (0.0347) (0.0348) 
Crisis Dummy  -0.0814*** -0.0814*** -0.0813*** -0.0831*** -0.0814*** 
  (0.0176) (0.0181) (0.0175) (0.0175) (0.0182) 
R-squared  0.2518 0.2524 0.2519 0.2563 0.2525 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.8762 1.8784 1.8766 1.8768 1.8787 
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Panel C. Risk Adjusted ROA 
  RAR(ROA) 
  Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables         
SSBI + -0.9311***    -0.9384*** 
   (0.2202)    (0.2211) 
SSBI2 - 0.0166***    0.0169*** 
    (0.00433)       (0.0043) 
DSBI +   -0.082   -0.2776 
     (0.5572)   (0.552) 
DSBI2 -   0.0175   0.0354 
      (0.0504)     (0.0503) 
TSBI +    -0.8683***    
      (0.2063)    
TSBI2 -    0.0137***    
        (0.00347)     
TQI +     -0.9139   
       (2.2168)   
TQI2 -     0.2914   
          (0.3808)   
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  -3.1113 -3.1305 -3.0372 -2.9876 -3.3764 
   (2.7052) (2.8228) (2.7183) (2.7828) (2.7816) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -28.098** -29.521** -23.658* -31.615** -27.230** 
   (13.550) (13.991) (13.605) (13.891) (13.833) 
Risk based capital ratio  -0.3524 -0.218 -0.3633 -0.2266 -0.3787 
   (0.4142) (0.4164) (0.4132) (0.416) (0.4159) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -3.2169 -4.4419 -3.165 -4.5637 -3.2547 
   (5.5001) (5.4843) (5.5034) (5.4818) (5.5089) 
Loan to asset ratio  23.9544 24.5555 22.2767 26.5672 23.6704 
   (16.285) (16.412) (16.293) (16.489) (16.319) 
Leverage ratio  0.4119 0.3547 0.4302 0.3686 0.4107 
   (0.3505) (0.3456) (0.3493) (0.3453) (0.3508) 
Revenue composition  1.0878 0.6192 1.2896 0.5662 1.219 
   (4.1302) (4.1705) (4.1299) (4.2181) (4.1352) 
Efficiency ratio  1.09 1.1617 1.0762 1.1317 1.1382 
   (2.5541) (2.5725) (2.5527) (2.5811) (2.5536) 
Intercept  74.045 73.7507 69.6506 78.7155 78.4088 
   (55.3566) (57.681) (55.3865) (64.6297) (56.8049) 
AR(1)  -0.8080*** -0.8180*** -0.8082*** -0.8151*** -0.8108*** 
   (0.0388) (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0387) (0.0388) 
AR(2)  0.1296*** 0.1370*** 0.1285*** 0.1363*** 0.1325*** 
   (0.0388) (0.0387) (0.0388) (0.0387) (0.0388) 
Crisis Dummy  -5.0216*** -4.8825 -4.8659*** -4.8978*** -5.0157*** 
  (1.0301) (1.0474) (1.0297) (1.0460) (1.0337) 
R-squared  0.7732 0.7675 0.7734 0.7675 0.7735 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.9144 1.9170 1.9167 1.9157 1.9205 
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Panel D. Risk Adjusted ROE 
  RAR(ROE) 
  Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables        
SSBI + -0.9706***    -0.9758*** 
   (0.2544)    (0.2553) 
SSBI2 - 0.0142***    0.0148*** 
    (0.00502)       (0.0050) 
DSBI +   -0.0155   -0.2318 
     (0.6485)   (0.642) 
DSBI2 -   0.0371   0.0512 
      (0.0586)     (0.0582) 
TSBI +    -0.908***    
      (0.2395)    
TSBI2 -    0.0127***    
        (0.0040)     
TQI +     -1.2555   
       (2.6402)   
TQI2 -     0.3589   
          (0.4565)   
Control variables        
Bank size (log assets) -5.9119** -6.5533** -5.712* -5.849* -6.6068** 
   (3.0316) (3.1697) (3.0527) (3.1334) (3.1152) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets -37.9326** -40.335** -32.062** -41.1532** -37.7553** 
   (15.7621) (16.3037) (15.8575) (16.1214) (16.1225) 
Risk based capital ratio -0.018 0.1418 -0.0184 0.1538 -0.0626 
   (0.4883) (0.4901) (0.4877) (0.4898) (0.4904) 
Loan to deposit ratio 1.4364 -1.0012 1.2015 -0.9831 1.2706 
   (6.5137) (6.5107) (6.519) (6.5156) (6.5119) 
Loan to asset ratio 19.2243 22.6599 17.7374 24.4403 19.0284 
   (19.0179) (19.1991) (19.0476) (19.2638) (19.0367) 
Leverage ratio 0.2504 0.2633 0.3061 0.287 0.2507 
   (0.4116) (0.4048) (0.4102) (0.4049) (0.4113) 
Revenue composition 1.5376 1.1422 1.7908 1.1001 1.7553 
   (5.2019) (5.2421) (5.2016) (5.2811) (5.2122) 
Efficiency ratio -0.1307 -0.1189 -0.1901 -0.1577 -0.0314 
   (3.2565) (3.2737) (3.2528) (3.2817) (3.2578) 
Intercept  127.6069** 137.1434** 119.3468** 139.5054* 140.325** 
   (62.0632) (64.804) (62.1702) (72.724) (63.6273) 
AR(1)  -0.6632*** -0.6719*** -0.6655*** -0.6706*** -0.6647*** 
   (0.0391) (0.03914) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) 
AR(2)  0.0317 0.0316 0.0329 0.0301 0.0364 
   (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0391) (0.0392) 
Crisis Dummy  -4.1487*** -4.0761*** -3.9102*** -3.9940*** -4.2205*** 
  (1.2461) (1.2672) (1.2467) (1.2646) (1.2522) 
R-squared  0.7266  0.7220 0.7266 0.7218 0.7270 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.9005 1.9058 1.9003 1.8999 1.9095 
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Panel E. Stock Return 
  AVERAGE RETURN  
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables         
SSBI + 0.0108    0.0098 
   (0.0086)    (0.0087) 
SSBI2 - -0.00015    -0.00013 
    (0.0001)       (0.00019) 
DSBI +   -0.0161   -0.0122 
     (0.0242)   (0.0244) 
DSBI2 -   0.00041   0.00016 
      (0.00226)     (0.0022) 
TSBI +    -0.0642    
      (0.4187)    
TSBI2 -    0.0174    
        (0.1612)     
TQI +     -0.2297*   
       (0.1371)   
TQI2 -     0.0491**   
          (0.026)   
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  -0.2969** -0.2823** -0.2883** -0.2504 -0.2908** 
   (0.1203) (0.1215) (0.1205) (0.1575) (0.1218) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.9584 -0.8177 -0.8653 -0.9541 -0.9154 
   (0.5965) (0.5797) (0.5766) (0.7714) (0.611) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0361 0.0286 0.0302 0.0369 0.0342 
   (0.0229) (0.0226) (0.0228) (0.0293) (0.0235) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.2856 0.3294 0.3489 0.3347 0.2731 
   (0.2734) (0.2683) (0.275) (0.3552) (0.2743) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.0938 -0.0118 -0.0341 -0.1331 0.0977 
   (0.7215) (0.722) (0.7341) (0.956) (0.7283) 
Leverage ratio  -0.0118 -0.0131 -0.0133 -0.028 -0.0121 
   (0.0167) (0.0162) (0.0165) (0.0216) (0.0168) 
Revenue composition  1.517*** 1.5647*** 1.5489*** 1.3837*** 1.5331*** 
   (0.3342) (0.3353) (0.3485) (0.4029) (0.3368) 
Efficiency ratio  -1.0055*** -1.011*** -0.9597*** -0.8398*** -1.0399*** 
   (0.2783) (0.2808) (0.2808) (0.3179) (0.282) 
Intercept  5.4006** 5.1663** 5.162** 5.647 5.3035** 
   (2.4209) (2.4311) (2.3315) (3.6393) (2.4416) 
AR(1)  0.3189*** 0.3189*** 0.3191*** 0.3182*** 0.3186*** 
   (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335) 
Crisis Dummy   -0.2127*** -0.2096*** -0.2210*** -0.2206*** -0.2057*** 
  (0.0529) (0.0547) (0.0527) (0.0530) (0.0549) 
R-squared  0.1968 0.1961 0.1962 0.1986 0.1975 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.9948 1.9957 1.9944 2.0005  1.9956 
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Panel F. Sharpe Ratio 
  SHARPE RATIO 
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables         
SSBI + 0.0262    0.0248 
   (0.0235)    (0.0237) 
SSBI2 - -0.00033    -0.00032 
    (0.00051)       (0.00051) 
DSBI +   -0.0687   -0.0591 
     (0.0658)   (0.0664) 
DSBI2 -   0.0084   0.0078 
      (0.0061)     (0.0061) 
TSBI +    0.0153    
      (0.0218)    
TSBI2 -    -0.00004    
        (0.0003)     
TQI +     0.1029   
       (0.2787)   
TQI2 -     0.0163   
          (0.053)   
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  -1.3106*** -1.3565*** -1.3133*** -1.3512*** -1.3783*** 
   (0.326) (0.329) (0.3275) (0.3271) (0.3296) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -1.5896 -0.9711 -1.3601 -1.1659 -1.2062 
   (1.6244) (1.5765) (1.6512) (1.5698) (1.6599) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0625 0.0343 0.0663 0.0443 0.0487 
   (0.0622) (0.0613) (0.0624) (0.0609) (0.0635) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -0.0923 0.1046 -0.0703 0.1855 -0.0384 
   (0.743) (0.7281) (0.739) (0.729) (0.7438) 
Loan to asset ratio  -0.6197 -1.2295 -0.68 -1.1256 -0.9537 
   (1.9638) (1.9619) (1.9733) (1.9507) (1.9777) 
Leverage ratio  -0.00237 -0.0045 0.00258 0.00174 -0.0016 
   (0.0455) (0.0439) (0.0454) (0.0443) (0.0455) 
Revenue composition  1.8736** 2.0542** 1.8559** 1.9186** 1.9757** 
   (0.8943) (0.8958) (0.8966) (0.8907) (0.8993) 
Efficiency ratio  -1.1174 -0.9679 -1.0482 -0.9792 -1.0388 
   (0.7352) (0.7403) (0.7337) (0.7332) (0.7431) 
Intercept  24.3457*** 25.1156*** 24.1078*** 28.6045*** 25.4512*** 
   (6.5613) (6.5798) (6.5422) (7.5709) (6.6054) 
AR(1)   0.2375*** 0.2391*** 0.2370*** 0.2396*** 0.2396*** 
   (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0344) 
Crisis Dummy  -0.9405*** -0.9566*** -0.9572*** -0.9820*** -0.9471*** 
  (0.1451) (0.1494) (0.1445) (0.1449) (0.1499) 
R-squared  0.1978 0.1983 0.1975 0.1992 0.1996 
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.0229 2.0240 2.0216 2.0243 2.0245 
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Figure 10 shows the plot of SSBI index and the risk-adjusted ROA. Bank size is 
shown as a circle where bigger banks are shown as bigger circles. The figure shows that 
as the level of activity/disclosure increases, bank performance declines. However after a 
certain point, as the level of activity/disclosure increases, performance also increases. As 
seen in the figure, banks those have higher disclosure/activity level and higher 
performance are bigger banks (Citigroup, Wachovia, Bank of America), which suggests 
that bigger banks may benefit from an economies of scale and handle securitization and 
credit derivative activities more profitably than smaller banks. 
 
Figure 10. SSBI and Risk-Ajusted ROA 
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Also, the results suggest that there is a level of disclosure/activity after which the 
bank performance increases. The level of the SSBI where the risk-adjusted ROA starts to 
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increase is 28.09 and where the risk-adjusted ROE starts to increase is 34.0; similarly the 
level of TSBI where the risk-adjusted ROA starts to increase is 31.6 and where the risk-
adjusted ROE starts to increase is 35.7. 
Another way to looking at this relationship is plotting the actual index values 
against performance and stability measures. Figure 11 shows the graphs for index values 
and performance/stability measures which have a min/max value. All the graphs show 
that up to a certain point the performance/stability measures decline and after reaching a 
minimum increase slowly. Part a of Figure 11 exhibits the relationship between z value 
and TSBI. Each dot represents the index level which corresponds to the z-value on the x 
axis. The graph clearly shows the turning point for the TSBI level after which the z-value 
starts to increase. The turning point shown in the graph (22.1) is approximately consistent 
with the theoretical turning point calculated (30.9), though not identical. The banks those 
lie to the right of the turning point are J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, Wachovia and Bank of 
America, all of which are money center banks that handle securitization activities 
efficiently. The results show that as the level of disclosure/activity increases, 
performance and stability of the bank holding companies decreases. However, the 
situation reverses for money center banks which have reached the economies of scale.  
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Figure 11. Turning Points 
a) TSBI and Z-value    b) SSBI and Z-value 
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5.1.1.2. Call Report Disclosure and Stability 
Table VII shows the regression results for disclosure/activity and bank stability. 
Disclosure/activity affects only the bank’s z-statistic (coefficient on SSBI is -20.7143, 
SSBI2 is 0.3745; coefficient on TSBI is -20.2501, TSBI2 is 0.3267). However, the signs 
of the coefficients are not as expected. This suggests that after a certain point, providing 
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information to the market stabilizes the bank holding company. The level of the SSBI 
after which the bank stabilizes is 27.6 and the level of TSBI after which the bank 
stabilizes is 30.9. The table exhibits that bank stability when measured by beta or 
standard deviation of stock returns, is not sensitive to the level of information/activity 
provided by the bank holding company regarding their securitization and credit derivative 
activities.  
As a robustness check to the call report disclosure and bank performance/ 
stability, the tests are run again with an interaction term between crisis and disclosure. 
The results were essentially the same as before. Also, to see if the large banks are biasing 
the results, the largest three banks are dropped from the sample and the whole tests are 
run again. The results haven’t changed much; showing the same U-shaped relationship 
between bank performance and disclosure and an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
bank stability and disclosure.  
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Table VII. Disclosure/Activity and Stability 
This table shows the regression results for disclosure/activity and stability. SSBI is securitization subcategory binary 
index, DSBI is credit derivative activities subcategory binary index, TSBI is total activities subcategory binary index 
and TQI is total quantitative index.  ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
Panel A. Volatility of Stock Returns 
  STD.DEV. OF RETURN 
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables        
SSBI - -0.0035    -0.0029 
  (0.0045)    (0.0045) 
SSBI2 + 0.000002    -0.000009 
    (0.000098)       (0.000099) 
DSBI -   0.0127   0.0119 
    (0.0126)   (0.0127) 
DSBI2 +   -0.00065   -0.0006 
      (0.00118)     (0.0011) 
TSBI -    -0.0013   
     (0.0042)   
TSBI2 +    -0.00001   
        (0.000074)     
TQI -     -0.045  
      (0.0534)  
TQI2 +     0.0063  
          (0.0102)   
Control variables        
Bank size (log assets)  0.327*** 0.3216*** 0.3282*** 0.3281*** 0.3251*** 
  (0.0591) (0.0603) (0.0594) (0.0596) (0.0603) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.1092 -0.1349 -0.1193 -0.1336 -0.1655 
  (0.3045) (0.3009) (0.3095) (0.2994) (0.3121) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0554*** 0.0599*** 0.0564*** 0.0575*** 0.0568*** 
  (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.0109) (0.0108) (0.011) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.157 0.1294 0.1404 0.1145 0.1617 
  (0.1359) (0.1341) (0.1353) (0.1341) (0.1362) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.5733 0.6415* 0.6009 0.6473* 0.5934 
  (0.3673) (0.3684) (0.3683) (0.3665) (0.3701) 
Leverage ratio  -0.00072 0.00179 -0.00045 0.0004 -0.00038 
  (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0084) 
Revenue composition  -0.1062 -0.1202 -0.1089 -0.1047 -0.1144 
  (0.1238) (0.1243) (0.1239) (0.1238) (0.1246) 
Efficiency ratio  1.0123*** 1.0091*** 1.0041*** 1.0036*** 1.0214*** 
  (0.0902) (0.0903) (0.0899) (0.0899) (0.0907) 
Intercept  -7.2379*** -7.2657*** -7.282*** -7.9281*** -7.2124*** 
  (1.2431) (1.2599) (1.2405) (1.373) (1.2615) 
AR(1)  -0.4682*** -0.4673*** -0.4704*** -0.4718*** -0.4625*** 
  (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0350) 
AR(2)  0.1549*** 0.1524*** 0.1557*** 0.1576*** 0.1500*** 
  (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0384) 
AR(3)  -0.1226*** -0.1222*** -0.1206*** -0.1237*** -0.1212*** 
  (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0385) (0.0384) 
AR(4)  0.1582*** 0.1569*** 0.15873*** 0.1603*** 0.1559*** 
  (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0350) 
R-squared  0.6195 0.6192  0.6194 0.6196 0.6192 
Crisis dummy  0.3366*** 0.3313*** 0.3399*** 0.3422*** 0.3298*** 
  (0.0284) (0.0289) (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0289) 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.9337 1.9235 1.9378 1.9347 1.9224 
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Panel B. Beta 
  BETA 
 Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables         
SSBI - -0.0059    -0.0056 
  (0.0077)    (0.0078) 
SSBI2 + 0.000017    0.000012 
    (0.00016)       (0.0001) 
DSBI -   0.0149   0.0128 
    (0.0216)   (0.0218) 
DSBI2 +   -0.0016   -0.0015 
      (0.0020)     (0.00203) 
TSBI -    -0.0033    
     (0.0071)    
TSBI2 +    -0.00003    
        (0.00012)     
TQI -     -0.1165   
      (0.0917)   
TQI2 +     0.0175   
          (0.0174)   
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  0.647*** 0.6535*** 0.653*** 0.6545*** 0.659*** 
  (0.1032) (0.105) (0.1038) (0.1041) (0.1049) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  0.8786* 0.8277 0.8314 0.7868 0.8017 
  (0.5285) (0.5178) (0.5373) (0.5156) (0.5406) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0718*** 0.0802*** 0.0721*** 0.0748*** 0.0742*** 
  (0.0196) (0.0194) (0.0196) (0.0193) (0.0199) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.3708 0.3093 0.3551 0.3022 0.3633 
  (0.2393) (0.2364) (0.2382) (0.2365) (0.2401) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.4432 0.5838 0.4792 0.5681 0.5026 
  (0.6393) (0.6422) (0.6422) (0.6387) (0.6447) 
Leverage ratio  0.0215 0.0246* 0.0208 0.0221 0.0215 
  (0.0147) (0.0143) (0.0147) (0.0144) (0.0147) 
Revenue composition  -0.3232 -0.3578 -0.3235 -0.326 -0.3403 
  (0.255) (0.2561) (0.2555) (0.2549) (0.2566) 
Efficiency ratio  2.0207*** 1.993*** 2.0053*** 2.0098*** 2.0131*** 
  (0.1974) (0.1982) (0.197) (0.1972) (0.1988) 
Intercept  -15.0201*** -15.4308*** -15.0817*** -15.2322*** -15.2479*** 
  (2.4019) (2.4203) (2.3955) (2.4037) (2.4246) 
AR(1)  -0.1032*** -0.1070*** -0.1039*** -0.1068*** -0.1031*** 
  (0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0352) 
Crisis Dummy  0.3883*** 0.3906*** 0.3933*** 0.3983*** 0.3874*** 
  (0.0472) (0.0486) (0.0470) (0.0474) (0.0486) 
R-squared  0.4303 0.4299 0.4303 0.4306 0.4307 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.9833 1.9848 1.9855 1.9850 1.9839 
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Panel C. Z Statistic 
  Z 
  Exp. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables         
SSBI + -20.7143***    -21.0112*** 
   (5.9701)    (5.9954) 
SSBI2 - 0.3745***    0.3866*** 
    (0.1178)       (0.119) 
DSBI +   -5.6932   -10.231 
     (15.037)   (14.9636) 
DSBI2 -   0.6996   1.1294 
      (1.3576)     (1.359) 
TSBI +    -20.2501***    
      (5.586)    
TSBI2 -    0.3267***    
        (0.0944)     
TQI +     -13.1409   
       (59.6204)   
TQI2 -     6.2267   
          (10.2659)   
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  -68.9524 -70.687 -67.8941 -70.156 -75.0036 
   (73.3756) (76.2545) (73.6281) (75.2386) (75.462) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -451.7683 -468.2247 -341.7934 -535.1279 -412.8503 
   (366.9689) (377.6079) (368.0354) (374.7273) (374.9201) 
Risk based capital ratio  -1.2531 1.5182 -1.7517 1.2224 -2.0155 
   (11.2752) (11.2852) (11.2323) (11.2775) (11.318) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -65.1352 -90.974 -62.314 -93.1649 -65.6723 
   (148.1613) (146.9811) (147.978) (146.8937) (148.3952) 
Loan to asset ratio  496.1412 502.1234 453.4764 553.1493 484.354 
   (440.2375) (441.6807) (439.7357) (443.8044) (441.1512) 
Leverage ratio  16.2707* 14.8692 16.8292* 15.1529* 16.2743* 
   (9.4827) (9.3152) (9.4369) (9.3086) (9.4893) 
Revenue composition  55.6404 48.2018 61.3109 42.0733 60.565 
   (111.225) (111.8901) (110.9887) (113.0822) (111.3524) 
Efficiency ratio  -23.8772 -22.0417 -23.9884 -23.4139 -22.5902 
   (68.585) (68.8196) (68.3915) (68.9643) (68.5619) 
Intercept  1632 1507 1563 1596 1730 
   (1504) (1557) (1500) (1747) (1542) 
AR(1)  -0.8429*** -0.8513*** -0.8457*** -0.8510*** -0.8457*** 
   (0.0385) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0385) 
AR(2)  0.1819*** 0.1874*** 0.1844*** 0.1887*** 0.1848*** 
   (0.0385) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0385) 
Crisis Dummy   -119.602*** -115.565*** -116.558*** -116.440*** -119.147*** 
  (25.9853) (26.3190) (25.9351) (26.2900) (26.0671) 
R-squared  0.7682 0.7645 0.7689 0.7645 0.7686 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.9618 1.9609 1.9672 1.9656 1.9671 
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5.1.2. Annual Report Indices 
5.1.2.1. Annual Report Disclosure and Performance 
Table VIII exhibits the results of the regression between the annual report indices 
(SARI and DARI) and the performance measures (ROA, ROE, Risk-adjusted ROA, Risk-
adjusted ROE, Stock return and Sharpe ratio). 
When performance is measured by ROA or ROE, securitization annual report 
index (SARI) has no significant effect on performance but credit derivatives annual 
report index (DARI) has a significant impact on performance (When ROA is the 
dependent variable, coefficient on DARI is -0.0059 and DARI2 is 0.000004; when ROE 
is the dependent variable, coefficient on DARI is -0.0078 and DARI2 is 0.00005). On the 
other hand, when risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE are used as performance 
measures, the effect of credit derivatives index (DARI) disappears and securitization 
annual report index (SARI) shows a significant impact on performance (When risk-
adjusted ROA is the dependent variable, coefficient on SARI is -0.1015 and SARI2 is 
0.00026; when risk-adjusted ROE is the dependent variable, coefficient on SARI is -
0.0988 and SARI2 is 0.00027).  
However, in all cases the signs of the coefficients are opposite of the expected 
signs. On the contrary to the anticipation of increasing positive effects of disclosure up to 
an optimal point followed by decreasing effects, effects of information disclosure in 
annual reports decreases up to a certain point and starts to increase afterwards. As in call 
report indices, this can be explained by economies of scale. Smaller banks engage in less 
securitization and credit derivatives activities. Once a bank gets larger, it can handle 
securitization and derivative activities more effectively and the market positively 
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responds to more information. When smaller banks which bear more costs than profits of 
securitization and credit derivatives activities communicate more about those activities in 
their annual reports, market perceives it as a bad signal and the bank performance 
decreases consequently. For bigger banks which can effectively manage securitization 
and credit derivatives, market welcomes more information conveyed in annual reports 
and the bank performance increases.  
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Table VIII. Annual Report Disclosure and Performance 
This table shows the regression results for annual report disclosure and performance. SARI is securitization annual 
report index, DARI is credit derivative activities annual report index.  In Panel A ROA, and ROE, in Panel B risk-
adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE,  in Panel C stock return and Sharpe ratio is used as the performance measure. 
Risk based capital ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total capital ratio. Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it 
is shown in decimals. Time period: June 2001- December 2008. Crisis dummy represents January 2007-December 
2008 period. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. ROA, ROE 
  ROA ROE 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Hypothesis variables         
SARI + 0.000006  0.00014   
  (0.00005)  (0.00059)   
SARI2 - 0.00000003  -0.00000004   
    (0.00000016)   (0.000002)   
DARI +   -0.00059***   -0.0078*** 
    (0.00014)   (0.0017) 
DARI2 -   0.000004***   0.00005*** 
      (0.0000017)   (0.00002) 
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  -0.0048* -0.0013 -0.0638** -0.0192 
  (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0328) (0.0296) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.0248 -0.0284** -0.2312 -0.2743 
  (0.0153) (0.0145) (0.1827) (0.1719) 
Risk based capital ratio  -0.0017*** -0.0014*** -0.0227*** -0.0189*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0067) (0.0065) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -0.00008 -0.0048 0.0136 -0.0503 
  (0.0071) (0.007) (0.0851) (0.0833) 
Loan to asset ratio  -0.011 -0.0078 0.0339 0.0752 
  (0.0198) (0.0189) (0.2356) (0.2236) 
Leverage ratio  -0.00007 0.0002 0.0045 0.0087* 
  (0.00043) (0.0004) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
Revenue composition  0.0227*** 0.0232*** 0.3255*** 0.3378*** 
  (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0912) (0.0903) 
Efficiency ratio  -0.0148** -0.0139** -0.2019*** -0.1934** 
  (0.0064) (0.0063) (0.0772) (0.076) 
Intercept  0.1505*** 0.0889* 1.6587** 0.8715 
  (0.0553) (0.0516) (0.6596) (0.6105) 
AR(1)  -0.0507 -0.0414 -0.04934  -0.0358 
  (0.0361) (0.0361) (0.03611) (0.0361) 
Crisis Dummy  -0.0061*** -0.0044*** -0.0740*** -0.0521*** 
  (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0165) (0.0163) 
R-squared   0.2133 0.2348 0.2058 0.2330 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.7488 1.7674 1.8720 1.8940 
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Panel B. Risk-adjusted ROA, Risk-adjusted ROE 
  RAR(ROA) RAR(ROE) 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Hypothesis variables          
SARI + -0.1015**   -0.0988**   
  (0.0419)   (0.0504)   
SARI2 - 0.00026*   0.00027*   
    (0.00013)   (0.00016)   
DARI +   -0.1127   -0.1792 
    (0.1105)   (0.1329) 
DARIP2 -   0.00106   0.0018 
      (0.0012)   (0.0015) 
Control variables          
Bank size (log assets)  1.2624 -0.9232 -2.2309 -3.8889 
  (3.0622) (2.9256) (3.5795) (3.3695) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -26.997** -30.9209** -36.7302** -40.9843** 
  (13.6048) (13.5739) (16.2047) (16.0214) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.1016 -0.0536 0.3559 0.257 
  (0.4382) (0.4364) (0.5301) (0.5265) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -3.8972 -4.9908 0.497 -0.9053 
  (5.5861) (5.6003) (6.793) (6.7658) 
Loan to asset ratio  25.1752 30.4386* 19.9302 26.5546 
  (16.2447) (16.188) (19.4603) (19.1978) 
Leverage ratio  0.572* 0.5111 0.4229 0.4076 
  (0.3489) (0.3517) (0.4195) (0.4219) 
Revenue composition  3.1822 2.3842 3.1951 2.7272 
  (4.2589) (4.2369) (5.398) (5.3958) 
Efficiency ratio  1.4365 1.0689 0.2583 -0.2836 
  (2.8164) (2.8001) (3.6349) (3.6353) 
Intercept  -4.9798 30.3512 60.6273 85.6002 
  (61.4916) (59.9718) (71.8565) (69.1525) 
AR(1)  -0.7771*** -0.7902*** -0.6639*** -0.6623*** 
  (0.0404) (0.0404) (0.0402) (0.0402) 
AR(2)  0.0235 0.0258 -0.0689 -0.0731 
  (0.0514) (0.0517) (0.0484) (0.0483) 
AR(3)  0.1234*** 0.1237*** 0.1563*** 0.1608*** 
  (0.04047) (0.0404) (0.0402) (0.0402) 
Crisis Dummy  -4.7037*** -4.6822*** -3.9958*** -4.0245*** 
  (1.0307) (1.0377) (1.2421) (1.2455) 
R-squared  0.7822 0.7817 0.7335 0.7326 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.8709 1.8906 1.9055 1.9060 
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Panel C. Stock Return, Sharpe Ratio 
  AVERAGE RETURN  SHARPE RATIO 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Hypothesis variables         
SARI + 0.0022  0.00614   
  (0.0019)  (0.0055)   
SARI2 - -0.0000052  -0.000014   
    (0.0000065)   (0.000018)   
DARI +   0.0073   0.0186 
    (0.0057)   (0.0166) 
DARI2 -   -0.000039   -0.00012 
      (0.00007)   (0.00020) 
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  -0.0984 -0.0866 -0.0792 -0.0193 
  (0.1035) (0.0963) (0.2991) (0.2786) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.9058 -0.6512 -1.5805 -0.9256 
  (0.5821) (0.5597) (1.6794) (1.6198) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0447** 0.0462** 0.1043* 0.1122* 
  (0.0221) (0.0217) (0.0634) (0.0625) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.154 0.283 -1.124 -0.8205 
  (0.2738) (0.2751) (0.7875) (0.793) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.1488 -0.1688 1.3747 0.5697 
  (0.7563) (0.7328) (2.1773) (2.1168) 
Leverage ratio  -0.0097 -0.014 0.0622 0.054 
  (0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0478) (0.0486) 
Revenue composition  1.5625*** 1.562*** 3.2312*** 3.1726*** 
  (0.3256) (0.3305) (0.9143) (0.9286) 
Efficiency ratio  -0.7408** -0.7843*** -0.4659 -0.5282 
  (0.2887) (0.291) (0.801) (0.8075) 
Intercept  1.7111 1.5667 0.4955* -0.4369 
  (2.0838) (1.9867) (6.0198) (5.7466) 
AR(1)  0.3140*** 0.3172*** 0.1929*** 0.1936*** 
  (0.0343) (0.0342) (0.0354) (0.0354) 
Crisis Dummy  -0.2135*** -0.2269*** -0.9783*** -1.0031*** 
  (0.0524) (0.0531) (0.1468) (0.1489) 
R-squared  0.1881 0.19 0.1665 0.167 
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.0141 2.015 2.0131 2.0141 
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5.1.2.2. Annual Report Disclosure and Stability 
Table IX shows the regression results for annual report disclosure and bank 
stability. As in call report disclosure indices, z-statistic is the only stability measure 
which shows a significant quadratic relationship with bank disclosure (coefficient on 
SARI is -2.704 and SARI2 is 0.0066). And also as in call report disclosure indices, the 
signs of the coefficients are the opposite of the expected signs. This implies that 
disclosing information about securitization activities in annual reports (SARI) decreases 
stability as the market receives new information up to a point. Afterwards, the market 
better understands the bank’s level of engagement and proficiency in the activity and 
hence the bank stabilizes. When stability is measured by volatility of stock returns and 
beta, the squared term is not significant. There is a positive significant relationship 
between derivatives annual report index (DARI) and bank stability which shows that as a 
bank discloses more information about its derivative activities on its balance sheet, stock 
return volatility and beta decreases (when stock return volatility is the dependent 
variable, the coefficient on DARI is 0.0099 and when beta is the dependent variable, the 
coefficient on DARI is 0.0107).  
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Table IX. Annual Report Disclosure and Stability 
This table shows the regression results for annual report disclosure and stability. SARII is securitization annual report 
index, DARI is credit derivative activities annual report index,  Risk based capital ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total capital 
ratio. Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it is shown in decimals. Time period: June 2001- 
December 2008. In Panel A volatility of stock returns and beta; and in Panel B z statistic is used as the stability 
measure. Crisis dummy represents January 2007-December 2008 period. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% 
significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Volatility of Stock Returns and Beta 
  STD.DEV. OF RETURN BETA 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Hypothesis variables         
SARI - 0.0006  0.0002   
  (0.0010)  (0.0016)   
SARI2 + 0.0000011  0.0000027   
    (0.0000034)   (0.000005)   
DARI -   0.0099***   0.0107** 
    (0.0028)   (0.0046) 
DARI2 +   -0.00004   -0.00005 
      (0.00003)   (0.000056) 
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  0.0678 0.0605 0.27*** 0.2418*** 
  (0.0606) (0.0557) (0.0897) (0.0818) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.0434 0.0479 1.1931** 1.2896*** 
  (0.3133) (0.305) (0.4953) (0.4728) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0303*** 0.0286*** 0.0334* 0.0301* 
  (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0182) (0.0177) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.3122** 0.4084*** 0.5328** 0.6626*** 
  (0.1413) (0.1411) (0.2301) (0.2278) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.1444 0.0334 -0.5146 -0.6767 
  (0.397) (0.3903) (0.6368) (0.6134) 
Leverage ratio  -0.0063 -0.0112 0.0099 0.0030 
  (0.0087) (0.0088) (0.014) (0.014) 
Revenue composition  -0.1964* -0.2049* -0.2258 -0.2548 
  (0.1132) (0.1134) (0.232) (0.2322) 
Efficiency ratio  0.4952*** 0.5234*** 0.8645*** 0.8599*** 
  (0.0852) (0.0854) (0.1923) (0.1917) 
Intercept  -1.8798 -1.7339 -5.8868*** -5.3367*** 
  (1.2124) (1.1411) (1.8013) (1.6849) 
AR(1)  -0.6276*** -0.5996*** -0.1679*** -0.1556*** 
  (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0356) (0.0357) 
AR(2)  0.2544*** 0.2316***     
  (0.0417) (0.0412)     
AR(3)  -0.2111*** -0.2150***     
  (0.0417) (0.0412)     
AR(4)  0.1389*** 0.1223***     
  (0.0358) (0.0359)     
Crisis Dummy  0.3093*** 0.2831*** 0.3510*** 0.3304*** 
  (0.0268) (0.0268) (0.0451) (0.0450) 
R-squared  0.6384 0.6453 0.4063 0.4125 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.8270 1.8304 1.9862 1.9929 
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Panel B. Z Statistic 
  Z 
 Exp.  (1) (2) 
Hypothesis variables      
SARI + -2.704***   
  (1.06)   
SARI2 - 0.0066**   
    (0.0034)   
DARI +   -3.1752 
    (2.7675) 
DARI2 -   0.0295 
      (0.0322) 
Control variables      
Bank size (log assets)  51.87 -9.8 
  (78.6135) (75.0209) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -367.5169 -491.7314 
  (347.507) (345.267) 
Risk based capital ratio  11.114 6.7567 
  (11.1332) (11.0701) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -94.7937 -123.708 
  (140.5398) (140.6658) 
Loan to asset ratio  536.6232 692.4216* 
  (414.7917) (412.3946) 
Leverage ratio  21.5328** 20.0699** 
  (8.9047) (8.9677) 
Revenue composition  97.1864 75.4609 
  (107.4949) (106.829) 
Efficiency ratio  -23.3947 -34.2272 
  (69.8189) (69.4009) 
Intercept  -765.2602 241.5468 
  (1580) (1537) 
AR(1)  -0.8113*** -0.8246*** 
  (0.0403) (0.0402) 
AR(2)  0.1469*** 0.1536*** 
  (0.0403) (0.0402) 
Crisis Dummy  -117.5659*** -117.3352*** 
  (26.1520) (26.3107) 
R-squared  0.7861 0.7852 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.8803 1.9082 
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5.1.3. Analysis of Change in Quantity of Disclosure 
To explore the relationship between the disclosure/activity and bank 
performance/stability more closely, the quarters and banks that increase/decrease their 
securitization and credit derivative activities are determined. First, the indices are plotted 
against time for each BHC to see how the level of activity/disclosure changes by time. 
The detailed graphs for each bank in the sample can be found in Appendix C.  
After closely examining each bank’s index through time, a major changes table is 
constructed.  The major changes in the indices for each bank is given in Appendix D. 
Here a subjective intuition is used to determine which change is a major change. Usually, 
for indices which have low maximum values (i.e. DSBI) a change greater than 4 is 
considered to be a large change (L), for indices those have high maximum values (i.e. 
SSBI), a change greater than 7 is considered to be a major change. For quantitative 
measures of activity/ disclosure (TSQI and TDQI), a change in the index that is greater 
than 25% is noted as a major change. Also for annual report indices (SARI and DARI), a 
change greater than 25% in the index value is considered as a major change. Small 
changes (S) were also indicated in the table but not formally modeled. The direction of 
the change is indicated by an upside or downside arrow. The table also shows the timing 
of changes and the actual quantitative changes in the indices. 
Table X shows the overall count of the times when those increases/decreases in 
call report and annual report indices have a significant impact on performance and 
stability measures. For example, there are a total of 16 incidences where the change in the 
activity (call report indices) had a significant impact on Sharpe ratio; out of those 16, 14 
were increase in the activity and 2 were decrease in the activity. In general, the change in 
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the activity level had a positive impact on measures of stability. Table XI shows the 
details of the BHC name, whether the impact is positive or negative, which performance/ 
stability measure was affected and in which quarter it has happened. The results of the 
Tables X and XI combined show that in general, increases in activity have more 
significant impact on performance and stability when compared to decreases in activity. 
Also, performance measures are more affected than stability measures. Besides, the 
results point out that quantitative measures of disclosure are more sensitive to the 
changes in the disclosure level than qualitative measures of disclosure. Generally, market 
shows reactions to the changes in the level of disclosure/activity by money center banks, 
followed by regional banks. Starting March 2003, banks were required to disclose more 
details about their securitization activities. This shows that even though the bank had the 
same level of activity, a change in the detail of the activity is followed by a reaction in 
the market. The results show that most of the significant effects of change in the call 
report indices happened during 2003. Changes in the annual report indices during 2008 
significantly affected the ROA and ROE. Interestingly, changes in securitization annual 
report index have a positive effect while changes in credit derivatives annual report index 
have a negative effect on ROA, ROE, stock return and Sharpe ratio;  which implies that 
securitization activities are perceived to be more profitable. 
 
Table X. Overall Count of Significant Impact of Change in the Activity Levels 
This table shows the overall count of significant impact of change in activity levels. There are three columns for each performance/ stability measures. The first shows the total 
count, second shows if there was an increase in the activity and the third shows if there was a decrease in the activity. TSQI is total securitization activity quantitative index, TDQI 
is total credit derivative activities quantitative index, SSBI is securitization subcategory binary index, and DSBI is credit derivative activities subcategory binary index,, SARI is 
securitization annual report index, DARI is credit derivatives annual report index.  Panel A shows the effect of an increase/decrease in the activity on performance measures and 
Panel B shows the effect of an increase/decrease in the activity on stability measures. 
 
PANEL A. Performance Measures 
  Performance Measures
Disclosure/Activity 
Measure 
Total 
number of 
dummies 
introduced ROA ROE 
Risk-adjusted 
ROA 
Risk-adjusted 
ROE 
Stock 
return 
Sharpe 
ratio 
  Total Inc. Dec. Total Inc. Dec. Total Inc. Dec. Total Inc. Dec. Total Inc. Dec. Total Inc. Dec. 
TSQI 65 - - - - - - 6 3 3 4 3 1 1 - 1 3 2 1 
TDQI 113 - - - - - - 3 3 - 1 1 - 3 2 1 5 4 1 
SSBI 28 - - - - - - 1 1 - - - - 2 - 2 1 1 - 
DSBI 24 - - - - - - 3 3 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 2 2 - 
SARI 40 8 8 - 8 8 - 4 4 - 5 5 - 4 4 - 3 3 - 
DARI 23 5 4 1 5 4 1 - - - 1 1 - 3 3 - 2 2 - 
TOTAL  13 12 1 13 12 1 17 14 3 12 11 1 14 10 4 16 14 2 
Sign of + 8 7 1 7 6 1 10 9 1 5 5 - 10 7 3 12 10 2 
reg.coeff. - 5 5 - 6 6 - 7 5 2 7 6 1 4 3 1 4 4 - 
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PANEL B. Stability Measures 
  Stability Measures
Disclosure/Activity 
Measure 
Total number of 
dummies 
introduced Z-value 
Volatility of 
stock return Beta 
  Total Inc. Dec. Total Inc. Dec. Total Inc. Dec. 
TSQI 65 3 2 1 2 1 1 3 2 1 
TDQI 113 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 
SSBI 28 1 1 - 2 - 2 2 1 1 
DSBI 24 1 1 - - - - - - - 
SARI 40 5 5 - 10 9 1 8 7 1 
DARI 23 - - - 13 12 1 10 9 1 
TOTAL  11 10 1 28 23 5 24 20 4 
Sign of + 7 6 1 19 17 2 18 16 2 
reg.coeff. - 4 4 - 9 6 3 6 4 2 
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Table XI. Identity of the BHCs and the Quarters With a  Significant Impact on Performance/ Stability 
This table gives the details of the information shown on Table 6. It depicts the identity of the BHCs, when the change occurred and which disclosure/activity index level had 
changed. TSQI is total securitization activity quantitative index, TDQI is total credit derivative activities quantitative index , SSBI is securitization subcategory binary index, DSBI 
is credit derivative activities subcategory binary index, SARI is securitization annual report index and DARI is credit derivatives annual report index., Panel A shows the effect of 
an increase/decrease in the activity on performance measures and Panel B shows the effect of an increase/decrease in the activity on stability measures. 
Panel A. Performance Measures 
Performance Measures
  ROA 
+/- 
ROE 
+/- 
Risk-adjusted 
ROA +/- 
Risk-adjusted 
ROE +/- 
Stock 
return +/- 
Sharpe 
ratio +/- 
TSQI     EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
2006(02) 
+ WELLS FARGO 
2003(01) 
- ZIONS 2008(03) + EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
2006(04) 
- 
     WELLS FARGO 
2003(01) 
- US BANK 2006(01) + 
  
US BANK 
2003(02) 
+ 
     US BANK 2003(02) - SUSQUEHANNA 
2003(01) 
+   HUNTINGTON 
2003(04) 
+ 
     US BANK 2005(04) + FIFTH THIRD 
2003(03) 
+     
     US BANK 2006(01) + 
  
    
         SUSQUEHANNA 
2003(01) 
+             
TDQI     FIFTH THIRD 
2004(04) 
- FIFTH THIRD 
2004(04) 
- REGIONS 2008(03) + US BANK 2003(04) + 
     KEYCORP 2003(04) +   FIFTH THIRD 
2008(02) 
- US BANK 2006(03) + 
     KEYCORP 2004(03) +   JP MORGAN 
2008(03) 
+ NATIONAL CITY 
2003(04) 
+ 
           COMERICA 
2003(02) 
+ 
                      KEYCORP 
2003(04) 
+ 
SSBI     SUSQUEHANNA 
2005(04)-2006(04) 
-     ZIONS 2008(03) + CITIGROUP 
2001(03) 
- 
                 REGIONS 2008(02) -     
DSBI     FIFTH THIRD 
2004(04) 
- FIFTH THIRD 
2004(04) 
- WACHOVIA 
2002(01) 
+ US BANK 
2006(03)-2007(01) 
+ 
     US BANK 
2006(03)-2007(01) 
+     WACHOVIA 
2002(01) 
+ 
          KEYCORP 2003(04) +         
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(Cont.) 
SARI M&T BANK CORP. 
(2008) 
+ M&T BANK CORP. 
(2008) 
+ M&T BANK CORP. 
(2007) 
- M&T BANK CORP. 
(2003) 
- HUNTINGTON 
BANCSHARES  
(2008) 
+ COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2003) 
+ 
 J.P. MORGAN 
CHASE & CO. 
(2008) 
+ J.P. MORGAN 
CHASE & CO. 
(2008) 
+ M&T BANK CORP. 
(2008) 
- M&T BANK CORP. 
(2007) 
- PNC FINANCIAL 
SERVICES  
(2008) 
+ FIRST HORIZON 
NATIONAL  
(2008) 
+ 
 FIFTH THIRD 
BANCORP 
(2008) 
- FIFTH THIRD 
BANCORP 
(2008) 
- SUSQUEHANNA 
BANCSHARES 
(2003) 
+ M&T BANK CORP. 
(2008) 
- COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2003) 
+ NORTHERN 
TRUST 
CORPORATION 
(2007) 
+ 
 BB&T CORP. 
(2008) 
+ BB&T CORP. 
(2008) 
+ EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
(2007) 
+ SUSQUEHANNA 
BANCSHARES 
(2003) 
+ NORTHERN 
TRUST 
CORPORATION 
(2007) 
+   
 FIRST CITIZENS 
BANCSHARES 
(2008) 
+ FIRST CITIZENS 
BANCSHARES 
(2008) 
+   EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
(2007) 
+     
 SOUTH FINANCIAL 
GROUP 
(2008) 
+ SOUTH FINANCIAL 
GROUP 
(2008) 
-         
 NORTHERN 
TRUST 
CORPORATION 
(2008) 
+ NORTHERN TRUST 
CORPORATION 
(2008) 
+         
  EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
(2007) 
+ EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
(2007) 
+                 
DARI KEYCORP (2008) - KEYCORP (2008) -   WELLS FARGO & 
COMPANY 
(2008) 
- J.P. MORGAN 
CHASE & CO. 
(2002) 
- J.P. MORGAN 
CHASE & CO. 
(2002) 
- 
 FIFTH THIRD 
BANCORP 
(2008) 
- FIFTH THIRD 
BANCORP 
(2008) 
-     COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2008) 
- CITIGROUP INC. 
(2007) 
- 
 WACHOVIA CORP. 
(2007) 
+ WACHOVIA CORP. 
(2007) 
+     WELLS FARGO & 
COMPANY 
(2008) 
+   
 COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2008) 
- COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2008) 
-
-
         
 REGIONS 
FINANCIAL CORP. 
(2008) 
- REGIONS 
FINANCIAL CORP. 
(2008) 
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Panel B. Stability Measures 
 Stability Measures
 
Z-value +/- Volatility of stock return +/- Beta +/- 
TSQI US BANK 2005(04) + EAST WEST BANCORP 2007(01) - CITIGROUP 2002(04) + 
 US BANK 2006(01) + ZIONS 2008(03) + ZIONS 2008(03) + 
  SUSQUEHANNA 2003(01) +     EAST WEST BANCORP 2007(01) - 
TDQI KEYCORP  
2003(04) 
+ REGIONS  
2008(03) 
+ REGIONS 2008(03) + 
SSBI SUSQUEHANNA 2005(04)-2006(04) - ZIONS 2008(03) + ZIONS 2008(03) + 
      REGIONS  
2008(02) 
- FIRST CITIZENS 2005(02)-2005(04) + 
DSBI KEYCORP  
2003(04) 
+         
SARI M&T BANK CORP. (2003) - ZIONS BANCORP. (2007) - ZIONS BANCORP. (2007) - 
 M&T BANK CORP. (2007) - M&T BANK CORP. (2007) - HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES  (2008) + 
 M&T BANK CORP. (2008) - HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES  (2008) + FIFTH THIRD BANCORP (2008) + 
 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES  
(2003) 
+ FIFTH THIRD BANCORP  
(2008) 
+ BANK OF AMERICA CORP.  
(2008) 
+ 
 EAST WEST BANCORP (2007) + BANK OF AMERICA CORP.  
(2008) 
+ FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES 
(2005) 
+ 
   FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES  
(2007) 
- FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES 
(2007) 
- 
   WELLS FARGO & COMPANY  
(2007) 
- FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES 
(2008) 
- 
   SUNTRUST BANKS (2007) - EAST WEST BANCORP (2007) - 
   SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP (2008) +   
      EAST WEST BANCORP (2007) -     
DARI   ZIONS BANCORP. (2008) + ZIONS BANCORP. (2008) + 
   J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO.  
(2002) 
+ J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO.  
(2002) 
+ 
   J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO.  
(2008) 
+ KEYCORP  
(2008) 
+ 
   KEYCORP (2008) + FIFTH THIRD BANCORP (2008) + 
   FIFTH THIRD BANCORP (2008) + WACHOVIA CORP. (2007) - 
   WACHOVIA CORP. (2007) - BANK OF AMERICA CORP. (2008) + 
   BANK OF AMERICA CORP. (2008) + COLONIAL BANCGROUP (2008) + 
   COLONIAL BANCGROUP (2008) + WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (2008) + 
   WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (2008) + CITIGROUP INC. (2002) + 
   SUNTRUST BANKS (2008) + REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. (2008) + 
   NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION 
(2008) 
+   
   CITIGROUP INC. (2002) +   
   REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. (2008) +   
 
Besides, the results show that credit derivatives annual report changes decrease 
bank stability while the same effect does not exist for securitization activities. 
 When a bank’s activity/disclosure level goes from 0 to a positive number, that is 
considered as an entry in the activity and when a bank’s activity/disclosure index level 
goes down from a positive level to 0, that is considered as an exit from the market. The 
reactions to an entry or exit are different than a reaction to an increase or decrease in the 
activity level. First of all, there are several costs attached to pursuing securitization and 
credit derivatives activity. Also, these activities can provide growth and profit 
opportunities. Considering the importance of market perceptions about entering or 
leaving the activity, this issue is further elaborated. Table XII shows the overall count of 
the times when an entry to a market is significant and whether it has positive or negative 
effect. Table XIII shows the identities of the BHCs, the specific quarter of the market 
entry, and the performance/stability measure it affects. For example, there are 5 
incidences when an entry to the activity has a significant impact on risk-adjusted ROA. 
Three out of these 5 incidences have a positive impact on the risk-adjusted ROA10. The 
results show that entry to the market generally has positive effect both on performance 
and stability.  In case of annual report indices, when a bank first starts to disclose 
information on its credit derivative activities, this has a negative effect on bank’s ROA 
and ROE and at the same time, decreases bank stability by increasing stock return 
volatility and beta11.  
                                                 
T10 Those incidences with positive impact are US Bank’s entry in March 2006, Susquehanna Bank’s entry 
in March 2003 and Fifth Third Bank’s entry in September 2003. Fifth Third Bank’s entry in December 
2004 has a negative impact both on TDQI and DSBI indices.   
11 There are two BHCs whose first time discussion of credit derivative activities has a negative impact on 
ROA and ROE, and a positive impact on stock price volatility and beta. These are Colonial Bancgroup’s 
2008 entry and Regions Financial Corp.’s 2008 entry.  
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Table XII. Overall Count of Significant Impact of Entry to the Market 
This table shows the overall count of significant impact of entry to the market. There was only one instance when 
the exit from the market had a significant impact (US Bank, 2006, quarter 1 -effects the risk adjusted 
ROA); therefore it is not reported in this table. TSQI is total securitization activity quantitative index, TDQI is 
total credit derivative activities quantitative index, SSBI is securitization subcategory binary index, DSBI is credit 
derivative activities subcategory binary index, SARI is securitization annual report index and DARI is credit 
derivatives annual report index.  
 
 Performance Measures Stability Measures
 ROA ROE 
Risk-
adjusted
ROA 
Risk-
adjusted
ROE 
Stock 
return 
Sharpe
ratio Z-value 
Volatility 
of 
stock 
return Beta
TSQI - - 1 1 - - 1 - - 
TDQI - - 2 1 - 2 1 - - 
SSBI - - - - - - - - 1 
DSBI - - 2 1 - - 1 - - 
SARI - - - - - - - - - 
DARI 2 2 - - 1 - - 2 2 
TOTAL 2 2 5 3 1 2 3 2 3 
+ - - 3 1 - 2 3 2 3 
- 2 2 2 2 1 - - - - 
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Table XIII. Identity of the BHCs and the Quarters With a  Significant Entry Impact 
on Performance/ Stability 
This table gives the details of the information shown on Table XII. It depicts the identity of the BHCs, when the change 
occurred and which disclosure/activity index level had changed. There was only one instance when the exit from the 
market had a significant impact (US Bank, 2006, quarter 1 -effects the risk adjusted ROA); therefore it is not reported 
in this table.TSQI is total securitization activity quantitative index, TDQI is total credit derivative activities quantitative 
index , SSBI is securitization subcategory binary index, DSBI is credit derivative activities subcategory binary index, 
SARI is securitization annual report index and DARI is credit derivatives annual report index. Panel A shows the effect 
of an entry to the market on performance measures and Panel B shows the effect of an entry to the market on stability 
measures. 
Panel A. Performance Measures 
Performance Measures
 
ROA +/- ROE +/- 
Risk-
adjusted 
ROA +/- 
Risk-
adjusted
ROE +/- 
Stock  
return +/- 
Sharpe 
ratio +/- 
TSQI         US BANK 
2006(01) 
+ US 
BANK 
2006(01) 
+         
TDQI     FIFTH 
THIRD 
2004(04) 
- FIFTH 
THIRD 
2004(04) 
-   NATIONAL 
CITY 
2003(04) 
+ 
          KEYCORP
2003(04) 
+         KEYCORP
2003(04) 
+ 
SSBI                         
DSBI     FIFTH 
THIRD 
2004(04) 
- FIFTH 
THIRD 
2004(04) 
-         
          KEYCORP
2003(04) 
+             
SARI         
  
              
DARI COLONIAL 
BANC. 
(2008) 
- COLONIAL 
BANC. 
(2008) 
-     COLONIAL 
BANC. 
(2008) 
-  
 
 
REGIONS 
FIN. 
CORP. 
(2008) 
- REGIONS 
FIN. 
CORP. 
(2008) 
-        
 
 
Panel B. Stability Measures 
 Stability Measures
 
Z-value +/- 
Volatility of 
stock return +/- Beta +/- 
TSQI US BANK 
2006(01) 
+         
TDQI KEYCORP 
2003(04) 
+         
SSBI         FIRST CITIZENS 
2005(02)-2005(04) 
+ 
DSBI KEYCORP 
2003(04) 
+         
SARI             
DARI 
  
COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2008) + 
COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2008) + 
   
REGIONS FINANCIAL 
CORP. 
(2008) + 
REGIONS FINANCIAL 
CORP. 
(2008) + 
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Table XIV shows the separate effects of the increase and decrease in disclosure/ 
activity. It exhibits the identity of BHCs, when the increase/ decrease happened and 
which performance/ stability measure it has affected. The results show that increase in 
activity has more impact both on performance and on stability than a decrease in activity. 
Also, quantitative indices show more significant impact than categorical indices. 
Performance is more affected by an increase or decrease in the activity than stability.  
In 2003 and 2006, there was a regulatory change in the call reports which required 
banks to disclose more details about their securitization and credit derivative activities12. 
On the whole, increases in the disclosure/ activity that occurred during 2003 and 2006 
and decreases in the disclosure/ activity during 2008 had significant impact on 
performance and stability. 
As a robustness check, different regressions are run to see if there was a 
significant change in the quantitative measures of disclosure at the point in time when 
there was a regulation change requiring more detailed disclosure. The results show that 
the quantitative measures of disclosure were not affected by the regulatory changes. This 
supports the findings that the market reacted to the changes in disclosure rather than the 
changes in activity during 2003 and 2006.  
In general increase in call report and annual report indices results in an increase in 
performance except for an increase in credit derivatives annual report index. When banks 
discuss more about their credit derivative activities in their annual reports, their 
                                                 
12 Starting March 2003, banks has to report maximum amount of credit exposure arising from recourse or 
other seller provided credit enhancements provided to structures reported in the form of subordinated 
securities and other residual interests in 1-4 family residential loans, home equity lines, credit card 
receivables, auto loans, other consumer loans, commercial and industrial loans and all other loans and 
leases. 
Starting March 2006, banks has to report notional amounts of  credit default swaps, total return swaps, 
credit options and other credit derivatives when the bank is the guarantor and beneficiary. 
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performance is negatively affected. Almost all of those significant negative impacts of 
credit derivatives discussion in annual reports happened in 2008. This cannot be 
explained by the crisis since in all models a crisis dummy is included. However, it is 
closely related to the consequences of the crisis. Before 2008, markets were not quite 
aware of the real riskiness of the credit derivatives; hence more information disclosure 
did not affect performance and stability very much. When market learnt the real risks of 
credit derivatives, banks’ disclosure on those activities led to decrease in performance 
and stability.   
Table XIV. Identity of the BHCs and the Quarters With a  Significant Impact on Performance/ Stability by Increase or 
Decrease in Disclosure/ Activity 
This table shows the separate effects of the increase and decrease in disclosure/ activity. It depicts the identity of the BHCs, when the change occurred and which 
disclosure/activity index level had changed.TSQI is total securitization activity quantitative index, TDQI is total credit derivative activities quantitative index , SSBI is 
securitization subcategory binary index, and DSBI is credit derivative activities subcategory binary index, SARI is securitization annual report index and DARI is credit derivatives 
annual report index.  Panel A shows the effects of increase in disclosure/activity and Panel B shows the effects of decrease in disclosure/activity. 
 
Panel A. Increase in Disclosure/Activity 
 Performance Measures Stability Measures 
 Risk-adjusted  
ROA +/- 
Risk-adjusted  
ROE +/- 
Stock  
return +/- 
Sharpe  
ratio +/- Z-value +/- 
Volatility of  
stock return +/- Beta +/- 
TSQI EAST WEST 
BANCORP  
2006(02) 
+ US BANK  
2006(01) 
+   EAST WEST 
BANCORP  
2006(04) 
- US BANK  
2006(01) 
+ EAST WEST 
BANCORP  
2007(01) 
- CITIGROUP 
2002(04) 
+ 
 US BANK  
2006(01) 
+ SUSQUEHANNA 
2003(01) 
+   HUNTINGTON
2003(04) 
+ SUSQUEHANNA  
2003(01) 
+   EAST WEST 
BANCORP  
2007(01) 
- 
  SUSQUEHANNA  
2003(01) 
+ FIFTH THIRD  
2003(03) 
+         
    
        
TDQI FIFTH THIRD  
2004(04) 
- FIFTH THIRD  
2004(04) 
- REGIONS  
2008(03) 
+ US BANK  
2003(04) 
+ KEYCORP  
2003(04) 
+ REGIONS  
2008(03) 
+ REGIONS  
2008(03) 
+ 
 KEYCORP  
2003(04) 
+   FIFTH 
THIRD  
2008(02) 
- US BANK  
2006(03) 
+       
 KEYCORP  
2004(03) 
+     NATIONAL 
CITY  
2003(04) 
+       
              KEYCORP  
2003(04) 
+             
SSBI SUSQUEHANNA  
2005(04)-
2006(04) 
-         CITIGROUP  
2001(03) 
- SUSQUEHANNA  
2005(04)-2006(04) 
-     FIRST 
CITIZENS 
2005(02)-
2005(04) 
+ 
DSBI FIFTH THIRD  
2004(04) 
- FIFTH THIRD  
2004(04) 
- WACHOVI
A 
2002(01) 
+ US BANK  
2006(03)-
2007(01) 
+ KEYCORP  
2003(04) 
+     
 US BANK  
2006(03)-
2007(01) 
+     WACHOVIA 
2002(01) 
+       
 KEYCORP  
2003(04) 
+     
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(Cont.) 
 Performance Measures 
 
ROA +/- ROE +/- 
Risk-adjusted 
ROA +/- 
Risk-adjusted 
ROE +/- 
Stock 
return +/- 
Sharpe 
ratio +/- 
SARI M&T BANK CORP. 
(2008) 
+ M&T BANK CORP.
(2008) 
+ M&T BANK CORP.
(2007) 
- M&T BANK 
CORP. 
(2003) 
- HUNTINGTON 
BANCSHARES  
(2008) 
+ COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2003) 
+ 
 
J.P. MORGAN 
CHASE & CO. 
(2008) 
+ J.P. MORGAN 
CHASE & CO. 
(2008) 
+ M&T BANK CORP.
(2008) 
- M&T BANK 
CORP. 
(2007) 
- PNC FINANCIAL 
SERVICES  
(2008) 
+ FIRST 
HORIZON 
NATIONAL  
(2008) 
+ 
 
FIFTH THIRD 
BANCORP 
(2008) 
- FIFTH THIRD 
BANCORP 
(2008) 
- SUSQUEHANNA 
BANCSHARES 
(2003) 
+ M&T BANK 
CORP. 
(2008) 
- COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2003) 
+ NORTHERN 
TRUST CORP. 
(2007) 
+ 
 
BB&T CORP. 
(2008) 
+ BB&T CORP. 
(2008) 
+ EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
(2007) 
+ SUSQUEHANN
A 
BANCSHARES 
(2003) 
+ NORTHERN 
TRUST CORP. 
(2007) 
+   
 
FIRST CITIZENS 
BANCSHARES 
(2008) 
+ FIRST CITIZENS 
BANCSHARES 
(2008) 
+   EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
(2007) 
+     
 
SOUTH FINANCIAL 
GROUP 
(2008) 
+ SOUTH 
FINANCIAL 
GROUP 
(2008) 
- 
        
 
NORTHERN TRUST 
CORP. 
(2008) 
+ NORTHERN 
TRUST CORP. 
(2008) 
+ 
        
 
EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
(2007) 
+ EAST WEST 
BANCORP 
(2007) 
+ 
        
DARI KEYCORP 
(2008) 
- KEYCORP 
(2008) 
- 
  
WELLS FARGO 
& COMPANY 
(2008) 
- J.P. MORGAN 
CHASE & CO. 
(2002) 
- J.P. MORGAN 
CHASE & CO. 
(2002) 
- 
 
FIFTH THIRD 
BANCORP 
(2008) 
- FIFTH THIRD 
BANCORP 
(2008) 
- 
    
COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2008) 
- CITIGROUP 
INC. 
(2007) 
- 
 
COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2008) 
- COLONIAL 
BANCGROUP 
(2008) 
- 
    
WELLS FARGO 
& COMPANY 
(2008) 
+   
 
REGIONS 
FINANCIAL CORP. 
(2008) 
- REGIONS 
FINANCIAL CORP.
(2008) 
- 
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(Cont.) 
 Stability Measures 
 
Z-value +/- 
Volatility of 
stock return +/- Beta +/- 
SARI M&T BANK CORP. (2003) - ZIONS BANCORP. (2007) - ZIONS BANCORP. (2007) - 
 
M&T BANK CORP. (2007) - M&T BANK CORP. (2007) - HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES  (2008) + 
 
M&T BANK CORP. (2008) - HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES  (2008) + FIFTH THIRD BANCORP (2008) + 
 
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES (2003) + FIFTH THIRD BANCORP (2008) + BANK OF AMERICA CORP. (2008) + 
 
EAST WEST BANCORP (2007) + BANK OF AMERICA CORP. (2008) + FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES (2005) + 
 
  WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (2007) - FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES (2008) - 
   SUNTRUST BANKS (2007) - EAST WEST BANCORP (2007) - 
   SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP (2008) +   
      EAST WEST BANCORP (2007) -     
DARI   ZIONS BANCORP. (2008) + ZIONS BANCORP. (2008) + 
 
  J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. (2002) + J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. (2002) + 
 
  J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. (2008) + KEYCORP (2008) + 
 
  KEYCORP (2008) + FIFTH THIRD BANCORP (2008) + 
 
  FIFTH THIRD BANCORP (2008) + BANK OF AMERICA CORP. (2008) + 
 
  BANK OF AMERICA CORP. (2008) + COLONIAL BANCGROUP (2008) + 
   COLONIAL BANCGROUP (2008) + WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (2008) + 
   WELLS FARGO & COMPANY (2008) + CITIGROUP INC. (2002) + 
 
  SUNTRUST BANKS (2008) + REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. (2008) + 
 
  NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION (2008) + 
  
 
  CITIGROUP INC. (2002) +   
   REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. (2008) +   
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Panel B. Decrease in Disclosure/Activity 
 
 Performance Measures Stability Measures 
 
 
Risk-
adjusted 
ROA 
  
+/- 
  
Risk-
adjusted 
ROE 
  
+/- 
  
Stock 
return 
  
+/- 
  
Sharpe 
ratio 
  
+/- 
  
Z-value 
  
+/- 
  
Volatility of 
stock return 
  
+/- 
  Beta +/- 
TSQI WELLS 
FARGO 
2003(01) 
- WELLS 
FARGO 
2003(01) 
- ZIONS 
2008(03) 
+ US BANK 
2003(02) 
+ US 
BANK 
2005(04) 
+ ZIONS 
2008(03) 
+ ZIONS 
2008(03) 
+ 
 US BANK 
2003(02) 
-   
    
  
    
  US BANK 
2005(04) 
+                         
TDQI         JP Morgan
2008(03) 
+ COMERICA
2003(02) 
+             
SSBI     ZIONS 
2008(03) 
+     ZIONS 
2008(03) 
+ ZIONS 
2008(03) 
+ 
          REGIONS
2008(02) 
-         REGIONS 
2008(02) 
-     
DSBI                             
SARI 
                    
FIRST 
CITIZENS 
BANCSHARES 
(2007) 
- FIRST 
CITIZENS 
BANCSHARES 
(2007) 
- 
DARI WACHOVIA 
CORP. 
(2007) 
+ WACHOVIA 
CORP. 
(2007) 
+ 
      
WACHOVIA 
CORP. 
(2007) 
- WACHOVIA 
CORP. 
(2007) 
- 
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5. 2. Quality of Disclosure 
 5.2.1. Quality of Disclosure and Performance 
To understand if the market welcomes information of high quality more than 
information of lower quality, the relationship between the quality of information and 
bank performance and stability is examined. Three different measures are used as a proxy 
of the quality of disclosure. Given that almost all the articles appeared on Wall Street 
Journal for the banks in the sample exposed negative news, number of articles is also 
used as a quality measure in addition to the number of transparency related articles and 
the quality index (QualIndex).  Considering that during the crisis total number of articles 
about the banks have tremendously increased, an interaction term between the crisis years 
of 2007 and 2008 and the total number of articles is included in the regression to correct 
for the possible bias in the results.  
Table XV shows the results of the regressions where quality of disclosure is the 
independent variable and bank performance is the dependent variable. No significant 
effect of quality of disclosure on performance exists when performance is measured by 
ROA, ROE, risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE. When performance is measured 
by stock return, total number of articles about the bank affects its stock return negatively 
as expected (the coefficient of # of articles is -0.00452). For example, when there are 10 
articles for a bank in Wall Street Journal, this decreases the stock price by 4.5%. Also, 
when performance is measured by Sharpe ratio, number of articles on transparency issues 
negatively affects the bank performance as expected.  
 
   
Table XV. Quality of Disclosure and Performance 
This table shows the regression results for quality of disclosure and performance. # of articles is the total number of articles appeared in news, TRNS is the total number of 
transparency related articles appeared in news, Crisis*# of Articles is the interaction term between the crisis dummy used for 2007 and 2008 and the total number of articles. 
QualIndex is the disclosure quality index. In Panel A ROA, and ROE, in Panel B risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE, in Panel C stock return and Sharpe ratio is used as the 
performance measure. Risk based capital ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total capital ratio. Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it is shown in decimals. Time period: 
June 2001- December 2008. Crisis dummy represents January 2007-December 2008 period. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. ROA, ROE 
  ROA ROE 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hypothesis variables             
# of articles - -0.0000079 -0.00001 -0.000026   -0.000106 -0.00013 -0.000129   
  (0.0000502) (0.00005) (0.000059)   (0.00060) (0.00061) (0.00071)   
TRNS -   0.00028 0.00028    0.00243 0.00243   
    (0.00094) (0.00094)    (0.0115) (0.0115)   
Crisis*# of articles -    0.000017     0.0000037   
     (0.000032)     (0.000397)   
QualIndex +     -0.000014    -9.5E-05 
      (0.000067)    (0.00082) 
Control variables             
Bank size (log assets)  -0.0062** -0.00625** -0.0063** -0.00635** -0.0872*** -0.0871*** -0.0871*** -0.0885*** 
  (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0326) (0.0326) (0.0327) (0.0317) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.0193 -0.0193 -0.018 -0.0189 -0.1078 -0.1072 -0.1071 -0.1026 
  (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.016) (0.0157) (0.1918) (0.1919) (0.1925) (0.1897) 
Risk based capital ratio  -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0023*** -0.0292*** -0.0292*** -0.0292*** -0.0293*** 
  (0.00058) (0.00058) (0.00059) (0.00058) (0.0070) (0.0070) (0.0071) (0.0070) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.0020 0.00209 0.00215 0.00224 0.0216 0.022 0.022 0.0237 
  (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.00761) (0.00758) (0.0916) (0.0917) (0.0917) (0.0914) 
Loan to asset ratio  -0.0286 -0.0288 -0.0293 -0.0291 -0.2488 -0.2507 -0.2508 -0.2547 
  (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0206) (0.0204) (0.2476) (0.2479) (0.2483) (0.2463) 
Leverage ratio  0.000041 0.000046 0.00002 0.000031 0.0052 0.0052 0.00524 0.0050 
  (0.00046) (0.000469) (0.00047) (0.00046) (0.0056) 0.0056 (0.00568) (0.0055) 
Revenue composition  0.0289*** 0.0289*** 0.0294*** 0.0291*** 0.3916*** 0.3918*** 0.3919*** 0.3936*** 
  (0.0080) (0.00806) (0.00812) (0.0079) (0.0977) (0.0977) (0.0985) (0.0969) 
Efficiency ratio  -0.0353*** -0.0354*** -0.0355*** -0.0354*** -0.4821*** -0.4828*** -0.4828*** -0.483*** 
  (0.0062) (0.00628) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0763) (0.0763) (0.0764) (0.0761) 
Intercept  0.1953*** 0.1951*** 0.1972*** 0.1982*** 2.3592*** 2.3574*** 2.3579*** 2.3902*** 
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  (0.0555) (0.0556) (0.0557) (0.0548) (0.6688) (0.6691) (0.6713) (0.6603) 
AR(1)  -0.0574 -0.0568 -0.0564 -0.05717 -0.0442 -0.0438 -0.0438 -0.0442 
  (0.0359) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0360) 
Crisis Dummy  -0.007147 -0.007130 -0.007336 -0.007142 -0.0854 -0.0853 -0.0853 -0.0854 
  0.0014*** 0.0014*** 0.0015*** 0.0014*** 0.0177*** 0.0177*** 0.0183*** 0.0177*** 
R-squared  (0.2541) (0.2541) (0.2544) (0.2541) (0.2477) (0.2477) (0.2477) (0.2476) 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.954 1.9544 1.9546 1.9539 1.9464 1.9466 1.9466 1.9462 
 
Panel B. Risk-adjusted ROA, Risk-adjusted ROE 
 
  RAR(ROA) RAR(ROE) 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hypothesis variables              
# of articles - 0.0010 -0.00084 -0.0185   0.0046 -0.00206 -0.0295   
  (0.0226) (0.0235) (0.0277)   (0.0299) (0.0306) (0.0356)   
TRNS -   0.0132 0.0158     0.4737 0.4826   
    (0.3585) (0.3585)     (0.4632) (0.4625)   
Crisis*# of articles -    0.0266      0.04   
     (0.022)      (0.0265)   
QualIndex +     -0.0053     -0.0155 
      (0.0229)     (0.0299) 
Control variables              
Bank size (log assets)  -2.0278 -1.9934 -2.2558 -1.9928 -4.895 -4.9089 -5.3527* -4.8164 
  (2.9009) (2.852) (2.8587) (2.8435) (3.2748) (3.2748) (3.2843) (3.2646) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -29.7415** -31.6018** -30.7877** -31.4357** -41.7092*** -41.1437** -39.6267** -41.2341** 
  (13.8111) (13.6063) (13.6197) (13.6028) (16.0405) (16.0495) (16.0616) (16.0485) 
Risk based capital ratio  -0.1425 -0.158 -0.1994 -0.1555 0.1247 0.128 0.0541 0.1403 
  (0.4217) (0.4177) (0.4189) (0.4162) (0.5022) (0.5022) (0.5039) (0.5008) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -5.705 -5.3911 -4.9266 -5.3681 -0.9462 -0.8243 -0.1555 -0.9127 
  (5.6464) (5.6053) (5.6182) (5.5964) (6.7568) (6.7575) (6.7635) (6.7514) 
Loan to asset ratio  28.5486* 28.0228* 26.4802* 28.0445* 24.0732 23.8985 21.5567 24.212 
  (16.5089) (16.2078) (16.252) (16.1862) (19.1908) (19.1905) (19.2263) (19.1718) 
Leverage ratio  0.4382 0.424 0.3765 0.4275 0.3166 0.3202 0.2404 0.3329 
  (0.354) (0.3481) (0.3501) (0.3477) (0.4163) (0.4163) (0.4191) (0.4157) 
Revenue composition  1.5194 1.8107 2.2962 1.8372 2.2953 2.4708 3.2512 2.1432 
 88
(Cont.) 
  (4.3246) (4.287) (4.3041) (4.1896) (5.4284) (5.4304) (5.4468) (5.309) 
Efficiency ratio  0.7375 0.7032 0.5445 0.7051 -0.4677 -0.4916 -0.6754 -0.4016 
  (2.5391) (2.5489) (2.5522) (2.5304) (3.2758) (3.2755) (3.2737) (3.2531) 
Intercept  52.443 54.0435 59.6727 54.3084 108.1868* 107.8367* 117.1409* 107.4661* 
  (59.360) (58.3183) (58.4704) (58.1002) (67.0058) (67.006) (67.2113) (66.7392) 
AR(1)  -0.8032*** -0.7878*** -0.7868*** -0.7886*** -0.665*** -0.6652*** -0.6653*** -0.666*** 
  (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.04027) (0.0400) (0.0400) (0.04005) (0.0399) 
AR(2)  0.1104*** 0.0038 0.0010 0.0047 -0.0969*** -0.0970*** -0.0986*** -0.0964*** 
  (0.0403) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0514) (0.0481) (0.04815) (0.0481) (0.0481) 
AR(3)    0.1319*** 0.1338*** 0.1313*** 0.1740*** 0.1743*** 0.1766*** 0.1749*** 
    (0.0403) (0.0403) (0.0402) (0.0400) (0.0400) (0.04005) (0.0399) 
Crisis Dummy  -4.8749*** -4.6364*** -5.0249*** -4.6321*** -4.0979*** -4.0579*** -4.6287*** -4.1020*** 
  (1.0450) (1.0349) (1.0849) (1.0327) (1.2374) (1.2380) (1.2930) (1.2361) 
R-squared  0.7792 0.7832 0.7837 0.7833 0.7348 0.7353 0.7364 0.7350 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.8843  1.8939 1.8941 1.8951 1.8986 1.8965 1.8985 1.8998 
 
Panel C. Stock Return, Sharpe Ratio 
 
  AVERAGE RETURN  SHARPE RATIO 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hypothesis variables             
# of articles - -0.0045** -0.00452** -0.0041*  0.00480 0.0070 0.0103   
  (0.00204) (0.00206) (0.0023)  (0.00560) (0.0056) (0.0065)   
TRNS -   -0.0037 -0.0033    -0.325*** -0.3252***   
    (0.0427) (0.0428)    (0.1138) (0.1138)   
Crisis*# of articles -    -0.00045     -0.0031   
     (0.00118)     (0.0033)   
QualIndex +     -0.0023     0.0069 
      (0.0030)     (0.0082) 
Control variables             
Bank size (log assets)  0.0233 0.0232 0.0257 -0.0324 0.0133 0.0082 0.023 0.0701 
  (0.098) (0.0982) (0.0985) (0.095) (0.279) (0.2769) (0.2774) (0.2682) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -1.0689* -1.0695* -1.0828* -0.8174 -0.7241 -0.8338 -0.9203 -0.9917 
  (0.5791) (0.5799) (0.5815) (0.5695) (1.6409) (1.629) (1.6323) (1.6065) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0477** 0.0477** 0.0484** 0.0471** 0.1176* 0.1122* 0.1165** 0.1181* 
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  (0.0218) (0.0218) (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0616) (0.0612) (0.0614) (0.0613) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.2306 0.2299 0.2285 0.2945 -0.9302 -0.9862 -0.9916 -1.0383 
  (0.2768) (0.2773) (0.2775) (0.2778) (0.7873) (0.7817) (0.782) (0.781) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.1443 0.1472 0.1578 -0.1017 0.2796 0.5528 0.6254 0.6006 
  (0.7464) (0.7482) (0.7494) (0.7435) (2.1206) (2.1067) (2.109) (2.096) 
Leverage ratio  0.0022 0.00216 0.0028 -0.0050 0.0566 0.0515 0.0557 0.0642 
  (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0173) (0.0169) (0.0487) (0.0484) (0.0486) (0.0476) 
Revenue composition  1.7363*** 1.7355*** 1.7153*** 1.7128*** 3.2853*** 3.281*** 3.1657*** 3.2123*** 
  (0.3233) (0.3237) (0.328) (0.3241) (0.9005) (0.8946) (0.9032) (0.8919) 
Efficiency ratio  -0.8718*** -0.8685*** -0.8667*** -0.8761*** -0.4196 -0.3176 -0.3014 -0.3683 
  (0.2708) (0.2734) (0.2736) (0.2727) (0.7366) (0.7332) (0.7335) (0.7344) 
Intercept  -0.3167 -0.3172 -0.3691 0.8672 -1.0267 -0.9127 -1.2328 -2.6861 
  (2.0066) (2.0091) (2.0154) (1.9896) (5.7119) (5.6691) (5.6815) (5.602) 
AR(1)  0.3024*** 0.3015*** 0.3010*** 0.3018*** 0.1835*** 0.1876*** 0.1871*** 0.1905*** 
  (0.0344) (0.0343) (0.0344) (0.0343) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.0354) (0.03537) 
Crisis Dummy  -0.2321*** -0.2354*** -0.2261*** -0.2317*** -1.0146*** -1.0315*** -0.9950*** -1.0144*** 
  (0.0536) (0.0536) (0.0553) (0.0534) (0.1511) (0.1501) (0.1551) (0.1504) 
R-squared  0.1852 0.1907  0.1908 0.1861 0.1692 0.1780 0.1789 0.1693 
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.0432 2.0394 2.0394 2.0317 2.0268 2.0281 2.0268 2.0195 
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5.2.2. Quality of Disclosure and Stability 
Table XVI shows the relationship between quality of disclosure and bank 
stability. The results show that no matter which measure is used, bank stability is not 
affected by the quality of the disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table XVI. Quality of Disclosure and Stability 
This table shows the regression results for quality of disclosure and stability. # of articles is the total number of articles appeared in news, TRNS is the total number of transparency 
related articles appeared in news, Crisis*# of Articles is the interaction term between the crisis dummy used for 2007 and 2008 and the total number of articles. QualIndex is the 
disclosure quality index. In Panel A volatility of stock returns and beta; and in Panel B z statistic is used as the stability measure. Risk based capital ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total 
capital ratio. Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it is shown in decimals. Time period: June 2001- December 2008. Crisis dummy represents January 2007-
December 2008 period. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Volatility of Stock Returns and Beta 
  STD.DEV. OF RETURN BETA 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hypothesis variables             
# of articles + -4.1E-05 -0.000105 0.00001  0.00021 0.00020 -0.00012   
  (0.00079) (0.0008) (0.0009)  (0.00158) (0.0016) (0.00186)   
TRNS +   0.00604 0.00603    0.0004 0.00050   
    (0.0129) (0.0129)    (0.0293) (0.0293)   
Crisis*Number of articles +    -0.00015     0.00037   
     (0.00066)     (0.00105)   
QualIndex -     -0.00031     -0.0018 
      (0.00087)     (0.0020) 
Control variables             
Bank size (log assets)  0.1452**  0.1455** 0.1473** 0.1492*** 0.3992*** 0.3992*** 0.397*** 0.4027*** 
  (0.0579) (0.0579) (0.0581) (0.0576) (0.0866) (0.0866) (0.0869) (0.0845) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.188 -0.1883 -0.1938 -0.1746 0.8909* 0.8907* 0.9033* 0.8874* 
  (0.3334) (0.3336) (0.3349) (0.3338) (0.509) (0.5093) (0.5108) (0.5042) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.05*** 0.0502*** 0.0504*** 0.0504*** 0.0653*** 0.0653*** 0.0648*** 0.066*** 
  (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0115) (0.0114) (0.0187) (0.0187) (0.0188) (0.0187) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.3444** 0.3450** 0.3434** 0.3404** 0.5229** 0.523** 0.5246** 0.5303** 
  (0.1539) (0.1540) (0.1542) (0.154) (0.2427) (0.2429) (0.2431) (0.2422) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.4148 0.4131 0.4206 0.4172 0.1949 0.1947 0.1829 0.1823 
  (0.4234) (0.4236) (0.425) (0.4237) (0.6565) (0.6572) (0.6584) (0.6537) 
Leverage ratio  -0.00819 -0.0080 -0.0078 -0.0080 0.0066 0.00664 0.00606 0.0071 
  (0.00952) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0095) (0.0149) (0.015) (0.0151) (0.0148) 
Revenue composition  -0.2689** -0.2695** -0.2716** -0.2663** -0.5607** -0.5609** -0.5502** -0.5676** 
  (0.1323) (0.1324) (0.133) (0.13) (0.2535) (0.2537) (0.2556) (0.2513) 
Efficiency ratio  0.9462*** 0.9474*** 0.9486*** 0.9382*** 1.9988*** 1.9991*** 1.9971*** 1.9975*** 
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  (0.0927) (0.0928) (0.093) (0.0917) (0.1958) (0.196) (0.1962) (0.1954) 
Intercept  -3.7008*** -3.7089*** -3.7453*** -3.7524*** -9.1558*** -9.1561*** -9.1092*** -9.04*** 
  (1.1902) (1.1909) (1.1954) (1.1894) (1.7757) (1.7766) (1.7827) (1.7551) 
AR(1)  -0.5029*** -0.5030*** -0.5030*** -0.5191*** -0.092*** -0.0917*** -0.0918*** -0.0935*** 
  (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0358) 
AR(2)  0.1549*** 0.1550*** 0.1550*** 0.1666***       
  (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0401)       
AR(3)  -0.1490*** -0.1490*** -0.1495*** -0.1550***       
  (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0401)       
AR(4)  0.0913*** 0.0912*** 0.0910*** 0.0937***       
  (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0360) (0.0359)       
Crisis Dummy  0.3200*** 0.3204*** 0.3221*** 0.3175*** 0.4002*** 0.4003*** 0.3958*** 0.4010*** 
  (0.0306) (0.0306) (0.0320) (0.0307) (0.0469) (0.0470) (0.0487) (0.0470) 
R-squared  0.6022 0.6023 0.6024 0.6054 0.4208 0.4208  0.4209 0.4214 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.8211 1.8202 1.8207 1.8526 1.9938 1.9934 1.9931 2.0006 
 
Panel B. Z Statistic 
 
  Z 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Hypothesis variables        
# of articles - 0.2232 0.3249 -0.0377   
  (0.5606) (0.5732) (0.6856)   
TRNS -   -7.9829 -7.9873   
    (8.9976) (9.0006)   
Crisis*# of articles -    0.5391   
     (0.5579)   
QualIndex +     0.1712 
      (0.5691) 
Control variables        
Bank size (log assets)  -41.0602 -40.456 -45.421 -39.2026 
  (72.9815) (72.9439) (73.1433) (72.8121) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -505.0843 -514.4481 -499.1924 -507.8355 
  (346.5373) (346.6645) (347.1951) (346.8605) 
Risk based capital ratio  4.4018 4.3959 3.6192 4.6089 
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  (10.5977) (10.6015) (10.6338) (10.5724) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -138.4711 -140.6055 -131.7619 -140.7728 
  (140.9755) (141.1051) (141.4957) (140.8777) 
Loan to asset ratio  623.6982 625.6892 596.0064 627.83 
  (413.7294) (413.8804) (415.1935) (413.4517) 
Leverage ratio  17.1567* 17.0904* 16.1099* 17.196* 
  (8.8725) (8.877) (8.9351) (8.8741) 
Revenue composition  69.3175 65.9374 75.3888 60.8414 
  (107.7818) (108.035) (108.503) (105.8116) 
Efficiency ratio  -37.4586 -37.8148 -41.3086 -35.084 
  (63.1816) (63.3069) (63.4327) (62.8603) 
Intercept  917.9656 917.9247 1026 868.1729 
  (1493) (1493) (1497) (1489) 
AR(1)  -0.8255*** -0.8222*** -0.8216*** -0.8254*** 
  (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0401) 
AR(2)  0.1382*** 0.1354*** 0.1341*** 0.1384*** 
  (0.0401) (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0401) 
Crisis Dummy  -115.4737*** -116.3692*** -124.3335*** -115.8899*** 
  (26.2652) (26.2864) (27.5901) (26.2567) 
R-squared  0.7865 0.7866 0.7869 0.7864 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.9350 1.9236 1.9242 1.9344 
 
 
 
 
5. 3. Quantity and Quality of Disclosure (Interaction) 
 To answer the next research question which asks if the increase in disclosure has 
more impact on the performance and stability when the information disclosed is of higher 
quality, an interaction term between the quality and quantity of information is included in 
the regressions. Using different quality and quantity indices, a total of thirty six models 
are run for each performance and stability measure. For the sake of brevity, only 
significant ones are tabulated13.   A summary table of the interaction term and its effects 
on performance and stability can be found in Appendix E. 
 
5.3.1. Quantity and Quality of Disclosure and Performance 
Table XVII shows the regression results for performance measures.  When 
performance is measured by ROA, ROE, risk-adjusted ROA or risk-adjusted ROE, 
interaction term between the disclosure indices and the number of total articles appeared 
in news which is used as a quality measure is positive (for example when ROA is the 
dependent variable, coefficient on # of articles*TSBI is 0.000005; the coefficient on # of 
articles*TQI is 0.00005; the coefficient on # of articles*SARI is 0.0000003). This could 
mean that when the bank discloses more about its securitization or credit derivative 
activities and also when there are more news about the bank, bank performance increases.  
When banks discuss more about their securitization activities in their annual reports 
and the quality of their information is high, banks’ ROA and ROE increase. (for example, 
when ROE is the dependent variable, the coefficient on QualIndex*SARI is 0.00001) 
However, the reverse is true for credit derivatives discussion. Even if the quality of 
                                                 
13 A total of 324 different regression models are run and in two separate tables (performance and stability) 
35 significant models are shown. The whole set of results are available upon request. 
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information is high, more disclosure about credit derivatives on annual reports negatively 
affects banks’ ROA and ROE (for example, when ROE is the dependent variable the 
coefficient on QualIndex*DARI is -0.00002). 
When both the banks’ disclosure on securitization and credit derivative activities 
in their call reports and the quality of their disclosure is high, their risk-adjusted ROE 
decreases (the coefficient on QualIndex*SSBI is -0.0034 and the coefficient on 
QualIndex*TSBI is -0.0026).  
Banks’ discussion of securitization and credit derivative activities in their annual 
reports increases their stock return when the information disclosed is of high quality (the 
coefficient of QualIndex*SARI is 0.00001 and the coefficient on QualIndex*DARI is 
0.00005). When enhanced discussion in a bank’s annual reports is accompanied with 
more negative publication about the bank’s transparency issues, Sharpe ratio is negatively 
affected (the coefficient on TRNS*SARI is -0.0022). In such a situation, it is possible to 
say that even when the quantity of disclosure is high, if it is of low quality the overall 
effect on performance is negative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table XVII. Quantity and Quality of Disclosure and Performance 
This table shows the regression results for interaction between quantity and quality of information and bank performance.  SSBI is securitization subcategory binary index, DSBI is 
credit derivative activities subcategory binary index, TSBI is total activities subcategory binary index, TQI is total quantitative index, SARI is securitization annual report index 
and DARI is credit derivative activities annual report index. # of articles is the total number of articles appeared in news, TRNS is the total number of transparency related articles 
appeared in news, and QualIndex is the disclosure quality index. In Panel A ROA; in Panel B ROE; in Panel C risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE,; in Panel D stock return 
and Sharpe ratio are used as the performance measure. Risk based capital ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total capital ratio. Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it is 
shown in decimals. Time period: June 2001- December 2008. Crisis dummy represents January 2007-December 2008 period. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels 
respectively. 
 
Panel A. ROA 
  ROA 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Hypothesis variables          
TSBI + -0.00002        
  (0.0001)        
TQI +   -0.0028       
    (0.0025)       
DARI +      -0.0005***    
       (0.0001)    
# of articles - -0.00028* -0.00007   -0.00007    
  (0.00015) (0.00005)   (0.00005)    
# of articles*TSBI +/- 0.000005*        
  (0.000003)        
# of articles*TQI +/-   0.00005* 0.00001*      
    (0.00002) (0.000011)      
# of articles*SARI +/-     0.0000003*     
      (0.0000002)     
# of articles*DARI +/-      0.000003***    
       (0.000001)    
QualIndex*SARI +       0.0000009*** 
        (0.0000002)   
QualIndex*DARI +        -0.000001*** 
         (0.0000006) 
Control variables          
Bank size (log assets) -0.0067** -0.0074*** -0.0073*** -0.0076*** -0.0019 -0.0106*** -0.0046* 
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  (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0027) (0.0027) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets -0.0136 -0.0217 -0.017 -0.0147 -0.026* -0.0261* -0.0211 
  (0.0162) (0.0161) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0146) (0.0156) (0.0157) 
Risk based capital ratio -0.0022*** -0.0025*** -0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0014*** -0.0026*** -0.0021*** 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Loan to deposit ratio 0.00019 0.0032 0.00351 0.0030 -0.0038 -0.0014 -0.0007 
  (0.0077) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0070) (0.0074) (0.0076) 
Loan to asset ratio -0.0275 -0.0307 -0.0322 -0.0321 -0.0095 -0.015 -0.0262 
  (0.0206) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0189) (0.0203) (0.0204) 
Leverage ratio 0.0002 -0.00008 -0.0000007 -0.00008 0.00005 -0.00008 0.00026 
  (0.00048) (0.00048) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.00045) (0.00046) 
Revenue composition 0.0281*** 0.0326*** 0.031*** 0.0316*** 0.0269*** 0.0306*** 0.0276*** 
  (0.0081) (0.0083) (0.0080) (0.0080) (0.0076) (0.00788) (0.0079) 
Efficiency ratio -0.0341*** -0.0343*** -0.0349*** -0.0356*** -0.0153** -0.0327*** -0.0345*** 
  (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0062) (0.0062) 
Intercept  0.1969*** 0.2211*** 0.2143*** 0.2189*** 0.0974* 0.2663*** 0.1656*** 
  (0.0555) (0.057) (0.0552) (0.0556) (0.0521) (0.0558) (0.0557) 
AR(1)  -0.0575 -0.0554 -0.0567 -0.0570 -0.0421 -0.0535 -0.0587 
  (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0361) (0.0359) (0.0359) 
Crisis Dummy  -0.0071*** -0.0071*** -0.0073*** -0.0073*** -0.0045*** -0.0079*** -0.0064*** 
  (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0014) (0.0014) 
R-squared  0.2579 0.2590 0.2571 0.2573 0.2424 0.2729 0.2606 
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.9604 1.9559 1.9545 1.9513 1.9779 1.9470 1.9547 
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Panel B. ROE 
  ROE 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables         
TSBI + -0.00076      
  (0.0016)      
DARI +    -0.0067***    
     (0.0012)    
# of articles - -0.0033*  -0.000674    
  (0.0018)  (0.00067)    
# of articles*TSBI +/- 0.00006*      
  (0.00003)      
# of articles*SARI +/-   0.000004*     
    (0.000002)     
# of articles*DARI +/-    0.00004***    
     (0.00001)    
QualIndex*SARI +     0.00001***   
      (0.000002)   
QualIndex*DARI +      -0.00002*** 
       (0.000008) 
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  -0.0914*** -0.1029*** -0.0269 -0.1352*** -0.0655** 
  (0.0328) (0.0328) (0.0303) (0.0333) (0.0325) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.0422 -0.0547 -0.2406 -0.182 -0.1317 
  (0.1948) (0.1916) (0.1741) (0.1882) (0.1888) 
Risk based capital ratio  -0.0292*** -0.0301*** -0.0186*** -0.0327*** -0.0269*** 
  (0.0073) (0.0070) (0.0065) (0.0070) (0.0070) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.0041 0.0325 -0.0364 -0.0168 -0.0165 
  (0.093) (0.0913) (0.0836) (0.0906) (0.0917) 
Loan to asset ratio  -0.243 -0.2894 0.0509 -0.0989 -0.2158 
  (0.2483) (0.2468) (0.2252) (0.2458) (0.2451) 
Leverage ratio  0.0073 0.0037 0.0066 0.0038 0.0081 
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(Cont.) 
  (0.0058) (0.0056) (0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0056) 
Revenue composition  0.3857*** 0.421*** 0.3714*** 0.4106*** 0.3742*** 
  (0.0982) (0.0981) (0.0916) (0.0958) (0.0966) 
Efficiency ratio  -0.4687*** -0.4842*** -0.203*** -0.4528*** -0.4727*** 
  (0.0766) (0.076) (0.0761) (0.0757) (0.0758) 
Intercept  2.3786*** 2.6252*** 0.9943 3.1489*** 1.9563*** 
  (0.668) (0.671) (0.6199) (0.6739) (0.6686) 
AR(1)  -0.0434 -0.045 -0.0417 -0.0414 -0.0438 
  (0.036) (0.036) (0.0361) (0.0360) (0.0360) 
Crisis Dummy  -0.0858*** -0.0876*** -0.0545*** -0.0942*** -0.0753*** 
  (0.0177) (0.0177) (0.0164) (0.0176) (0.0179) 
R-squared  0.2510 0.2505 0.2383 0.2638 0.2558 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.9499  1.9434 1.9735 1.9398  1.9494 
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Panel C. Risk-adjusted ROA , Risk-adjusted ROE 
  RAR(ROA) RAR(ROE) 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Hypothesis variables               
SSBI + -0.298**    -0.4916***       
  (0.1347)    (0.1591)       
TSBI +   -0.2658**     -0.41***      
    (0.1286)     (0.1525)      
SARI +    -0.0535**    -0.0614**     
     (0.0237)    (0.0285)     
DARI +          -0.1526*    
           (0.0901)    
# of articles - -0.1382* -0.1718* -0.0714 -0.1859* -0.2506** -0.0981* -0.0463    
  (0.0819) (0.0945) (0.0472) (0.1003) (0.116) (0.058) (0.0423)    
# of articles*SSBI +/- 0.0037*    0.00520*       
  (0.0021)    (0.0026)       
# of articles*TSBI +/-   0.0037*     0.0056**      
    (0.0020)     (0.0025)      
# of articles*SARI +/-    0.00046*         
     (0.00026)         
TRNS*SARI +/-         0.00067**     
          (0.00032)     
TRNS*DARI +/-          0.0014*    
           (0.00087)    
QualIndex*SSBI +           -0.0034**   
            (0.0013)   
QualIndex*TSBI +            -0.0026** 
             (0.0012) 
Control variables               
Bank size (log assets)  -1.8471 -1.6804 0.7671 -4.6537 -4.386 -2.5457 -3.6335 -4.8781 -4.3166 
  (2.8132) (2.818) (3.0518) (3.1941) (3.208) (3.5432) (3.3868) (3.2236) (3.2482) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -32.708** -30.2499** -28.0807** -42.8957*** -38.2821** -37.0698** -41.8127*** -42.9456*** -40.0593** 
  (13.4932) (13.5003) (13.5986) (15.7566) (15.7955) (16.1085) (16.0067) (15.8783) (15.9526) 
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(Cont.) 
Risk based capital ratio  -0.2192 -0.2073 0.0553 0.0174 0.0451 0.3306 0.2795 -0.0126 0.0412 
  (0.4205) (0.4189) (0.4388) (0.5024) (0.501) (0.5292) (0.5285) (0.501) (0.5006) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -4.5164 -4.5924 -3.9209 0.7047 0.1362 0.6737 -1.0916 1.9466 1.2624 
  (5.6776) (5.6692) (5.6008) (6.7833) (6.7683) (6.7805) (6.7597) (6.7902) (6.8013) 
Loan to asset ratio  26.0449 25.7284 25.8793 20.5792 20.5758 19.9155 27.5864 19.4311 20.2915 
  (16.1736) (16.1719) (16.2718) (18.9426) (18.9469) (19.3821) (19.2073) (19.0931) (19.1627) 
Leverage ratio  0.3965 0.4014 0.5415 0.2617 0.3017 0.3922 0.4028 0.1619 0.2199 
  (0.3559) (0.3527) (0.3499) (0.4222) (0.4181) (0.4194) (0.4233) (0.4173) (0.4163) 
Revenue composition  1.6317 1.871 3.4896 2.0776 2.4032 4.0938 3.9996 2.3186 2.3004 
  (4.2977) (4.2991) (4.3764) (5.4276) (5.4241) (5.5444) (5.5745) (5.3) (5.3034) 
Efficiency ratio  0.8902 0.8334 0.9725 -0.3009 -0.349 -0.3348 -0.613 -0.3113 -0.3778 
  (2.5653) (2.568) (2.8159) (3.2889) (3.2891) (3.6401) (3.6459) (3.248) (3.249) 
Intercept  57.5786 52.5582 3.2431 113.5998* 104.2368 66.0241 81.0005 116.5768* 102.3738 
  (57.6699) (57.4568) (61.5039) (65.5287) (65.4027) (71.3986) (69.5206) (66.056) (66.2665) 
AR(1)  -0.7713*** -0.7686*** -0.7756*** -0.6432*** -0.6444*** -0.6572*** -0.6622***  -0.6604*** -0.6627*** 
  (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0404) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0400) (0.0400) 
AR(2)  -0.0088 -0.013 0.0163 -0.1061*** -0.1078*** -0.0745 -0.0697 -0.0896 -0.0919** 
  (0.0510) (0.0509) (0.0513) (0.0475) (0.0475) (0.0483) (0.0484) (0.0480) (0.0480) 
AR(3)  0.1409*** 0.1449*** 0.1289*** 0.1870*** 0.1923*** 0.1609*** 0.1585*** 0.1721*** 0.1723*** 
  (0.0402) (0.0402) (0.0404) (0.0399) (0.0399) (0.0402) (0.0403) (0.0400) (0.0400) 
Crisis Dummy  -4.7952*** -4.7397*** -4.6395*** -4.0857*** -3.9544*** -3.7476*** -3.8006*** -3.9632*** -3.8498*** 
  (1.0468) (1.0468) (1.0512) (1.2491) (1.2504) (1.2618) (1.2664) (1.2524) (1.2560) 
R-squared  0.7839 0.7837 0.7821 0.7369 0.7365 0.7337 0.7331 0.7368 0.7362 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.8829 1.8813 1.8850  1.8946 1.8958 1.8972 1.9014 1.9027 1.8999 
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Panel D. Stock Return, Sharpe Ratio 
  AVERAGE RETURN  SHARPE RATIO 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (1) (2) (3) 
Hypothesis variables           
DARI +        -0.1934 
         (0.1197) 
QualIndex +        -0.0015 
         (0.0095) 
TRNS*SARI +/-     -0.0022*    
      (0.0013)    
TRNS*DARI +/-       -0.0096*   
        (0.0052)   
QualIndex*SARI + 0.00001**        
  (0.000007)        
QualIndex*DARI +   0.00005**    0.0020* 
    (0.00002)    (0.0011) 
Control variables           
Bank size (log assets)  -0.1166 -0.0855 0.0989 0.1086 -0.0164 
  (0.1002) (0.0975) (0.2675) (0.2677) (0.2771) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.968* -0.7411 -1.1128 -1.1415 -1.0544 
  (0.5685) (0.5673) (1.6016) (1.6018) (1.6154) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.04* 0.0413* 0.1185* 0.1225** 0.1092* 
  (0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0611) (0.0611) (0.0623) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.199 0.3738 -1.0466 -1.0694 -0.8667 
  (0.2766) (0.279) (0.7768) (0.7771) (0.7908) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.2357 -0.1596 0.6828 0.8016 0.7209 
  (0.7473) (0.7395) (2.0871) (2.0902) (2.1115) 
Leverage ratio  -0.0064 -0.0121 0.0649 0.0676 0.0517 
  (0.0168) (0.0172) (0.0474) (0.0475) (0.0484) 
Revenue composition  1.7486*** 1.7741*** 3.0491*** 2.9788*** 3.3237 
  (0.3222) (0.3239) (0.8941) (0.8978) (0.908) 
Efficiency ratio  -0.7932*** -0.9118*** -0.2909 -0.2393 -0.4929*** 
  (0.2712) (0.2716) (0.7345) (0.7366) (0.8048) 
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(Cont.) 
Intercept  1.9891 1.5967 -2.4522 -2.7444 -0.2695 
  (2.029) (2.0063) (5.5329) (5.5399) (5.799) 
AR(1)  0.3080***  0.3060*** 0.1942*** 0.194*** 0.196*** 
  (0.0342) (0.0343) (0.0353) (0.035) (0.0354) 
Crisis Dummy  -0.2475*** -0.2553*** -1.0175*** -1.0160*** -1.0459*** 
  (0.0533) (0.0542) (0.1498) (0.1497) (0.1535) 
R-squared  0.1920 0.1905 0.1717 0.1722  0.1704 
Durbin-Watson statistic  2.0395 2.0351 2.0219 2.0202 2.0174 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3.2. Quantity and Quality of Disclosure and Stability 
Table XVIII shows the regression results for stability measures. Number of 
articles appeared in the papers along with increased information disclosure decreases the 
stock volatility and beta; and increases the z-statistic (for example, when stock volatility 
is the dependent variable the coefficient on # of articles*TQI is -0.0009; when beta is the 
dependent variable the coefficient on # of articles*TSBI is -0.00016 and when z-statistic 
is the dependent variable the coefficient on # of articles*SARI is 0.0118). This shows that 
even if there are considerable amounts of negative publication about the bank in the 
papers, if the quantity of information disclosed is high, market perceives it as a positive 
signal and consequently the bank stability increases. On the other hand if the information 
disclosed is of lower quality, increased annual report disclosure on securitization and 
credit derivatives destabilize the bank by increasing the stock volatility (the coefficient on 
TRNS*SARI is 0.0005; the coefficient on TRNS*DARI is 0.0022; and the coefficient on 
QualIndex*DARI is 0.00007). 
If the bank’s enhanced discussion of securitization in annual reports is also of 
higher quality, bank’s beta decreases (the coefficient on QualIndex*SARI is -0.00001). 
Interestingly, for credit derivative activities discussion in annual reports a reverse 
situation applies. Even if the information disclosed is of higher quality, more information 
on credit derivatives disclosed in annual reports destabilizes the bank by increasing the 
beta (the coefficient on QualIndex*DARI is 0.00004).  
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Table XVIII. Quantity and Quality of Disclosure and Stability 
This table shows the regression results for interaction between quantity and quality of information and bank stability.  
SSBI is securitization subcategory binary index, DSBI is credit derivative activities subcategory binary index, TSBI is 
total activities subcategory binary index, TQI is total quantitative index, SARI is securitization annual report index and 
DARI is credit derivative activities annual report index. # of articles is the total number of articles appeared in news, 
TRNS is the total number of transparency related articles appeared in news, and QualIndex is the disclosure quality 
index. In Panel A volatility of stock returns; in Panel B beta and z statistic is used as the stability measure. Risk based 
capital ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total capital ratio. Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it is shown in 
decimals. Time period: June 2001- December 2008. Crisis dummy represents January 2007-December 2008 period. 
***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Volatility of Stock Returns 
  STD.DEV. OF RETURN 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Hypothesis variables         
TQI - 0.084*      
  (0.0501)      
SARI -    0.0009**    
     (0.00045)    
DARI -   0.0136***  0.0071***   
    (0.0019)  (0.0012)   
# of articles + 0.0011 0.0016*     
  (0.0010) (0.0009)     
TRNS +    -0.0358 -0.0274   
     (0.0226) (0.017)   
# of articles*TQI +/- -0.0009*      
  (0.0005)      
# of articles*DARI +/-   -0.00008***     
    (0.00002)     
TRNS*SARI +/-    0.0005**    
     (0.0002)    
TRNS*DARI +/-     0.0022***   
      (0.0008)   
QualIndex*DARI -      0.00007*** 
       (0.00001) 
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets)  0.1613*** 0.0534 0.0646 0.0588 0.1075* 
  (0.0586) (0.0546) (0.0596) (0.0555) (0.0592) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -0.1063 0.0204 -0.0812 0.0219 -0.1158 
  (0.3368) (0.3024) (0.31) (0.3067) (0.3338) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0535*** 0.0278*** 0.0277** 0.0253** 0.0457*** 
  (0.0116) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0106) (0.0114) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.3485** 0.4196*** 0.2895** 0.4002*** 0.4264*** 
  (0.1542) (0.1389) (0.1403) (0.1398) (0.1546) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.415 0.0414 0.1578 0.0042 0.3557 
  (0.4233) (0.3827) (0.3927) (0.3873) (0.4224) 
Leverage ratio  -0.0049 -0.0101 -0.0069 -0.0132 -0.0144 
  (0.0097) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0096) 
Revenue composition  -0.3251** -0.2767** -0.1551 -0.1301 -0.2334 
  (0.1362) (0.1173) (0.1142) (0.1142) (0.1294) 
Efficiency ratio  0.9387*** 0.5731*** 0.4769*** 0.4958*** 0.966*** 
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  (0.093) (0.0877) (0.0852) (0.0853) (0.0915) 
Intercept  -4.1199*** -1.6214 -1.7616 -1.5967 -3.0424** 
  (1.21) (1.1181) (1.2005) (1.1404) (1.2143) 
AR(1)  -0.4976*** -0.5431*** -0.6321*** -0.6035*** -0.4904*** 
  ( 0.0360) ( 0.0360) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.035) 
AR(2)  0.1509*** 0.1921*** 0.2578*** 0.2349***  0.1375*** 
  (0.0398) (0.0404) (0.0419) (0.0413) (0.0396) 
AR(3)  -0.1503*** -0.1994*** -0.210*** -0.2203*** -0.1642*** 
  (0.0398) (0.0404) (0.0419) (0.0413) (0.0396) 
AR(4)  0.0924*** 0.1020*** 0.1252*** 0.1184*** 0.0796*** 
  (0.0360) (0.036) (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0359) 
Crisis Dummy  0.3025*** 0.2533*** 0.2615*** 0.2514*** 0.2817*** 
  (0.0314) (0.0283) (0.0296) (0.0289) (0.0310) 
R-squared  0.6030 0.6448 0.6415 0.6498 0.6148 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.8158 1.7545 1.8164 1.7913 1.8490 
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Panel B. Beta, Z 
  BETA  Z 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) Exp.  (1) 
Hypothesis variables          
TSBI - -0.0021    +   
  (0.0044)       
SARI -      + -1.4705** 
        (0.6) 
# of articles + 0.0084*    - -1.6072 
  (0.0048)     (1.1942) 
# of articles*TSBI +/- -0.00016*    +/-   
  (0.00009)       
# of articles*SARI +/-      +/- 0.0118* 
        (0.0069) 
QualIndex*SARI -   -0.00001*   +   
    (0.000006)      
QualIndex*DARI -    0.00004* +   
     (0.00002)    
Control variables          
Bank size (log assets)  0.4188*** 0.4608*** 0.3621***  36.6773 
  (0.087) (0.09) (0.0866)  (78.2628) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  0.7147 0.9825* 0.927*  -405.9993 
  (0.5167) (0.5076) (0.502)  (346.9069) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0603*** 0.0699*** 0.061***  9.7167 
  (0.0193) (0.0188) (0.0187)  (11.1611) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.601** 0.5683** 0.5865**  -94.5645 
  (0.2459) (0.2436) (0.2432)  (141.0276) 
Loan to asset ratio  0.1282 0.0154 0.141  553.3967 
  (0.6579) (0.6616) (0.6506)  (415.3834) 
Leverage ratio  -0.0013 0.0084 0.0017  20.4458** 
  (0.01504) (0.0148) (0.015)  (8.9358) 
Revenue composition  -0.5191** -0.5779** -0.5364**  111.8721 
  (0.2547) (0.2513) (0.251)  (110.6445) 
Efficiency ratio  1.9701*** 1.9555*** 1.9892***  -37.7349 
  (0.1965) (0.1961) (0.1951)  (69.9222) 
Intercept  -9.2024*** -10.1776*** -8.4651***  -497.2796 
  (1.773) (1.8202) (1.7787)  (1578) 
AR(1)  -0.0917*** -0.0980*** -0.0888***  -0.8076*** 
  ( 0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0358)  (0.0403) 
AR(2)        0.1439*** 
        (0.0403) 
Crisis Dummy  0.4016*** 0.4103*** 0.3836***  -110.3423*** 
  (0.0468) (0.0474) (0.0476)  (26.5193) 
R-squared  0.4241 0.4237 0.4233  0.7855 
Durbin-Watson statistic   1.9938 1.9991 2.0043   1.9257 
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5.4. Peer Comparisons 
5.4.1. Before and After Comparison 
5.4.1.1. Stock Returns 
The first comparison is made to see how the stock returns react to changes in the 
quality of information disclosed (e.g., corrections and restatements regarding earnings 
and allowance for loan losses). Table XIX shows the results of the event study. Full 
sample results are reported along with clean sample results as a robustness check. 
However, it should be noted that full sample results might be biased and their results 
should be interpreted with caution.  
In general, number of firms with negative returns is higher than the number of 
firms with positive returns during event times. Therefore, any positive abnormal returns 
around the event date can be attributed to some extreme cases. Though, almost all daily 
abnormal returns are insignificant.  
Four different event windows are used. Both for transparency and trouble related 
articles, one day after the event, the cumulative abnormal returns decrease when 
compared to cumulative abnormal returns before the event day, though not significant. 
The results show that market already anticipated the negative publication about a bank’s 
transparency or healthiness issues. There might be a lot of leakage before an article 
appears on the Wall Street Journal.  
As for the amendments to annual reports, the 2-day cumulative abnormal returns 
are 0.86 % and significant. It takes a few days for market to digest the news about 
amendments and favor the corrected information. However, cumulative abnormal returns 
for other event windows are not significant. 
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Table XIX. Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns (CASRs) 
This table shows the results for the stock return event study. In Panel A daily abnormal returns; in Panel B event 
window cumulative abnormal returns are shown. The results are classified by the event dates used in the analysis. 
“Transparency related articles” shows the results of the analysis where the publication dates of transparency related 
articles on WSJ; “Trouble related articles” shows the results of the analysis where the  publication dates of trouble 
related articles on WSJ and “Amendments” shows the results of the analysis where the announcements of amendments 
to annual reports are used as event dates. AR is the abnormal stock return for the portfolio of banks used in the analysis 
in event time; CAR is the cumulative abnormal stock return for the portfolio of banks used in the analysis during the 
event window period; N is the number of events and Number – is the number of firms in the portfolio showing negative 
return for day t. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns 
Transparency related articles 
Clean sample (n=27)  Full sample (n=38) 
Day AR t-statistic N Number -  Day AR t-statistic N Number - 
-3 -0.29% -1.26 27 17  -3 -0.19% -1.09 38 20 
-2 0.35% 0.78 27 14  -2 0.28% 0.81 38 22 
-1 0.63% 0.62 27 14  -1 0.27% 0.33 38 18 
0 -0.30% -1.63 27 15  0 -0.07% -0.4 38 18 
1 0.10% 0.47 27 15  1 0.23% 1.38 38 18 
2 1.53% 1.63 27 11  2 0.92% 1.35 38 18 
3 0.12% 0.5 27 13  3 0.20% 1.09 38 15 
           
Trouble related articles 
Clean sample (n=29)  Full sample (n=55) 
Day AR t-statistic N Number -  Day AR t-statistic N Number - 
-3 -1.44% -1.1 29 17  -3 -1.09% -1.3 55 31 
-2 -1.02% -1.38 29 20  -2 -1.17% -1.69* 55 34 
-1 2.33% 0.94 29 14  -1 1.58% 1.09 55 27 
0 -0.08% -0.1 29 18  0 -0.26% -0.34 55 36 
1 0.84% 0.95 29 14  1 -0.21% -0.34 55 30 
2 -0.21% -0.3 29 16  2 -0.49% -0.64 55 28 
3 0.30% 0.31 29 15  3 -0.71% -0.71 55 31 
           
Amendments       
Full sample (n=9)       
Day AR t-statistic N Number -       
-3 -0.40% -1.56 9 7       
-2 0.58% 2.41** 9 1       
-1 0.00% 0.03 9 6       
0 0.03% 0.13 9 3       
1 0.43% 1.42 9 3       
2 0.40% 1.52 9 3       
3 -0.19% -0.91 9 5       
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Panel B. Event Window Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Transparency related articles 
Clean sample (n=27)  Full sample (n=38) 
Event window CAR t-statistic  Event window CAR t-statistic 
[-1,0] 0.33% 0.35  [-1,0] 0.19% 0.24 
[0,+1] -0.20% -1.3  [0,+1] 0.16% 1.04 
[0,+2] 1.33% 1.45  [0,+2] 1.08% 1.62 
[0,+3] 1.45% 1.32  [0,+3] 1.28% 1.61 
       
Trouble related articles 
Clean sample (n=29)  Full sample (n=55) 
Event window CAR t-statistic   Event window CAR t-statistic 
[-1,0] 2.25% 0.68  [-1,0] 1.32% 0.67 
[0,+1] 0.75% 0.53  [0,+1] -0.46% -0.41 
[0,+2] 0.54% 0.5  [0,+2] -0.96% -0.73 
[0,+3] 0.84% 0.63  [0,+3] -1.66% -0.99 
       
Amendments     
Full sample (n=9)     
Event window CAR t-statistic     
[-1,0] 0.04% 0.12     
[0,+1] 0.46% 1.74     
[0,+2] 0.86% 1.98*     
[0,+3] 0.67% 1.63     
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5.4.1.2. CDS Spreads 
CDS data is available only for very limited number of banks in the sample. 
Therefore, this part of the analysis is restricted to the five banks with the CDS data 
available.  
First, CDS spreads are plotted during the event dates to visually observe any 
significant reactions. Figure 12 depicts the CDS spreads for 37 days (-30 to +7) 
surrounding the event days. The dotted line on the graph shows the trend of the average 
of the five banks with CDS spread data. Only a few representative graphs are shown here. 
All the graphs can be found at Appendix F. An observation of the graphs reveals that as 
in the case of stock prices, CDS spreads do not show significant reaction to the events. 
This might either mean that the events were fully anticipated by the market before the 
publication day or the market did not perceive the events as very significant events.  
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Figure 12. CDS Spreads During 2001-2008 
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5.4.1.2.1. Market proxy: CDX indices 
Considering that just a visual observation of CDS spread behavior around the 
event dates might lead to biased results, an event study similar to the one used for stock 
returns is applied. The results are shown at Table XX. Two different proxies for the 
market are used. Both proxies yield very similar results. When looking at CDXFIN 
results, as expected, for trouble announcements, a statistically significant abnormal return 
is observed on day 0 and on day 2. This shows that the market reacted to trouble related 
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news by increasing the CDS spreads as anticipated. No significant cumulative abnormal 
returns are found for either index for transparency announcements. The results show that 
the market does not show any reaction to transparency related articles appearing on the 
Wall Street Journal.  
And finally, a cross-sectional regression model is run for each bank to see the 
effects of event date dummies on CDS spreads. Table XXI shows the significant event 
dates in the regression analysis, their regression coefficient and the tone of the article. It 
is anticipated that an article with unfavorable tone would have a positive effect on the 
CDS spreads. The table shows that most of the articles were conveying clearly 
unfavorable information and their effects on CDS spreads are positive as expected. There 
are only two instances where the effect on CDS spread is negative. Both of those articles 
are about Wells Fargo. The articles can be interpreted as positive or negative. The first 
article states that the bank will continue to provide home equity financing directly to 
customers but it would not originate or acquire home equity loans through indirect 
channels. The second article argues that Wells Fargo’s earnings increase but the loan loss 
reserves decrease. It looks like the market perceived these as positive news and reacted 
by lowering the CDS spreads of Wells Fargo.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 114
Table XX. Cumulative Abnormal CDS Returns (CACRs) 
This table shows the results for the CDS return event study. In Panel A daily abnormal returns; in Panel B event 
window cumulative abnormal returns are shown. The results are classified by the event dates used in the analysis. 
“Transparency related articles” shows the results of the analysis where the publication dates of transparency related 
articles on WSJ and “Trouble related articles” shows the results of the analysis where the publication dates of trouble 
related articles on WSJ used as event dates. Two different indices are used as a market proxy. CDX is the general 
market index, CDXFIN is the financials index. AR is the abnormal CDS return for the portfolio of banks used in the 
analysis in event time; CAR is the cumulative abnormal CDS return for the portfolio of banks used in the analysis 
during the event window period; N is the number of events and Number – is the number of firms in the portfolio 
showing negative return for day t. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Daily Abnormal Returns 
Transparency related articles 
Market proxy: CDX 
Clean sample (n=7)  Full sample (n=11) 
Day AR t-statistic N Number -  Day AR t-statistic N Number - 
-3 -0.63% -0.22 7 5  -3 1.82% 0.57 11 8 
-2 1.44% 0.51 7 2  -2 -1.00% -0.38 11 5 
-1 1.75% 0.81 7 4  -1 0.86% 0.61 11 7 
0 -3.27% -1.41 7 4  0 -0.94% -0.49 11 4 
1 3.64% 1.05 7 3  1 0.69% 0.27 11 7 
2 -0.21% -0.14 7 5  2 0.41% 0.33 11 7 
3 -1.66% -0.73 7 4  3 -1.87% -1.18 11 7 
Market proxy: CDXFIN 
Clean sample (n=7)  Full sample (n=11) 
Day AR t-statistic N Number -  Day AR t-statistic N Number - 
-3 -0.93% -0.3 7 5  -3 1.57% 0.47 11 7 
-2 0.21% 0.08 7 3  -2 -1.59% -0.66 11 6 
-1 1.24% 0.6 7 3  -1 0.79% 0.61 11 6 
0 -3.72% -1.79 7 6  0 -1.16% -0.62 11 6 
1 3.23% 0.97 7 2  1 0.60% 0.24 11 6 
2 0.13% 0.07 7 3  2 0.59% 0.41 11 6 
3 -1.12% -0.39 7 2  3 -1.32% -0.69 11 4 
           
Trouble related articles 
Market proxy: CDX 
Clean sample (n=7)  Full sample (n=19) 
Day AR t-statistic N Number -  Day AR t-statistic N Number - 
-3 0.28% 0.6 7 2  -3 -0.83% -1.4 19 10 
-2 2.16% 0.74 7 4  -2 -1.33% -0.6 19 11 
-1 0.89% 0.63 7 3  -1 -1.48% -0.8 19 9 
0 1.13% 0.98 7 2  0 -1.85% -0.96 19 9 
1 -2.09% -1.09 7 4  1 0.44% 0.39 19 10 
2 2.38% 2.07* 7 2  2 -0.48% -0.25 19 10 
3 -4.93% -1.04 7 4  3 -0.52% -0.23 19 9 
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(Cont.) 
Market proxy: CDXFIN 
Clean sample (n=7)  Full sample (n=19) 
Day AR t-statistic N Number -  Day AR t-statistic N Number - 
-3 0.18% 0.14 7 2  -3 -0.61% -0.95 19 10 
-2 2.39% 0.76 7 5  -2 -1.83% -0.74 19 12 
-1 2.34% 1.26 7 2  -1 -0.32% -0.17 19 9 
0 2.25% 1.88* 7 1  0 -0.87% -0.43 19 6 
1 -0.62% -0.27 7 4  1 1.04% 0.93 19 9 
2 3.58% 2.3* 7 1  2 0.21% 0.1 19 10 
3 -5.09% -1.00 7 4  3 -0.26% -0.11 19 10 
  
Panel B. Event Window Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Transparency related articles 
Market proxy: CDX 
Clean sample (n=7)  Full sample (n=11) 
Event window CAR t-statistic  Event window CAR t-statistic 
[-1,0] -1.52% -0.74  [-1,0] -0.08% -0.05 
[0,+1] 0.38% 0.13  [0,+1] -0.25% -0.11 
[0,+2] 0.16% 0.04  [0,+2] 0.16% 0.07 
[0,+3] -1.50% -0.29  [0,+3] -1.71% -0.53 
       
Market proxy: CDXFIN 
Clean sample (n=7)  Full sample (n=11) 
Event window CAR t-statistic  Event window CAR t-statistic 
[-1,0] -2.48% -1.07  [-1,0] -0.37% -0.2 
[0,+1] -0.49% -0.15  [0,+1] -0.56% -0.22 
[0,+2] -0.36% -0.08  [0,+2] 0.03% 0.01 
[0,+3] -1.48% -0.22  [0,+3] -1.29% -0.3 
       
Trouble related articles 
Market proxy: CDX 
Clean sample (n=7)  Full sample (n=19) 
Event window CAR t-statistic   Event window CAR t-statistic 
[-1,0] 2.02% 0.95  [-1,0] -3.33% -1.15 
[0,+1] -0.96% -0.42  [0,+1] -1.41% -0.61 
[0,+2] 1.42% 0.54  [0,+2] -1.90% -0.65 
[0,+3] -3.51% -0.54  [0,+3] -2.41% -0.57 
       
Market proxy: CDXFIN 
Clean sample (n=7)  Full sample (n=19) 
Event window CAR t-statistic   Event window CAR t-statistic 
[-1,0] 4.59% 1.86  [-1,0] -1.19% -0.38 
[0,+1] 1.63% 0.57  [0,+1] 0.17% 0.07 
[0,+2] 5.21% 1.51  [0,+2] 0.38% 0.11 
[0,+3] 0.13% 0.02  [0,+3] 0.12% 0.03 
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Table XXI. Regression Analysis of Event Dates: Statistically Significant Results  
This table shows the event dates which were significant at regressions, their sign of regression coefficients and the 
general tone of the article published on Wall Street Journal at the event date. The question mark is used when the 
interpretation of the tone of the article is not very clear. The expectation is to have a positive regression coefficient 
when the tone of the article is clearly negative.  
 
Bank Date Sign of Regression Coeficient Favorable(+) / Unfavorable(-) Article 
Citigroup 10/18/2007 + - 
 11/5/2007 + - 
    
Bank of America 10/18/2007 + - 
    
Wells Fargo 10/17/2007 + - 
 11/28/2007 - ? 
 10/16/2008 - ? 
    
JP Morgan 10/16/2007 + - 
 12/14/2007 + - 
 3/12/2008 + - 
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5.4.1.2.2. Market proxy: CD spreads 
As a robustness check, the event study and the regression analysis are repeated 
using six-month certificates of deposit (CD) spreads as the market proxy. The results are 
very similar to the ones reported above14. In the event study analysis, no significant 
abnormal returns are observed except for the day 2 following the trouble announcements. 
Also, the same dates are found to be significantly affecting the CDS spreads when the 
regression analysis is run. In general, the results are very robust to the choice of the 
market index.  
 
5.4.2. High versus Low Disclosure Banks 
Most transparent banks are compared with their least transparent peers using 
standard tests of significance. The list of most and least transparent banks is given at 
Table II.  
Table XXII shows the results of the t-tests between high and low disclosure 
banks. Almost all performance measures are higher for less transparent banks (except 
risk-adjusted ROA and risk-adjusted ROE). The most striking difference is in the stock 
returns. On average for very transparent banks the stock return is 0.5 % and for less 
transparent banks the stock return is 5.83 %. However, this difference is not statistically 
significant.  
Among the stability measures, only the difference between the betas is significant. 
Beta for high disclosure banks is 1.11 on average and beta for low disclosure banks is 
0.99 on average. Highly transparent banks are significantly riskier than their less 
transparent peers.  
                                                 
T14 For the sake of brevity, the results are not tabulated here but they are available upon request. 
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The comparison between high and low disclosure banks is further extended to see 
how performance and stability measures change before and during the crisis for most and 
least transparent banks. Table XXIII shows the results of the tests. There is a significant 
difference in all performance and stability measures between before and during crisis 
periods both for the most transparent and least transparent banks. During the crisis period, 
all banks’ performance and stability has decreased. However, the difference is a lot larger 
for the most transparent banks. For example, highly transparent banks had an average 
return of 11.8 % before the crisis, but it decreased to -32.93 % during the crisis period. 
Similarly, the average ROE for the most transparent banks was 15.19 % before the crisis 
but it significantly decreased to -0.16 % during the crisis. Among all the performance and 
stability measures, the differences between high and low disclosure banks are not 
significant except for beta. During the crisis period, both the most transparent banks’ 
betas and the least transparent banks’ betas are increased. During the crisis period, highly 
transparent banks have an average beta of 1.59 and less transparent banks have an 
average beta of 1.34. The results show that during the crisis period, banks with high 
disclosure levels were perceived to be riskier than banks with low disclosure levels.   
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Table XXII. Most and Least Transparent Banks T-Test Comparison 
This table shows the t-test comparisons between most and least transparent banks’  performance and stability measures 
and control variables.  Time period is June 2001- December 2008. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels 
respectively. 
 
 
Most 
transparent 
banks 
mean 
Least 
transparent 
banks 
mean t- test 
Performance Measures       
ROA(%) 0.96 1.03 0.52 
ROE(%) 11.31 11.75 0.27 
Risk-adjusted ROA 9.14 8.38 -0.93 
Risk-adjusted ROE 9.66 8.62 -0.96 
Stock Return(%) 0.50 5.83 0.97 
Sharpe ratio 0.18 0.20 0.13 
Stability Measures       
Volatility of Stock Return(%) 30.63 30.42 -0.08 
Beta 1.11 0.99 -2.7*** 
Z statistic 258.31 264.30 0.26 
Control Variables       
Total Assets($ in millions) 590,093 32,663 -15.9*** 
Risk weighted assets/Total assets (%) 80.27 77.01 -2.68*** 
Risk based capitalratio (%) 11.82 13.01 11.02*** 
Loan to deposit ratio (%) 104.67 93.10 -7.14*** 
Loan to assets ratio (%) 58.98 63.91 4.07*** 
Leverage ratio 11.10 10.64 -2.98*** 
Revenue composition (%) 33.67 25.19 -9.1*** 
Efficiency ratio (%) 46.31 42.20 -3.86*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table XXIII. Most and Least Transparent Banks T-Test Comparison Before and During Crisis 
This table shows the t-test comparisons between most and least transparent banks’  performance and stability measures before and during the crisis period.  Panel A shows the 
significance tests for market measures and Panel B shows the significance tests for accounting measures. Time period is June 2001- December 2008. Crisis period is from January 
2007 to December 2008.  ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Market Measures 
 ALL BHCS MOST TRANSPARENT LEAST TRANSPARENT 
 Full 
Before
Crisis 
During
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis Full 
Before
Crisis 
During 
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis Full 
Before
Crisis 
During
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis 
Average Beta 1.05 0.91 1.46 12.4*** 1.11 0.95 1.59 -10.19*** 0.99 0.88 1.34 -7.56*** 
Average Z 261.32 309.73 163.12 -6.25*** 258.31 314.46 142.80 5.14*** 264.30 305.01 182.89 3.69*** 
Average Stock return 3.17 11.95 -22.42 -5.6*** 0.50 11.80 -32.93 5.13*** 5.83 12.11 -12.21 2.82** 
Average Stock volatility 30.53 21.57 56.66 13.89*** 30.63 20.91 59.37 -10.70*** 30.42 22.22 54.02 -8.94*** 
 
 
 
 
MOST 
TRANSPARENT 
BHCs  
Before  
Crisis 
LEAST 
TRANSPARENT 
BHCs  
Before  
Crisis 
t-test Most 
Transparent/ 
Least 
Transparent 
BHCs Before 
Crisis 
MOST 
TRANSPARENT 
BHCs  
During  
Crisis 
LEAST 
TRANSPARENT 
BHCs  
During  
Crisis 
t-test Most 
Transparent/ 
Least 
Transparent 
BHCs During 
Crisis 
Average Beta 0.95 0.88 1.73 1.59 1.34 3.24*** 
Average Z 314.46 305.01 0.34 142.80 182.89 -1.04 
Average Stock return 11.80 12.11 -0.04 -32.93 -12.21 -1.96 
Average Stock volatility 20.91 22.22 -0.51 59.37 54.02 1.22 
 
 
 121
122
Panel B. Accounting Measures 
 ALL BHCS MOST TRANSPARENT LEAST TRANSPARENT 
 Full 
Before 
Crisis 
During 
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis Full 
Before
Crisis 
During 
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis Full 
Before
Crisis 
During 
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis 
ROA(%) 1.00 1.23 0.32 -6.63*** 0.96 1.27 0.06 6.23*** 1.03 1.19 0.57 3.19*** 
ROE(%) 11.53 14.53 2.79 -6.58*** 11.31 15.19 -0.16 6.06*** 11.75 13.87 5.65 3.28*** 
Risk-adjusted ROA 8.76 10.85 4.51 -7.78*** 9.14 11.66 3.96 6.65*** 8.38 10.05 5.05 4.36*** 
Risk-adjusted ROE 9.14 11.15 5.05 -5.47*** 9.66 11.82 5.22 4.16*** 8.62 10.48 4.89 3.55*** 
Sharpe ratio 0.18 0.50 -0.74 -8.0*** 0.17 0.54 -0.89 6.46*** 0.19 0.47 -0.59 4.85*** 
 
 
 
 
MOST 
TRANSPARENT 
BHCs  
Before  
Crisis 
LEAST 
TRANSPARENT 
BHCs  
Before  
Crisis 
t-test Most 
Transparent/ 
Least 
Transparent 
BHCs Before 
Crisis 
MOST 
TRANSPARENT 
BHCs  
During  
Crisis 
LEAST 
TRANSPARENT 
BHCs  
During  
Crisis 
t-test Most 
Transparent/ 
Least 
Transparent 
BHCs During 
Crisis 
ROA(%) 1.27 1.19 0.6 0.06 0.57 -2.17 
ROE(%) 15.19 13.87 0.73 -0.16 5.65 -1.89 
Risk-adjusted ROA 11.66 10.05 1.72 3.96 5.05 -0.81 
Risk-adjusted ROE 11.82 10.48 1.04 5.22 4.89 0.17 
Sharpe ratio 0.54 0.47 0.44 -0.89 -0.59 -1.11 
 
 
 
 
 
5.4.3. Weak versus Healthy Banks 
The last comparison is made between the weak and healthy banks. To understand 
if there is a significant difference in performance and stability between weak (troubled) 
and healthy banks, three different approaches have been used. First, the mean values for 
each group is compared to each other and t tests are used to understand if the difference 
between the means are significant. Afterwards, logit regressions are run to see if the 
disclosure leads the bank to become a troubled bank. Finally, the same regression models 
used to understand effect of the quantity and quality of information disclosure on 
performance and stability are utilized, but this time a dummy variable called “Troubled” 
is used in the regressions. The “Troubled” dummy takes a value of 1 if the bank is listed 
in the troubled bank list (Table III), and a value of 0 if not.  
 
5.4.3.1. Standard Tests of Significance 
Table XXIV shows the results of the t-test comparisons. All the disclosure indices 
are significantly higher for troubled banks sample. Due to the nature of the call report 
disclosure indices, higher values of disclosure index values for troubled banks would also 
mean that these banks engage more in securitization and credit derivative activities and 
hence disclose more information to public. Also, troubled banks significantly have more 
annual report disclosure and there is a significantly more negative publication about those 
banks in newspapers. 
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Table XXIV. Troubled and Healthy Banks T-Test Comparison 
This table shows the t-test comparisons between troubled and healthy banks’ disclosure indices, performance and 
stability measures and control variables.  SSBI is securitization subcategory binary index, DSBI is credit derivative 
activities subcategory binary index, TSBI is total activities subcategory binary index, TQI is total quantitative index, 
SARI is securitization annual report index and DARI is credit derivative activities annual report index. # of articles is 
the total number of articles appeared in news, TRNS is the total number of transparency related articles appeared in 
news, and QualIndex is the disclosure quality index. ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Healthy 
banks 
mean 
Troubled 
banks 
mean t- test 
Disclosure Indices       
SSBI 3.11 17.05 -17.15*** 
DSBI 0.43 3.90 -18.59*** 
TSBI 3.54 20.97 -18.78*** 
TQI 0.12 0.38 -5.61*** 
SARI 30.20 73.99 -13.56*** 
DARI 0.70 9.34 -9.58*** 
# of Art 0.77 23.83 -10.49*** 
TRNS 0.01 0.13 -3.56*** 
QualIndex 99.41 98.91 1.04 
Performance Measures       
ROA(%) 1.06 1.03 0.33 
ROE(%) 12.58 11.32 1.03 
Risk-adjusted ROA 8.94 10.73 -2.04** 
Risk-adjusted ROE 8.86 10.73 -1.91* 
Stock Return(%) 8.61 0.53 1.76* 
Sharpe ratio 0.20 0.16 0.35 
Stability Measures       
Volatility of Stock Return(%) 31.18 30.57 0.29 
Beta 1.02 1.07 -1.18 
Z statistic 273.94 301.87 -1.25 
Control Variables       
Total Assets($ in millions) 27,181 365,319 -12.29*** 
Risk weighted assets/Total assets (%) 76.33 84.10 -9.04*** 
Risk based capitalratio (%) 12.88 12.00 9.66*** 
Loan to deposit ratio (%) 95.55 105.46 -8.17*** 
Loan to assets ratio (%) 64.57 64.57 0.00 
Leverage ratio 10.56 10.43 0.96 
Revenue composition (%) 27.39 29.91 -2.97*** 
Efficiency ratio (%) 43.36 44.13 -0.91 
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When we look at the performance measures, the difference between the mean 
values for ROA and ROE of healthy and troubled banks is not very high and the 
difference is not significant. Troubled banks have slightly higher risk-adjusted ROA and 
risk-adjusted ROE values than healthy banks and the difference is statistically significant. 
However, stock return is significantly lower for troubled banks than healthy banks and 
the difference is quite large – average stock return for healthy banks is 8.6 % while the 
average stock return for weak banks is 0.5 %. The result seems to be conflicting but the 
main reason for it is that the accounting measures of performance are not as sensitive as 
market measures of performance to the negative news in the media regarding the health 
of the bank. None of the stability measures are significantly different for troubled and 
healthy banks.   
Table XXV shows the troubled and healthy banks comparison before and during 
the crisis period. Both for the troubled and healthy banks, during the crisis period 
performance and stability have significantly decreased. Before the crisis, the only 
performance measure that was significantly different for troubled and healthy banks was 
risk-adjusted ROA. However, during the crisis, this difference disappears and the only 
performance measure which is significantly different for troubled banks and healthy 
banks is their ROE’s. During that period, ROE of healthy banks decreased from 14.58 % 
to 6.83 %; and the ROE of troubled banks decreased from 15.12 % to 0.25 %. Before the 
crisis, stock return of healthy banks was slightly higher than the stock return of troubled 
banks and the difference between them was not significant. However, during the crisis 
period, stock return of troubled banks decreased to -31.49 % while the stock return of 
healthy banks decreased to -6.52 %. This difference is statistically significant.  
Table XXV. Troubled and Healthy Banks T-Test Comparison Before and During Crisis 
This table shows the t-test comparisons between troubled and healthy banks’ performance and stability measures before and during the crisis period.  Panel A shows the 
significance tests for market measures and Panel B shows the significance tests for accounting measures. Time period is June 2001- December 2008. Crisis period is from January 
2007 to December 2008.  ***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 
Panel A. Market Measures 
 ALL BHCS TROUBLED HEALTHY 
 Full 
Before
Crisis 
During
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis Full 
Before
Crisis 
During 
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis Full 
Before
Crisis 
During
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis 
Average Beta 1.05 0.91 1.46 15.5*** 1.06 0.91 1.52 -13.16*** 1.02 0.90 1.37 -8.47*** 
Average Z 290.45 352.58 165.03 -8.45*** 301.86 375.01 153.25 7.68*** 273.93 319.96 181.89 3.99*** 
Average Stock Return 3.83 12.46 -21.22 -6.66*** 0.53 11.49 -31.49 6.55*** 8.61 13.87 -6.52 2.59* 
Average Stock Volatility 30.82 21.55 57.71 18.12*** 30.57 20.77 59.19 -14.78*** 31.18 22.68 55.60 -10.56***
 
 
 
 
TROUBLED BHCs 
Before  
Crisis 
HEALTHY BHCs 
Before  
Crisis 
t-test 
Troubled/ 
Healthy BHCs 
Before Crisis 
TROUBLED BHCs 
During  
Crisis 
HEALTHY BHCs 
During  
Crisis 
t-test 
Troubled/ 
Healthy BHCs 
During Crisis 
Average Beta 0.91 0.90 0.22 1.52 1.37 2.36†
Average Z 375.01 319.96 2.12 153.25 181.89 -0.77 
Average Stock Return 11.49 13.87 -0.45 -31.49 -6.52 -2.82** 
Average Stock Volatility 20.77 22.68 -0.92 59.19 55.60 1.02 
 
† significant at 10.87% 
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Panel B. Accounting Measures 
 ALL BHCS TROUBLED HEALTHY 
 Full 
Before 
Crisis 
During
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis Full 
Before
Crisis 
During 
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis Full 
Before
Crisis 
During
Crisis 
t-test 
Before/ 
During 
Crisis 
ROA(%) 1.04 1.29 0.32 0.33 1.03 1.34 0.14 8.53*** 1.06 1.23 0.59 3.80*** 
ROE(%) 11.84 14.90 2.96 1.03 11.32 15.12 0.25 8.74*** 12.58 14.58 6.83 3.80*** 
Risk-adjusted ROA 10.00 12.72 4.51 -2.04** 10.73 13.90 4.28 8.66*** 8.94 10.99 4.84 4.62*** 
Risk-adjusted ROE 9.97 12.47 4.91 -1.91* 10.73 13.47 5.17 6.518*** 8.86 11.03 4.54 4.24*** 
Sharpe ratio 0.18 0.51 -0.79 0.35 0.16 0.53 -0.91 8.72*** 0.20 0.48 -0.61 5.52*** 
 
 
 
 
TROUBLED  
BHCs  
Before  
Crisis 
HEALTHY 
BHCs  
Before  
Crisis 
t-test 
Troubled/ 
Healthy BHCs 
Before Crisis 
TROUBLED  
BHCs  
During  
Crisis 
HEALTHY 
BHCs  
During  
Crisis 
t-test 
Troubled/ 
Healthy BHCs 
During Crisis 
ROA(%) 1.34 1.23 0.96 0.14 0.59 -2.38‡
ROE(%) 15.12 14.58 0.39 0.25 6.83 -2.87** 
Risk-adjusted ROA 13.90 10.99 2.91** 4.28 4.84 -0.39 
Risk-adjusted ROE 13.47 11.03 2.13 5.17 4.54 0.38 
Sharpe ratio 0.53 0.48 0.33 -0.91 -0.61 -1.36 
 
‡ significant at 10.4% 
 
 
5.4.3.2. Logit Regressions 
To see if disclosure indices significantly impact a bank’s probability to become a 
troubled bank, logit regressions are run. Table XXVI shows the results of the logit 
models. More information disclosed on call reports increases the probability of becoming 
a troubled bank (the coefficient on SSBI is 0.318). Also, greater discussion of credit 
derivative activities on annual reports significantly increases the probability of a bank to 
be in trouble (the coefficient on DARI is 0.335).  
However, market welcomes more information about securitization activities on 
annual reports. Although the coefficient is lower (-0.016) on SARI than the coefficients 
on other disclosure indices, more disclosure about securitization in annual reports 
decreases a bank’s probability to become a troubled bank.  
Another interesting result of the logit regressions is the negative sign of the 
coefficient on TQI. This index is calculated as the total amount of securitization and 
credit derivative activities scaled by the bank size. The results show that higher TQI 
reduces a bank’s probability to be a troubled bank. This can be interpreted in conjunction 
with the previous results about the quantity of information and performance. Regressions 
on call report indices show that higher levels of disclosure/activity are associated with 
higher performance. As a bank gets more proficient on securitization and credit derivative 
activities, bank profitability increases. The same results are seen in logit regressions. As a 
bank engages more in securitization and credit derivative activities, its probability of 
being in trouble decreases.  
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Table XXVI. Logit Model Results 
This table shows the logit regression results.  SSBI is securitization subcategory binary index, DSBI is credit derivative 
activities subcategory binary index, TSBI is total activities subcategory binary index, TQI is total quantitative index, 
SARI is securitization annual report index and DARI is credit derivative activities annual report index. Risk based 
capital ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total capital ratio. Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it is shown in 
decimals. Time period: June 2001- December 2008. Crisis period is from January 2007 to December 2008.  ***, **, * 
indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Hypothesis variables             
SSBI 0.318***  0.286***  0.207***   
 (0.058)  (0.045)  (0.044)   
DSBI -0.067  0.343***   0.008 
 0.140  (0.124)   (0.122) 
TSBI   0.271***      
   (0.053)      
TQI -5.345*** -4.924*** -3.470***     
 (0.902) (1.059) (0.596)     
SARI -0.016* -0.009  0.011** -0.002   
 (0.009) (0.008)  (0.005) (0.006)   
DARI 0.335*** 0.274***  0.306***  0.338*** 
 (0.065) (0.057)  (0.057)  (0.060) 
Control variables         
Bank size (log assets) 3.749*** 3.371*** 3.262*** 3.211*** 3.191*** 3.126*** 
 (0.422) (0.365) (0.346) (0.313) (0.303) (0.321) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets 11.311*** 9.999*** 9.256*** 10.269*** 10.898*** 11.701*** 
 (3.110) (2.960) (2.624) (2.624) (2.549) (2.674) 
Risk based capital ratio -0.417*** -0.405*** -0.513*** -0.373*** -0.499*** -0.349*** 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.154) (0.145) (0.148) (0.145) 
Loan to deposit ratio -1.946 -1.510 -3.994** -2.417 -4.872** -1.932 
 (2.227) (2.181) (2.010) (1.859) (1.937) (1.820) 
Loan to asset ratio 5.269 4.982 1.938 5.816 1.149 6.267 
 (4.854) (4.62) (4.218) (4.164) (3.943) (4.127) 
Leverage ratio 0.467*** 0.404*** 0.323*** 0.244*** 0.186** 0.225** 
 (0.116) (0.109) (0.092) (0.092) (0.083) (0.093) 
Revenue composition -17.867*** -17.652*** -16.559*** -15.523*** -14.141*** -14.684*** 
 (2.926) (2.854) (2.691) (2.530) (2.364) (2.405) 
Efficiency ratio 0.333 1.495 2.241 2.877** 1.851 2.946** 
 (1.847) (1.747) (1.636) (1.441) (1.494) (1.452) 
Crisis Dummy -2.072*** -2.440*** -2.166*** -2.796*** -1.778*** -2.624*** 
 (0.489) (0.481) (0.418) (0.426) (0.397) (0.422) 
Number of observations 837 837 837 837 837 837 
Model χ2 859.55*** 853.16*** 825.274*** 805.059*** 795.569*** 801.102*** 
AIC 293.48 297.86 330.08 341.97 351.46 345.93 
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5.4.3.3. Regressions with Troubled Dummy 
Table XXVII shows the results of the regressions where “Troubled” dummy is 
used in all set of regressions. For each performance and stability measure, forty nine 
different regressions are run. In sum, a total of 441 regressions are run15.  
The “Troubled” dummy is insignificant for all the performance variables. In case 
of stability measures, only when beta and z-statistic are used as the dependent variable 
the “Troubled” dummy is significant. However, the results are very interesting. 
“Troubled” dummy takes a negative value for beta and positive for z-statistic, which 
means that the risk is reduced when the bank is in the troubled bank sample. These results 
confirm that the market was not very successful at understanding the risks of 
securitization and credit derivative activities.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 For the sake of brevity, only significant results are tabulated. The whole set of results are available upon 
request. 
Table XXVII. Troubled and Healthy Bank Comparison 
This table shows the regression results for the disclosure of information, bank health and stability.  SSBI is securitization subcategory binary index, DSBI is credit derivative 
activities subcategory binary index, TSBI is total activities subcategory binary index, TQI is total quantitative index, SARI is securitization annual report index and DARI is credit 
derivative activities annual report index. # of articles is the total number of articles appeared in news, TRNS is the total number of transparency related articles appeared in news, 
and QualIndex is the disclosure quality index. In Panel A beta; in Panel B z-statistic is used as the stability  measure. Risk based capital ratio is Tier 1+ Tier 2 to total capital ratio. 
Leverage ratio is total debt divided by total equity and it is shown in decimals. Time period: June 2001- December 2008. Crisis period is from January 2007 to December 2008.  
***, **, * indicates 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Beta 
  BETA 
 Exp.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Hypothesis variables            
SSBI - -0.0028         
  (0.0054)         
SSBI2  0.00009         
  (0.0001)         
DSBI -   -0.0010        
    (0.0198)        
DSBI2    0.0004        
    (0.0019)        
TQI -    -0.1449*       
     (0.0742)       
TQI2     0.0311**       
     (0.0156)       
SARI -     0.0005      
      (0.0009)      
SARI2      0.000003      
      (0.000004)      
DARI -      0.0046     
       (0.0039)     
DARI2       0.00001     
       (0.00005)     
# of articles +       0.0011 0.0012   
        (0.0010) (0.0010)   
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(Cont.) 
TRNS +        -0.0119   
         (0.0292)   
QualIndex -         -0.0008 
          (0.0020) 
Control variables            
Bank size (log assets)  0.0178 0.0217 0.038 -0.0066 -0.0093 0.0122 0.0116 0.0278 
  (0.0266) (0.0276) (0.0245) (0.0223) (0.0223) (0.027) (0.027) (0.0233) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  0.7313*** 0.7268*** 0.6532*** 0.7178*** 0.6738*** 0.7305*** 0.7305*** 0.7243*** 
  (0.2441) (0.2459) (0.2443) (0.2275) (0.2277) (0.2442) (0.2444) (0.2439) 
Risk based capital ratio  0.0073 0.007 -0.00001 -0.0037 -0.0064 0.0089 0.0087 0.0074 
  (0.0159) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0146) (0.0144) (0.0155) (0.0156) (0.0155) 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.6921*** 0.6861*** 0.7178*** 0.493*** 0.6001*** 0.6425*** 0.6401*** 0.678*** 
  (0.1836) (0.1801) (0.1781) (0.1743) (0.1649) (0.1812) (0.1814) (0.1788) 
Loan to asset ratio  -1.5926*** -1.6406*** -1.6443*** -1.3552*** -1.3166*** -1.467*** -1.4641*** -1.6364*** 
  (0.3851) (0.3709) (0.3675) (0.3553) (0.3587) (0.3982) (0.3985) (0.3692) 
Leverage ratio  -0.0252** -0.0259** -0.0227** -0.0123 -0.018* -0.0292*** -0.0295*** -0.0265** 
  (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0111) (0.0109) 
Revenue composition  -0.669*** -0.7082*** -0.7111*** -0.2297 -0.2132 -0.613*** -0.6072*** -0.7155*** 
  (0.1987) (0.1941) (0.1864) (0.1751) (0.176) (0.2058) (0.2064) (0.1876) 
Efficiency ratio  1.6684*** 1.6618*** 1.7109*** 0.6063*** 0.6069*** 1.6506*** 1.6525*** 1.6655*** 
  (0.1887) (0.185) (0.1858) (0.1774) (0.1768) (0.1848) (0.185) (0.1845) 
Trouble  -0.1028* -0.1132* -0.1258** -0.1052* -0.1101** -0.1101* -0.1088* -0.1185** 
  (0.0623) (0.06) (0.0597) (0.0566) (0.0561) (0.0602) (0.0603) (0.0597) 
Intercept  0.0648 0.06 -0.1373 0.8531* 0.9182* 0.122 0.1364 0.0408 
  (0.5533) (0.5836) (0.5507) (0.5158) (0.5152) (0.5633) (0.5648) (0.5761) 
AR(1)  -0.1836*** -0.1836*** -0.1782*** -0.2485*** -0.2447*** -0.1892*** -0.1894*** -0.1870*** 
  (0.0349) (0.0349) (0.0349) ( 0.0344) (0.0345) (0.0348) (0.0348) (0.0348) 
Crisis Dummy  0.4955*** 0.4880*** 0.4904*** 0.4146*** 0.4097*** 0.5033*** 0.5030*** 0.5007*** 
  (0.0438) (0.0444) (0.0433) (0.0409) (0.0409) (0.0418) (0.0418) (0.0416) 
R-squared  0.3610 0.3606 0.3634 0.3698 0.3715 0.3614 0.3615 0.3603 
Durbin-Watson statistic   2.0206 2.0241 2.0190 2.0377 2.0444 2.0210 2.0208 2.0244 
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Panel B. Z- Statistic 
  Z 
 Exp.  (1)    
Hypothesis variables       
SSBI + -10.7105**  -10.9281** 
  (4.7158)  (4.7409) 
SSBI2 - 0.2643***  0.2701*** 
  (0.0987)  (0.0995) 
DSBI +    -4.6828 
     (13.5677) 
DSBI2 -    0.6514 
     (1.2581) 
TSBI +   -10.7599**   
    (4.4508)   
TSBI2 -   0.2232***   
    (0.0785)   
Control variables       
Bank size (log assets)  -35.5884 -35.754 -37.2592 
  (30.0365) (31.3704) (32.3996) 
Risk weighted assets/total assets  -559.3041** -512.0795** -553.7453** 
  (254.9623) (254.6627) (259.8744) 
Risk based capital ratio  -0.4168 -0.5567 -0.5676 
  (9.2297) (9.2136) (9.2467) 
Loan to deposit ratio  -201.4223 -203.4774 -204.5177 
  (138.3627) (138.1593) (138.6279) 
Loan to asset ratio  908.4854*** 908.8594*** 921.7213*** 
  (341.5841) (342.6442) (344.2156) 
Leverage ratio  11.8675 11.8089 11.8406 
  (7.8441) (7.8201) (7.853) 
Revenue composition  93.7514 102.2997 98.8549 
  (100.3199) (100.5262) (100.8922) 
Efficiency ratio  -13.0069 -11.4741 -12.4386 
  (62.1373) (62.1091) (62.2626) 
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(Cont.) 
Trouble  134.5915* 140.7467* 138.097* 
  (80.4271) (80.5512) (80.694) 
Intercept  831.8603 804.8849 852.162 
  (636.1677) (650.6807) (671.6788) 
AR(1)  -0.8317*** -0.8316*** -0.8313*** 
  (0.0220) (0.0220) (0.0221) 
Crisis Dummy  -101.4092*** -100.6914*** -101.7984*** 
  (24.7673) (24.7226) (24.8352) 
R-squared  0.7817 0.782 0.7818 
Durbin-Watson statistic  1.8181 1.8132 1.8154 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 This study examined the relationship between information disclosure and banking 
performance and stability during the eight years leading to one of the worst financial 
crisis in the world history. Securitized assets and credit derivatives were mostly seen as 
the triggering securities of the subprime mortgage crisis. This research specifically 
concentrated on the disclosure regarding the securitization and credit derivatives. The 
study aimed to analyze the market discipline and the monitoring ability of the markets by 
evaluating the linkage between the information disclosure and bank performance and 
stability.  
 Several research questions were asked: Does the quantity and quality of 
information disclosure affect performance and stability? How does the market react to 
changes in disclosure levels? How does the disclosure related news affect the return and 
risk perception of the market? How do the least transparent and most transparent banks 
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differ in their performance and stability? How do troubled and healthy banks differ in 
their disclosure levels? Does the level of disclosure affect a bank to become a troubled 
bank? 
 The results show a significant relationship between the quality/quantity of 
disclosure and bank performance/stability. It is hypothesized that as the bank increases 
the quantity of information disclosed to the market, the performance and stability of a 
bank would increase as the market welcomes this information but after a certain point, 
extensive, inappropriate and improperly timed information disclosure would lower the 
bank performance and destabilize the bank. On the contrary to the expectations, the 
results of the study provide evidence of a U-shaped relationship between information 
disclosure and banking performance and stability. This shows that initially when banks 
disclose information about those activities, market reacts negatively but as banks engage 
more in securitization and credit derivative activities, they reach the economies of scale 
and after a certain point, providing more information to the market increases banking 
performance and stability.  
When changes in disclosure indices are analyzed, it is seen that the increases in 
disclosure/activity have more significant impact on performance and stability compared 
to decreases. Performance measures are more sensitive to changes in the 
disclosure/activity level than stability measures. Besides, quantitative measures of 
disclosure/activity are more influenced by the changes in the disclosure level than 
qualitative measures of disclosure/activity. There is a greater market reaction to 
disclosure/activity changes by money center banks, followed by regional banks.  
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 There have been two regulatory changes which required banks to disclose more 
details in their call reports in 2003 and in 2006. This increase in the disclosure level is 
very well welcomed by the market. Most of the significant effects of the increase in 
disclosure on performance and stability happened during those years. This means that 
even though the activity level might have remained the same, the market reacted to an 
increase in the level of disclosure.   
When changes in annual report indices are investigated, it is noticed that market 
perceives the securitization activities more profitable. Changes in the disclosure of 
securitization activities significantly and positively affect performance.  
 In general, an increase in disclosure/activity as reported in call reports and annual 
reports results in an increase in the performance. However, more discussion of credit 
derivative activities in annual reports leads to a decrease in the performance and almost 
all these negative impact of increased annual report disclosure happened in 2008. This 
can be explained by the market’s perception of the riskiness of the credit derivative 
activities. Before the crisis, people were not fully aware of the real risks of those 
securities. As the market learnt the real risks of credit derivatives, it started to react 
negatively to increased disclosure on those activities.     
Analysis of the effects of the quality of disclosure revealed that if the information 
disclosed is of lower quality, performance is decreased. But no significant effect on 
stability is found. Here it should be noted that there might be causality issue in this case. 
If the bank management knows that they are not doing well, they might be inclined to 
conceal some information or even disclose wrong information to the public. This would 
lower the quality of the information disclosure. Thus, it might be the case where the low 
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performance causes low quality, not vice versa. When there are more news about a bank 
in the papers, the bank performance is lowered. The market perceives no news as good 
news. 
 When the enhanced annual report disclosure is of high quality, stock price 
significantly increases and beta decreases. Although there are cases when lower quality 
of increased disclosure negatively affects performance and stability, the coefficients on 
those variables are very small.  
 The results of the analysis of the market’s reactions to transparency and quality 
related news show that those news were already anticipated by the market before they 
appeared on the Wall Street Journal. Neither in stock prices nor in CDS spreads, a 
significant reaction to those news is observed.   
When high and low disclosure banks are compared, the only significant difference 
is in their riskiness which is measured by their betas. Highly transparent banks are riskier 
than their less transparent peers. It should be noted that being risky does not necessarily 
mean that the bank is a low performer.  
The comparison between healthy and troubled banks shows that all disclosure 
indices are higher for troubled banks. The analysis also reveals that healthy banks have 
significantly higher stock returns than troubled banks. During the crisis period the 
difference between the stock returns of troubled and healthy banks more than doubles. 
Although all banks’ performance and stability measures decline during the crisis period, 
the results show that the difference is a lot higher for troubled banks. This means that 
troubled banks went into more trouble during that period and the difference between 
healthy and troubled banks became more distinct. In terms of the troubled bank logit 
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model, greater securitization and credit derivative   activities as reported in the bank’s 
regulatory reports increase the probability of being a troubled bank as does the more 
extensive coverage of credit derivatives in the bank’s annual report.  On the other hand, 
increased discussion of securitization in the annual report reduces the probability of being 
a troubled bank.      
 The biggest challenge of this study was the intertwined nature of activity and 
disclosure. A possible further study would be the one which can segregate the business 
and disclosure effects by using a small, homogenous sample of banks which match by 
their activity level. Also, another direction for future studies would be to use different 
measures of quantity and quality of information. In the future studies, it might be also 
wise to control for ownership structure to separate institutional owners and observe only 
the behaviors of individual investors.   
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APPENDIX A. DISCLOSURE DATA 
Sub-Category Activity Explanation 
PANEL A: 
Securitization 
1. Securitization activities Outstanding principal balance of 
assets sold and securitized with 
servicing retained or with recourse 
or other seller-provided credit 
enhancements. 
Categories:  
1) 1-4 family residential 
loans,  
2) home equity lines,  
3) credit card receivables,  
4) auto loans,  
5) other consumer loans, 
6) commercial and industrial 
loans,  
7) all other loans and all 
leases and all other assets 
 2. Credit enhancing interest-only 
strips 
 
Maximum amount of credit 
exposure arising from recourse or 
other seller provided credit 
enhancements provided to 
securitization activities in the form 
of credit enhancing interest-only 
strips 
Categories:  
1) 1-4 family residential 
loans,  
2) home equity lines,  
3) credit card receivables,  
4) auto loans,  
5) other consumer loans, 
6) commercial and industrial 
loans,  
7) all other loans and all 
leases and all other assets 
 3. Subordinated securities and 
other residual interests 
 
Maximum amount of credit 
exposure arising from recourse or 
other seller provided credit 
enhancements provided to 
securitization activities in the form 
of subordinated securities and 
other residual interests 
Categories:  
1) 1-4 family residential 
loans,  
2) home equity lines,  
3) credit card receivables,  
4) auto loans,  
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5) other consumer loans, 
6) commercial and industrial 
loans,  
7) all other loans and all 
leases and all other assets 
 4. Standby letters of credit and 
other enhancements 
 
Maximum amount of credit 
exposure arising from recourse or 
other seller provided credit 
enhancements provided to 
securitization activities in the form 
of standby letters of credit and 
other enhancements 
Categories:  
1) 1-4 family residential loans,  
2) home equity lines,  
3) credit card receivables,  
4) auto loans,  
5) other consumer loans, 
6) commercial and industrial 
loans,  
7) all other loans and all 
leases and all other assets 
 5. Unused liquidity 
commitments 
Dollar amount of unused 
commitments to provide liquidity 
to asset sold and securitized 
Categories:  
1) 1-4 family residential loans,  
2) home equity lines,  
3) credit card receivables,  
4) auto loans,  
5) other consumer loans, 
6) commercial and industrial 
loans,  
7) all other loans and all 
leases and all other assets 
 6. 30-89 days past due 
securitized  
assets 
Dollar amount of all securitized 
loans and leases 30 to 89 days past 
due  
Categories:  
1) 1-4 family residential loans,  
2) home equity lines,  
3) credit card receivables,  
4) auto loans,  
5) other consumer loans, 
6) commercial and industrial 
loans,  
7) all other loans and all 
leases and all other assets 
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 7. 90+ days past due securitized 
assets 
Dollar amount of all securitized 
loansand leases 90 plus days past 
due  
Categories:  
1) 1-4 family residential loans,  
2) home equity lines,  
3) credit card receivables,  
4) auto loans,  
5) other consumer loans, 
6) commercial and industrial 
loans,  
7) all other loans and all 
leases and all other assets 
 8. Charge-offs  Charge-offs on assets sold and 
securitized with servicing retained 
or with recourse or other seller-
provided credit enhancements 
Categories:  
1) 1-4 family residential loans,  
2) home equity lines,  
3) credit card receivables,  
4) auto loans,  
5) other consumer loans, 
6) commercial and industrial 
loans, 
7)  all other loans and all 
leases and all other assets 
 9. Recoveries Recoveries on assets sold and 
securitized with servicing retained 
or with recourse or other seller-
provided credit enhancements 
Categories:  
1) 1-4 family residential loans,  
2) home equity lines,  
3) credit card receivables,  
4) auto loans,  
5) other consumer loans, 
6) commercial and industrial 
loans, 
7)  all other loans and all 
leases and all other assets 
  
10. Sellers interest in securities  
Dollar amount of ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as 
securities  
Categories:  
1) home equity lines,  
2) credit card receivables,  
3) commercial and industrial 
loans 
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11. Sellers interest in loans 
Dollar amount of ownership (or 
sellers) interests carried as loans  
Categories:  
1) home equity lines,  
2) credit card receivables,  
3) commercial and industrial 
loans 
PANEL B:  
Credit derivatives 
1. Notional amounts 
   (guarantor) 
Notional amounts of credit 
derivatives when the bank is the 
guarantor. Categories: 
1) credit default swaps, 
2) total return swaps, 
3) credit options, 
4) other credit derivatives 
 2. Notional amounts 
   (beneficiary) 
Notional amounts of credit 
derivatives when the bank is the 
beneficiary. Categories: 
1) credit default swaps, 
2) total return swaps, 
3) credit options, 
      4)    other credit derivatives 
 3. Gross fair values 
    (guarantor) 
The amount at which an asset 
(liability) could be bought 
(incurred) or sold (settled) in a 
current transaction between willing 
parties, that is other than in a 
forced or liquidation sale when the 
bank is the guarantor. Categories:  
1) gross positive fair value,  
2) gross negative fair value  
 4. Gross fair values 
    (beneficiary) 
The amount at which an asset 
(liability) could be bought 
(incurred) or sold (settled) in a 
current transaction between willing 
parties, that is other than in a 
forced or liquidation sale when the 
bank is the beneficiary. Categories: 
1) gross positive fair value,  
2) gross negative fair value 
Source: FDIC Call Reports (FR-Y9C) 
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APPENDIX B. LIST OF BHCS IN THE SAMPLE 
NAME BHC ID PERMCO TICKER 
TOTAL 
ASSETS 
($)(1000) 
JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. 1039502 20436 JPM 2,175,052,000 
CITIGROUP INC. 1951350 20483 C 1,940,000,000 
BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION 1073757 3151 BAC 1,822,068,028 
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 1120754 21305 WFC 1,309,639,000 
WACHOVIA CORPORATION 1073551 1869 WB 760,558,000 
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC. 1069778 3685 PNC 291,092,876 
U.S. BANCORP 1119794 1645 USB 267,032,000 
SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. 1131787 21691 STI 189,000,000 
BB&T CORPORATION 1074156 4163 BBT 152,015,025 
REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION 3242838 1620 RF 146,253,935 
NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION 1069125 3157 NCC 143,695,954 
FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 1070345 1741 FITB 120,000,000 
KEYCORP 1068025 2535 KEY 105,231,004 
NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION 1199611 3275 NTRS 82,053,626 
COMERICA INCORPORATED 1199844 1261 CMA 67,912,580 
M&T BANK CORPORATION 1037003 1689 MTB 65,815,757 
ZIONS BANCORPORATION 1027004 5057 ZION  55,339,951 
HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INC. 1068191 2093 HBAN 54,355,998 
FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORPORATION 1094640 1856 FHN 31,022,768 
COLONIAL BANCGROUP, INC., THE 1080465 4128 CNB 25,816,306 
ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 1199563 362 ASBC 24,198,697 
FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES, INC. 1075612 8674 FCNCA 16,745,662 
SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES, INC. 1117156 7050 SUSQ 13,682,988 
SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP, THE 1141599 8711 TSFG 13,600,077 
INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORP. 1104231 31854 IBOC 12,439,341 
EAST WEST BANCORP, INC. 2734233 16402 EWBC 12,423,491 
FIRSTMERIT CORPORATION 1070804 5259 FMER 11,101,201 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C. CHANGES IN INDICES 
  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
3242838 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORPORATION SABI 31 5.2903 2.7832 0 7 
  DABI 31 1.4839 1.7102 0 4 
  TABI 31 6.7742 3.6761 0 11 
  SSBI 31 7.871 4.4252 0 11 
  DSBI 31 1.6452 1.8717 0 5 
  TSBI 31 9.5161 5.3033 0 16 
  TQI 31 0.015 0.0153 0 0.0463 
  SARI 31 28.3225 7.4224 14 38 
    DARI 31 1.67741 2.9027 0 7 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
2734233 EAST WEST BANCORP, INC. SABI 31 1.871 1.0565 0 4 
  DABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TABI 31 1.871 1.0565 0 4 
  SSBI 31 2.6452 2.0256 0 8 
  DSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TSBI 31 2.6452 2.0256 0 8 
  TQI 31 0.0309 0.0283 0 0.0832 
  SARI 31 47.8709 21.4534 20 82 
    DARI 31 0 0 0 0 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1951350 CITIGROUP INC. SABI 31 10.1613 0.6375 9 11 
  DABI 31 3.8065 0.6011 2 4 
  TABI 31 13.9677 0.9123 12 15 
  SSBI 31 39.129 2.8722 33 43 
  DSBI 31 7.1613 2.6089 2 11 
  TSBI 31 46.2903 3.0462 35 50 
  TQI 31 0.9347 0.7079 0.2267 2.2324 
  SARI 31 129.6129 44.6046 82 214 
    DARI 31 27.129 25.5678 3 81 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1199844 COMERICA INCORPORATED SABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  DABI 31 2.0645 1.7877 0 4 
  TABI 31 2.0645 1.7877 0 4 
  SSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  DSBI 31 2.6129 2.4314 0 6 
  TSBI 31 2.6129 2.4314 0 6 
  TQI 31 0.0003 0.0003 0 0.0014 
  SARI 31 1.2903 3.0352 0 9 
    DARI 31 0.3548 0.4863 0 1 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1199611 NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION SABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  DABI 31 1.9032 0.3005 1 2 
  TABI 31 1.9032 0.3005 1 2 
  SSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  DSBI 31 2.4516 0.6752 1 3 
  TSBI 31 2.4516 0.6752 1 3 
  TQI 31 0.0028 0.0011 0.0011 0.005 
  SARI 31 13.7096 9.9605 3 34 
    DARI 31 5.1612 3.1315 0 10 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1199563 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP SABI 31 0.9032 0.3005 0 1 
  DABI 31 0.5161 1.3631 0 4 
  TABI 31 1.4194 1.4323 0 5 
  SSBI 31 0.9032 0.3005 0 1 
  DSBI 31 0.5161 1.3631 0 4 
  TSBI 31 1.4194 1.4323 0 5 
  TQI 31 0.0007 0.0018 0 0.0058 
  SARI 31 5.5161 2.6567 1 8 
    DARI 31 0 0 0 0 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1141599 SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP, THE SABI 31 1.6774 1.4694 0 4 
  DABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TABI 31 1.6774 1.4694 0 4 
  SSBI 31 1.6774 1.4694 0 4 
  DSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TSBI 31 1.6774 1.4694 0 4 
  TQI 31 0.0059 0.012 0 0.0625 
  SARI 31 18.387 8.6242 11 34 
    DARI 31 0.258 0.6815 0 2 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1131787 SUNTRUST BANKS, INC. SABI 31 7.3548 0.9504 6 9 
  DABI 31 3.6129 0.9193 1 4 
  TABI 31 10.9677 1.4256 8 13 
  SSBI 31 13.3871 2.8009 9 18 
  DSBI 31 5.8065 2.1201 1 9 
  TSBI 31 19.1935 3.5723 15 25 
  TQI 31 0.462 0.143 0.2822 0.7722 
  SARI 31 46.032258 26.368522 23 99 
    DARI 31 6.5806452 4.5517337 0 17 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1120754 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY SABI 31 6.6452 1.4035 5 10 
  DABI 31 3.7742 0.7169 1 4 
  TABI 31 10.4194 1.5869 7 14 
  SSBI 31 16.2581 4.2815 11 34 
  DSBI 31 5.9355 1.672 1 10 
  TSBI 31 22.1935 4.8677 15 44 
  TQI 31 0.6402 0.3361 0.3815 1.3563 
  SARI 31 65.5806 23.3934 39 116 
    DARI 31 6.9677 12.2187 0 38 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1119794 U.S. BANCORP SABI 31 5.5161 3.2749 0 9 
  DABI 31 1.9677 1.4941 0 4 
  TABI 31 7.4839 2.3075 2 10 
  SSBI 31 6.7419 4.8509 0 15 
  DSBI 31 2.3226 1.956 0 6 
  TSBI 31 9.0645 3.346 2 15 
  TQI 31 0.0294 0.0349 0.0015 0.1413 
  SARI 31 45.4516 11.8006 31 66 
    DARI 31 1.0322 0.7063 0 2 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1117156 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES, INC. SABI 31 5.6129 1.6264 1 7 
  DABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TABI 31 5.6129 1.6264 1 7 
  SSBI 31 9.6452 6.4475 1 20 
  DSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TSBI 31 9.6452 6.4475 1 20 
  TQI 31 0.083 0.0385 0.0325 0.1619 
  SARI 31 101.0645 55.0138 19 171 
    DARI 31 1.8064 4.7708 0 14 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1104231 INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES CORPORATION SABI 31 1.5806 1.4089 0 4 
  DABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TABI 31 1.5806 1.4089 0 4 
  SSBI 31 2.1613 1.8457 0 5 
  DSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TSBI 31 2.1613 1.8457 0 5 
  TQI 31 0.0012 0.0011 0 0.0037 
  SARI 31 0.8064 1.2495 0 3 
    DARI 31 0 0 0 0 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1094640 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORPORATION SABI 31 6.1613 0.9344 4 7 
  DABI 31 0.4194 0.7648 0 2 
  TABI 31 6.5806 1.1482 4 8 
  SSBI 31 10.871 2.3344 5 13 
  DSBI 31 0.4194 0.7648 0 2 
  TSBI 31 11.2903 2.4792 5 13 
  TQI 31 1.1132 0.8588 0.2338 2.5575 
  SARI 31 48.1935 39.8073 2 121 
    DARI 31 0.387 1.0223 0 3 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1080465 COLONIAL BANCGROUP, INC., THE SABI 31 0.7097 0.9727 0 2 
  DABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TABI 31 0.7097 0.9727 0 2 
  SSBI 31 0.7097 0.9727 0 2 
  DSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TSBI 31 0.7097 0.9727 0 2 
  TQI 31 0.0042 0.0072 0 0.0257 
  SARI 31 31.2258 7.7662 18 42 
    DARI 31 1.8064 4.7708 0 14 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1075612 FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES, INC. SABI 31 1.871 2.0614 0 5 
  DABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TABI 31 1.871 2.0614 0 5 
  SSBI 31 1.871 2.0614 0 5 
  DSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TSBI 31 1.871 2.0614 0 5 
  TQI 31 0.0055 0.0064 0 0.0185 
  SARI 31 6.5806 7.0747 0 19 
    DARI 31 0 0 0 0 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1074156 BB&T CORPORATION SABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  DABI 31 1.0968 1.7001 0 4 
  TABI 31 1.0968 1.7001 0 4 
  SSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  DSBI 31 1.3226 2.1038 0 5 
  TSBI 31 1.3226 2.1038 0 5 
  TQI 31 0.0003 0.0006 0 0.0026 
  SARI 31 28.4193 9.6359 16 48 
    DARI 31 0.129 0.3407 0 1 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1073757 BANK OF AMERICA CORPORATION SABI 31 9.4194 0.5642 9 11 
  DABI 31 3.8065 0.6011 2 4 
  TABI 31 13.2258 0.9205 11 15 
  SSBI 31 42.0645 8.2176 28 52 
  DSBI 31 7.129 2.5396 2 10 
  TSBI 31 49.1935 9.7243 34 62 
  TQI 31 0.8379 0.6496 0.1719 2.0738 
  SARI 31 118.6774 68.5897 57 270 
    DARI 31 19.4193 15.3292 6 57 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1073551 WACHOVIA CORPORATION SABI 30 9.7 0.596 8 10 
  DABI 30 3.8 0.6103 2 4 
  TABI 30 13.5 1.0086 11 14 
  SSBI 30 39.8 2.7216 34 44 
  DSBI 30 6.5 1.9432 2 9 
  TSBI 30 46.3 3.706 37 50 
  TQI 30 0.4328 0.2164 0.1591 0.7903 
  SARI 27 107.7407 18.536 67 132 
    DARI 27 3.8148 1.5451 1 6 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1070804 FIRSTMERIT CORPORATION SABI 31 1.6129 2.376 0 5 
  DABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TABI 31 1.6129 2.376 0 5 
  SSBI 31 1.6129 2.376 0 5 
  DSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TSBI 31 1.6129 2.376 0 5 
  TQI 31 0.006 0.0089 0 0.0215 
  SARI 31 13.0967 1.3001 11 15 
    DARI 31 0 0 0 0 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1070345 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP SABI 31 6.0323 1.2512 4 7 
  DABI 31 1.7419 1.6323 0 4 
  TABI 31 7.7742 2.7774 4 11 
  SSBI 31 12.0323 5.7532 4 18 
  DSBI 31 1.7419 1.6323 0 4 
  TSBI 31 13.7742 7.1587 4 22 
  TQI 31 0.0186 0.0329 0.0057 0.1949 
  SARI 31 44.258 7.389 28 55 
    DARI 31 1.5161 1.7864 0 6 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1069778 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC., THE SABI 31 4.1935 0.9805 3 9 
  DABI 31 3.0645 1.1528 1 4 
  TABI 31 7.2581 1.6526 4 13 
  SSBI 31 7.7419 3.0764 3 22 
  DSBI 31 4.4516 1.8228 1 6 
  TSBI 31 12.1935 3.7365 4 28 
  TQI 31 0.05 0.0082 0.0268 0.0708 
  SARI 31 79 30.4674 57 155 
    DARI 31 18.3548 6.5906 9 30 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1069125 NATIONAL CITY CORPORATION SABI 30 7.7667 0.4302 7 8 
  DABI 30 2.8667 1.7167 0 4 
  TABI 30 10.6333 2.0254 7 12 
  SSBI 30 18 4.8352 11 33 
  DSBI 30 3.8667 2.5152 0 6 
  TSBI 30 21.8667 6.0271 13 37 
  TQI 30 0.0276 0.0077 0.0125 0.0423 
  SARI 27 130 15.6941 94 146 
    DARI 27 0 0 0 0 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1068191 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES INCORPORATED SABI 31 2.6774 2.9027 0 6 
  DABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TABI 31 2.6774 2.9027 0 6 
  SSBI 31 2.8065 3.0705 0 7 
  DSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TSBI 31 2.8065 3.0705 0 7 
  TQI 31 0.0227 0.0287 0 0.0849 
  SARI 31 48.5806 8.8723 38 64 
    DARI 31 0 0 0 0 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1068025 KEYCORP SABI 31 6 0 6 6 
  DABI 31 2.8065 1.778 0 4 
  TABI 31 8.8065 1.778 6 10 
  SSBI 31 11.5484 4.0236 6 17 
  DSBI 31 4.4516 2.9871 0 7 
  TSBI 31 16 2.582 12 22 
  TQI 31 0.1068 0.0345 0.0594 0.1522 
  SARI 31 89.258 15.3122 53 105 
    DARI 31 11.0967 17.6169 0 52 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1039502 J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. SABI 31 9.5806 0.9924 8 11 
  DABI 31 3.8065 0.6011 2 4 
  TABI 31 13.3871 1.3584 10 15 
  SSBI 31 37.1935 2.7254 32 43 
  DSBI 31 7.9355 3.4827 2 12 
  TSBI 31 45.129 4.4252 36 55 
  TQI 31 2.2629 1.9275 0.3679 6.3123 
  SARI 31 149.2903 61.582 84 286 
    DARI 31 46.8064 19.7339 13 90 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1037003 M&T BANK CORPORATION SABI 31 5.0645 0.5122 4 6 
  DABI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TABI 31 5.0645 0.5122 4 6 
  SSBI 31 6.3226 1.3263 4 9 
  DSBI 31 0 0 0 0 
  TSBI 31 6.3226 1.3263 4 9 
  TQI 31 0.1594 0.0175 0.1269 0.1941 
  SARI 31 51.5483 23.5977 22 101 
    DARI 31 0 0 0 0 
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  Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
1027004 ZIONS BANCORPORATION SABI 31 8.0323 2.008 0 9 
  DABI 31 0.6452 0.9504 0 2 
  TABI 31 8.6774 1.8145 2 11 
  SSBI 31 15.0323 10.1176 0 35 
  DSBI 31 0.9032 1.3504 0 3 
  TSBI 31 15.9355 9.4549 3 35 
  TQI 31 0.0381 0.0385 0 0.1048 
  SARI 31 78.129 31.1252 42 129 
    DARI 31 0.9032 2.0224 0 6 
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APPENDIX D. MAJOR CHANGES  
This appendix shows the major changes in disclosure indices. The direction of the change is denoted by an upside or 
downside arrow, while the magnitude of the change is shown by L (large) or S (small). SSBI is the securitization 
subcategory index, DSBI is the credit derivatives subcategory index, TSQI is the total securitization quantitative index, 
TDQI is the total credit derivatives quantitative index, SARI is the securitization annual report index and DARI is the 
credit derivatives annual report index.  
  SSBI DSBI 
BANK ID BANK NAME 
Year  
(Quarter) ∆ Quant. 
Year  
(Quarter) ∆ Quant. 
1027004 ZIONS BANCORP. 2002(04) ↓ L (33 to 19) 2006(03) ↑ S (0 to 2) 
  2003(04) ↓ S (23 to 18)      
  2004(02) ↓ S (16 to 9)      
    2008(03) ↓ L (7 to 2)       
1037003 M&T BANK CORP. 2002(02) ↓ S (9 to 5)      
    2008(03) ↓ S (7 to 4)       
1039502 J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. 2006(01) ↓ L (41 to 34) 2002(01) ↑ L (2 to 6) 
    2008(02) ↑ S (36 to 43) 2006(01) ↑ L (6 to 12) 
1068025 KEYCORP 2004(04) ↑ S (11 to 16) 2003(04) ↑ L (0 to 4) 
1068191 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES  2004(02) ↓ S (7 to 5)      
  2004(03) ↓ S (5 to 3)      
    2005(01) ↓ S (3 to 0)       
1069125 NATIONAL CITY CORP. 2002(01) ↑ S (11 to 15) 2003(04) ↑ L (0 to 4) 
  2004(03) ↑ L (18 to 33) 2005(01) ↑ S (4 to 6) 
  2004(04) ↓ L (33 to 24)      
    2006(02) ↓ S (24 to 19)       
1069778 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES  2001(03) ↑ S (3 to 7) 2005(01) ↑ S (3 to 6) 
  2007(01) ↑ S (7 to 11)      
  2007(03) ↓ L (11 to 4)      
    2008(04) ↑ L (6 to 22)       
1070345 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 2007(03) ↓ L (17 to 10) 2004(04) ↑ L (0 to 4) 
1070804 FIRSTMERIT CORP. 2003(04) ↓ L (5 to 0)       
1073551 WACHOVIA CORP. 2008(01) ↓ S (42 to 38) 2002(01) ↑ L (2 to 6) 
          2006(01) ↑ S (6 to 9) 
1073757 BANK OF AMERICA CORP. 2002(02) ↓ L (35 to 28) 2002(01) ↑ L (2 to 6) 
  2004(02) ↑ L (32 to 45) 2006(01) ↑ L (6 to 10) 
    2004(03) ↑ L (45 to 52)       
1074156 BB&T CORP.      2006(03) ↑ L (0 to 5) 
          2008(02) ↓ S (5 to 2) 
1075612 FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES 2005(02) ↑ S (0 to 2)      
  2005(03) ↑ S (2 to 4)      
  2008(01) ↓ S (4 to 2)      
    2008(02) ↑ S (2 to 5)       
1080465 COLONIAL BANCGROUP 2004(01) ↓ S (2 to 0)       
1094640 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL  2003(02) ↓ S (11 to 7) 2003(02) ↓ S (2 to 0) 
1104231 INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES  2004(02) ↑ S (0 to 3)      
    2007(03) ↓ S (5 to 3)       
1117156 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES 2002(01) ↑ S (0 to 2)      
  2006(01) ↑ S (9 to 11)      
    2006(03) ↑ S (13 to 17)       
1119794 U.S. BANCORP 2003(01) ↓ L (14 to 8)      
  2005(04) ↓ L (8 to 0)      
    2006(01) ↑ S (0 to 2)       
1120754 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 2001(04) ↑ S (16 to 20) 2002(01) ↑ S (2 to 5) 
    2008(04) ↑ L (11 to 34) 2008(04) ↑ S (7 to 10) 
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  SSBI DSBI 
BANK ID BANK NAME 
Year  
(Quarter) ∆ Quant. 
Year  
(Quarter) ∆ Quant. 
1131787 SUNTRUST BANKS 2001(04) ↑ S (14 to 17) 2002(01) ↑ S (2 to 5) 
  2003(02) ↓ S (14 to 10) 2003(01) ↑ S (3 to 6) 
    2006(01) ↑ S (11 to 14)       
1141599 SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP 2001(03) ↑ S (2 to 4)      
  2003(01) ↓ S (4 to 2)      
    2006(02) ↓ S (2 to 0)       
        
1199563 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 2002(01) ↑ S (0 to 1) 2008(01) ↑ L (0 to 4) 
1199844 COMERICA INCORPORATED      2003(02) ↓ S (2 to 0) 
          2005(04) ↑ L (0 to 5) 
1951350 CITIGROUP INC. 2001(03) ↑ L (33 to 39) 2002(01) ↑ L (2 to 6) 
    2007(01) ↓ S (39 to 35) 2006(01) ↑ L (6 to 11) 
2734233 EAST WEST BANCORP 2002(03) ↑ S (0 to 1)      
  2005(01) ↓ S (4 to 2)      
  2006(04) ↑ S (2 to 4)      
    2008(02) ↑ S (4 to 7)       
3242838 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. 2002(04) ↑ L (0 to 8) 2005(02) ↑ S (0 to 3) 
    2008(02) ↓ L (11 to 4) 2007(01) ↑ S (3 to 5) 
 
  TSQI TDQI 
BANK ID BANK NAME 
Year  
(Quarter
) ∆ Quant. 
Year  
(Quarter) ∆ Quant. 
1027004 ZIONS BANCORP. 2001(04) ↑ L (0.07 to 0.10) 2006(03) ↑ S (0 to 0.000003) 
  2003(03) ↑ L (0.07 to 0.09) 2007(01) ↑ S (0.000003 to 0.00007) 
  2004(02) ↓ L (0.07 to 0.015)     
    2008(03) ↓ L (0.003 to 0.000005)       
1037003 M&T BANK CORP. 2003(02) ↓ L (0.19 to 0.13)     
    2008(03) ↓ L (0.18 to 0.13)       
1039502 J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. 2004(03) ↑ L (0.09 to 0.12) 2001(04) ↑ L (0.30 to 0.39) 
    2008(02) ↑ L (0.14 to 0.22) 2008(03) ↓ L (6.08 to 4.41) 
1068025 KEYCORP      2002(01) ↓ L (0.0008 to 0) 
      2003(04) ↑ L (0 to 0.0007) 
       2004(01) ↑ L (0.0007 to 0.005) 
       2004(02) ↑ L (0.005 to 0.02) 
          2004(03) ↑ L (0.02 to 0.05) 
1068191 
HUNTINGTON 
BANCSHARES  2003(01) ↑ L (0.049 to 0.063)     
  2003(04) ↑ L (0.041 to 0.075)     
  2004(02) ↓ L (0.08 to 0.006)     
    2005(01) ↓ L (0.006 to 0)       
1069125 NATIONAL CITY CORP. 2002(01) ↑ L (0.010 to 0.027) 2001(04) ↓ L (0.0015 to 0) 
  2004(01) ↑ S (0.020 to 0.026) 2003(04) ↑ L (0 to 0.0013) 
  2004(04) ↓ L (0.03 to 0.02) 2004(03) ↑ L (0.002 to 0.007) 
    2005(04) ↑ L (0.016 to 0.028)       
1069778 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES  2001(03) ↑ L (0.008 to 0.051) 2001(03) ↓ L (0.06 to 0.001) 
       2002(03) ↑ L (0.002 to 0.004) 
       2004(02) ↑ L (0.002 to 0.004) 
          2005(02) ↑ L (0.006 to 0.015) 
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  TSQI TDQI 
BANK ID BANK NAME 
Year  
(Quarter) ∆ Quant. 
Year  
(Quarter) ∆ Quant. 
1070345 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 2001(03) ↓ L (0.19 to 0.014) 2004(04) ↑ L (0 to 0.0013) 
  2002(02) ↑ L (0.010 to 0.016) 2008(01) ↑ L (0.0043 to 0.0069) 
  2003(03) ↑ L (0.005 to 0.014) 2008(02) ↑ L (0.0069 to 0.010) 
  2004(02) ↑ L (0.012 to 0.019)      
    2008(01) ↑ L (0.002 to 0.01)       
1070804 FIRSTMERIT CORP. 2003(04) ↓ L (0.015 to 0)       
1073551 WACHOVIA CORP. 2005(04) ↑ L (0.14 to 0.19) 2001(03) ↑ L (0.006 to 0.011) 
       2002(02) ↑ L (0.013 to 0.030) 
      2003(03) ↑ L (0.05 to 0.07) 
          2006(03)  ↑ L (0.38 to 0.51) 
1075612 
FIRST CITIZENS 
BANCSHARES 2005(02) ↑ S (0 to 0.018)       
1080465 COLONIAL BANCGROUP 2001(04) ↓ L (0.023 to 0.003)     
  2002(01) ↑ L (0.003 to 0.016)     
    2004(01) ↓ L (0.0045 to 0)       
1094640 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL  2003(04) ↓ L (2.55 to 0.255) 2003(01) ↓ L (0.009 to 0.003) 
          2003(02) ↓ L (0.003 to 0) 
1104231 
INTERNATIONAL 
BANCSHARES  2004(02) ↑ S (0 to 0.0036)       
1117156 
SUSQUEHANNA 
BANCSHARES 2002(03) ↑ L (0.042 to 0.068)     
  2003(01) ↑ L (0.052 to 0.084)     
  2005(01) ↑ L (0.073 to 0.10)     
  2006(01) ↑ L (0.10 to 0.15)     
    2007(04) ↓ L (0.11 to 0.06)       
1119794 U.S. BANCORP 2001(03) ↑ L (0.08 to 0.14) 2003(03) ↑ L (0 to 0.0007) 
  2002(01) ↓ L (0.12 to 0.066) 2003(04) ↑ L (0.0007 to 0.001) 
  2003(02) ↓ L (0.035 to 0.021) 2006(03) ↑ L (0.001 to 0.002) 
  2003(03) ↓ L (0.021 to 0.0039) 2008(01) ↑ L (0.004 to 0.006) 
  2005(04) ↓ L (0.0019 to 0)     
  2006(01) ↑ L (0 to 0.033)     
  2008(01) ↓ L (0.01 to 0.007)     
    2008(02) ↓ L (0.007 to 0.003)       
1120754 
WELLS FARGO & 
COMPANY 2003(01) ↓ L (1.29 to 0.41) 2001(03) ↑ L (0.0005 to 0.005) 
  2005(02) ↓ L (0.55 to 0.37) 2002(04) ↑ L (0.007 to 0.014) 
  2008(04) ↓ S (0.47 to 0.33) 2006(04) ↓ L (0.012 to 0.003) 
          2008(04) ↑ L (0.004 to 0.25) 
1131787 SUNTRUST BANKS 2004(04) ↓ S (0.461 to 0.343) 2001(04) ↑ L (0.00019 to 0.0016) 
          2008(01) ↑ L (0.006 to 0.012) 
1141599 SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP 2002(04) ↑ L (0.01 to 0.0625)     
  2003(01) ↓ L (0.0625 to 0.0055)     
    2006(02) ↓ S (0.0008 to 0)       
1199563 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 2002(01) ↑ S (0 to 0.00011) 2008(01)  (0 to 0.004) 
    2007(02) ↓ S 
(0.00001 to 
0.00006)       
1199844 
COMERICA 
INCORPORATED     2001(03) ↓ S (0.0004 to 0.0001) 
      2002(01) ↑ S (0.0001 to 0.0002) 
      2003(02) ↓ L (0.0001 to 0) 
      2005(04) ↑ S (0 to 0.0003) 
      2007(04) ↑ S (0.0002 to 0.0004) 
          2008(01) ↑ S (0.0004 to 0.0008) 
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  TSQI TDQI 
BANK ID BANK NAME 
Year  
(Quarter) ∆ Quant. 
Year  
(Quarter) ∆ Quant. 
1951350 CITIGROUP INC. 2002(04) ↑ L (0.17 to 0.24) 2004(01) ↑ L (0.15 to 0.20) 
  2004(03) ↑ L (0.16 to 0.25) 2004(03) ↑ L (0.24 to 0.31) 
    2007(01) ↑ L (0.22 to 0.36) 2005(03) ↑ L (0.53 to 0.67) 
2734233 EAST WEST BANCORP 2002(03) ↑ L (0 to 0.049)     
  2004(01) ↓ L (0.026 to 0.012)     
  2005(01) ↓ L (0.009 to 0.004)     
  2006(02) ↑ L (0.001 to 0.021)     
  2006(04) ↑ L (0.019 to 0.047)     
    2007(01) ↑ L (0.047 to 0.083)       
3242838 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. 2002(04) ↑ S (0 to 0.038) 2005(02) ↑ S (0 to 0.0015) 
  2003(04) ↑ S (0.034 to 0.043) 2006(03) ↓ S (0.0016 to 0.0009) 
  2004(03) ↓ S (0.033 to 0.025) 2007(01) ↑ S (0.0005 to 0.002) 
  2006(01) ↓ L (0.014 to 0.09) 2008(03) ↑ S (0.0019 to 0.0031) 
    2006(04) ↓ S (0.007 to 0.003)       
 
 
   SARI DARI 
BANK ID BANK NAME Year  ∆ Quant. Year  ∆ Quant. 
1027004 ZIONS BANCORP. 2003 ↑ S (42 to 58) 2007 ↑ S (0 to 1) 
   2004 ↑ S (58 to 73) 2008 ↑ L (1 to 6) 
    2007 ↑ L (78 to 129)       
1037003 M&T BANK CORP. 2002 ↑ L (22 to 33)     
   2003 ↑ L (33 to 56)     
   2006 ↓ L (54 to 26)     
   2007 ↑ L (26 to 58)     
    2008 ↑ L (58 to 101)       
1039502 J.P. MORGAN CHASE & CO. 2003 ↑ S (87 to 112) 2002 ↑ L (13 to 40) 
   2008 ↑ L (180 to 286) 2007 ↑ S (39 to 50) 
          2008 ↑ L (50 to 90) 
1068025 KEYCORP 2002 ↑ L (53 to 73) 2006 ↑ L (0 to 17) 
    2003 ↑ L (73 to 99) 2008 ↑ L (17 to 52) 
1068191 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES  2004 ↓ S (58 to 43)     
    2008 ↑ L (40 to 64)       
1069125 NATIONAL CITY CORP. 2002 ↑ L (94 to 131)       
1069778 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES  2006 ↑ S (61 to 78) 2003 ↑ L (9 to 14) 
   2008 ↑ L (75 to 155) 2004 ↑ L (14 to 22) 
       2006 ↓ S (23 to 16) 
          2008 ↑ L (20 to 30) 
1070345 FIFTH THIRD BANCORP 2002 ↑ L (28 to 45) 2004 ↓ S (1 to 0) 
   2008 ↑ L (37 to 55) 2005 ↑ S (0 to 1) 
          2008 ↑ L (1 to 6) 
1073551 WACHOVIA CORP. 2002 ↑ L (67 to 111) 2002 ↑ L (1 to 3) 
       2004 ↑ S (3 to 5) 
          2007 ↓ L (6 to 3) 
 
 
 
 
 179
   SARI DARI 
BANK ID BANK NAME Year  ∆ Quant. Year  ∆ Quant. 
1073757 BANK OF AMERICA CORP. 2003 ↑ S (60 to 76) 2002 ↑ L (6 to 13) 
   2005 ↑ S (77 to 100) 2004 ↑ S (12 to 16) 
   2006 ↑ S (100 to 130) 2005 ↓ S (16 to 10) 
   2007 ↑ S (130 to 164) 2006 ↑ L (10 to 22) 
   2008 ↑ L (164 to 270) 2007 ↓ S (22 to 16) 
          2008 ↑ L (16 to 57) 
1074156 BB&T CORP. 2004 ↑ L (16 to 25) 2008 ↑ S (0 to 1) 
   2005 ↑ S (25 to 34)     
    2008 ↑ L (27 to 48)       
1075612 FIRST CITIZENS BANCSHARES 2005 ↑ L (1 to 13)     
   2007 ↓ L (12 to 6)     
    2008 ↑ L (6 to 19)       
1080465 COLONIAL BANCGROUP 2003 ↑ L (18 to 30) 2008 ↑ L (0 to 14) 
1094640 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL  2002 ↑ S (2 to 3) 2008 ↑ S (0 to 3) 
   2003 ↓ S (3 to 2)     
   2004 ↑ L (2 to 53)     
    2008 ↑ L (63 to 121)       
1104231 INTERNATIONAL BANCSHARES  2003 ↓ L (3 to 0)     
    2008 ↑ S (0 to 1)       
1117156 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES 2002 ↑ L (19 to 36) 2008 ↑ L (0 to 14) 
   2003 ↑ L (36 to 66)     
   2005 ↑ L (75 to 108)     
    2006 ↑ L (108 to 171)       
1119794 U.S. BANCORP 2002 ↑ L (35 to 66) 2003 ↑ S (0 to 1) 
   2005 ↓ S (51 to 31) 2006 ↑ S (1 to 2) 
    2007 ↑ L (32 to 47) 2008 ↓ S (2 to 1) 
1120754 WELLS FARGO & COMPANY 2002 ↑ S (39 to 52) 2002 ↑ S (0 to 1) 
   2007 ↑ L (57 to 87) 2004 ↑ L (1 to 4) 
    2008 ↑ S (87 to 116) 2008 ↑ L (3 to 38) 
1131787 SUNTRUST BANKS 2003 ↓ S (31 to 23) 2002 ↑ L (0 to 4) 
   2006 ↑ L (32 to 56) 2004 ↑ L (4 to 7) 
   2007 ↑ L (56 to 99) 2008 ↑ L (7 to 17) 
    2008 ↓ S (99 to 71)       
1141599 SOUTH FINANCIAL GROUP 2002 ↓ S (34 to 22) 2008 ↑ S (0 to 2) 
   2003 ↓ S (22 to 14)     
   2007 ↑ S (11 to 14)     
    2008 ↑ L (14 to 32)       
1199563 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 2002 ↑ L (1 to 3)     
   2003 ↓ S (3 to 2)     
    2004 ↑ L (2 to 8)       
1199611 NORTHERN TRUST CORPORATION 2002 ↑ S (3 to 4) 2003 ↑ L (0 to 6) 
   2004 ↑ L (5 to 14) 2008 ↑ L (6 to 10) 
   2007 ↑ L (11 to 22)     
    2008 ↑ L (22 to 34)       
1199844 COMERICA INCORPORATED 2008 ↑ L (1 to 9) 2002 ↓ S (1 to 0) 
       2007 ↑ S (0 to 1) 
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   SARI DARI 
BANK ID BANK NAME Year  ∆ Quant. Year  ∆ Quant. 
1951350 CITIGROUP INC. 2002 ↑ S (82 to 108) 2002 ↑ L (3 to 13) 
   2007 ↑ L (111 to 190) 2003 ↑ L (13 to 23) 
       2004 ↓ L (23 to 8) 
       2005 ↑ S (8 to 12) 
       2006 ↑ S (12 to 18) 
       2007 ↑ L (18 to 53) 
          2008 ↑ L (53 to 81) 
2734233 EAST WEST BANCORP 2002 ↑ L (20 to 42)     
   2003 ↓ S (42 to 30)     
    2007 ↑ L (50 to 82)       
3242838 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP. 2002 ↑ L (14 to 30) 2005 ↑ L (0 to 7) 
   2003 ↑ S (30 to 38) 2006 ↓ L (7 to 0) 
   2004 ↓ S (38 to 26) 2008 ↑ L (0 to 6) 
    2007 ↑ S (23 to 31)       
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APPENDIX E. SUMMARY TABLE FOR THE INTERACTION TERM 
 
 
 
# of 
art.*SSBI 
# of 
art.*TSBI 
# of 
art.*TQI 
# of 
art.*SARI 
# of 
art.*DARI 
QUANTITY high high high high high 
QUALITY low low low low low 
Effect on Performance           
ROA  + + + + 
ROE  +  + + 
RAR(ROA) + +  +  
RAR(ROE) + +    
STOCK RETURN      
SHARPE      
Effect on Stability           
VOLATILITY   -  - 
BETA  -    
Z    +  
 
 QualIndex*SSBI QualIndex*TSBI QualIndex*SARI QualIndex*DARI
QUANTITY high high high high 
QUALITY high high high high 
Effect on Performance         
ROA   + - 
ROE   + - 
RAR(ROA)     
RAR(ROE) - -   
STOCK RETURN   + + 
SHARPE    + 
Effect on Stability         
VOLATILITY    + 
BETA   - + 
Z     
 
 TRNS*SARI TRNS*DARI 
QUANTITY high high 
QUALITY low low 
Effect on Performance     
ROA   
ROE   
RAR(ROA)   
RAR(ROE) + + 
STOCK RETURN   
SHARPE - - 
Effect on Stability     
VOLATILITY + + 
BETA   
Z   
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APPENDIX F. CDS SPREADS AROUND THE EVENT DAYS 
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Bank of America (trouble)-06/19/2008
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Wachovia (transparency) -11/05/2004
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